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11 August 1983

NEAR EAST/SOUTH ASIA REPORT

No. 2800

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GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL RELATIONS WITH YAR DISCUSSED

San'a' AL-THAWRAH in Arabic 30 May 83 p 3

/Interview With Ibrahim Subhi, Gulf Cooperation Council assistant secretary general for political affairs, by Yahya al-'Arrasi and Qasim 'Abd-al-Rabb: "Yemen's Relations With Gulf Cooperation Council Member States Are Deep-Rooted Historical Relations; New Phase in Yemen Provides Indication of Leadership's Cohesion With People, and This Is One Form of Democracy"/

/Text/ Ibrahim Subhi, the Gulf Cooperation Council assistant secretary general for political affairs, has lauded the fraternal relations existing between the YAR and the Council member states. In an interview with SABA' NEWS AGENCY and AL-THAWRAH newspaper, Subhi has asserted that these are deep-rooted historical relations that are developing with the hopes and aspirations of the Yemeni people and of the citizens of the Council member states and that keep pace with the inclinations of the YAR leadership and of the leaders of the Council member states to entrench cooperation in all spheres.

Ibrahim Subhi touched on the reelection of Col 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih, the president and secretary general, to another presidential term, describing it as a historical turning point in the YAR which indicates the leadership's cohesion with the people and the people's trust in their leadership.

Subhi also said that the constitutional measures under which the elections were held represent a form of democracy, of freedom of expression and of the people's selection of their leadership, which works to achieve their hopes and aspirations.

He also asserted that our country has witnessed a new phase under the presidency of brother Col 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih, the president of the republic, the armed forces general commander and the secretary general of the People's Congress.

He said: We have felt during our visit the results of this phase, reflected in strengthened security and stability and in the accomplishment of numerous ambitious projects.

He added: We in the Gulf Cooperation Council congratulate the Yemeni people on their wise leadership and congratulate this leadership on the people's trust which it has and wish the Yemeni people further progress and development under the canopy of their wise leadership.

Regarding the Iraq-Iran war and the Gulf Cooperation Council's efforts to end this war, Ibrahim Subhi said that the Council is exerting ceaseless efforts to end the fighting between the two countries and that there are encouraging results.

He expressed the hope that the two sides will reach a result to end this destructive war through dialogue and contracts.

Following is the text of the interview:

/Yahya al-'Arrasi] To start with, we want to know your evaluation of Yemeni-Arab relations and, consequently, of the relations binding the YAR to the Gulf Cooperation Council member states.

/Answer/ Thank you very much. I wish to discuss the second part of the question, namely my evaluation of the relations between the YAR and the Cooperation Council member states. In fact, they are deep-rooted historical relations. They are strong, sedate and advanced and still developing with the ambitions and hopes of the Yemeni people and of the citizens of the Cooperation Council member states. These relations are also keeping pace with all that is planned by their majesties, highnesses and excellencies, the leaders of the Cooperation Council member states and of the YAR.

/Yahya al-'Arrasi/ What about the first part, especially since we are in the phase following the election of brother President Col 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih for the coming presidential term.

/Answer/ There is no doubt that the new phase begun by the YAR with the reelection of His Excellency President 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih represents, to my mind, a historic turning point in the YAR's history and an indication of the leadership's cohesion with the people and of the people's trust in their leadership. This is a form of democracy, of the freedom of expression and of the people's free selection of their leadership which achieves their aspirations and ambitions. There is no doubt that the preceding period in which his excellency the president held the keys of government in the YAR was also a new phase. During our visit, we have felt the results of this period, reflected in strengthened security and stability in the YAR and in the accomplishment of numerous ambitious projects. We in the Cooperation Council congratulate, in our terms, the Yemeni people for their wise leadership and congratulate this leadership for the people's trust in it and wish the leadership and the people continued progress.

/Qasim 'Abd-al-Rabb/ Let us move to the broader Arab sphere. A lot of comments are being currently made on the Lebanese-Israeli agreement. It

is well known that some of the Gulf Cooperation Council member states have defined their position toward the agreement while others have not done so yet. We want to ask: What is the position of the Cooperation Council member states generally, embodied in the Council?

/Answer/ Naturally, the position of the Cooperation Council member states is that Lebanon should enjoy security and stability, that is, if this security and stability do not affect the security and stability of the neighboring countries.

/Yahya al-'Arrasi/ The Iraq-Iran war is still going on for the third year. We want to know the efforts which have been exerted by the Gulf Cooperation Council to put an end to this war.

/Answer/ Since the war started, the Cooperation Council, from the time of its foundation on 25 May 1981, i.e., shortly after the outbreak of the war, has devoted the larger part of the discussions in all the meetings it has held, whether at the level of the leadership or the level of the ministers, to the Iraq-Iran war. Ceaseless efforts have been exerted, either directly through contacts or /indirectly/ through encouraging the efforts exerted by the Islamic Conference, the nonaligned countries or the United Nations. These efforts or initiatives have also assumed other forms of communication, especially since the war has begun to have serious ramifications for the area in its entirety, as in the case of the crude oil spill which is posing a threat to the marine environment in particular. We can say that most of the countries located on the Arab Gulf shoreline are affected "thermometrically" by this spill. This is why a tendency has developed to contact the sides concerned with this war directly whereas such contacts had been conducted directly with the brothers in the Republic of Iraq and indirectly with Iran.

But this time, there were signs that the contacts would take place directly. Thus came about the visit /to Tehran/ of Shaykh Sabah al-Ahmad al-Jabir, the Kuwaiti deputy prime minister and minister of foreign affairs and of information, and of Rashid ibn 'Abdallah al-Nu'aymi, the UAE minister of state for foreign affairs. The outcome of this visit was discussed in the latest session which was held at the General Secretariat headquarters a week ago. The results have been very encouraging for the continuation of these contacts. This is why this committee will contact Tehran and Baghdad again to bring the viewpoints closer to each other and to reach a solution that will stop the oil spill in the Gulf area. At the same time, this oil spill incident may be a window through which the Cooperation Council member states can, by way of dialogue and contact with both sides, reach a result to put an end to this devastating war which has destroyed the economies of both countries, as well as the human and material aspects, not to mention its social impact. Both sides are aware of this.

/Qasim 'Abd-al-Rabb/ There is an urgent question concerning the future, namely: Will the cooperation currently existing among the Council member states lead ultimately to an advanced form of unity?

/Answer/ By God, unity can be a goal. When you study the objectives of the Cooperation Council, namely to have similar laws and regulations and similarity in many of the agencies, you will find that this will subsequently lead to a form of unity among the Cooperation Council member states while each state continues to retain the characteristics it wants to retain. So far, this means that even though there is a large degree of similarity in foreign policy, each state has continued to maintain a certain degree of /individual/ political inclination. Even among people of the same country, each citizen has his distinguishing characteristics, the preferences and the things that befit him.

/Qasim 'Abd-al-Rabb/ You have mentioned the laws and regulations. We know that the Arab League tries to channel the laws and regulations in the Arab countries generally with the aim of establishing one of the bases of comprehensive Arab unity. Does the Gulf Cooperation Council take this into consideration in its steps to unify the regulations of its member states?

/Answer/ Yes. In all we do, we take into consideration the objectives and regulations of the Arab League and of the agencies and organizations emanating from it. We do all we can and exert our utmost efforts to harmonize these regulations that are projected at the Arab level with the regulations of the Council member states.

/Uahya al-'Arrasi/ We have heard that you write about Yemen. One of the pieces you have written is an article that was published in a Kuwaiti paper and that has continued to be the talk of some colleagues here. How have you found Yemen after your visit and how did you imagine it?

/Answer/ The truth is that after my short visit to the YAR, I have been greatly dazzled and I have been saying deep in my heart: I wish I had not read about Yemen and I wish the visit were a surprise or by chance because all I had read about Yemen has disappeared and vanished since I came to Yemen. Historically, archeologically and in terms of tourism, Yemen is beyond anything that has been written and published. I have told the brothers /in Yemen/, and I hope they will excuse me for doing so: Tourist information has become a business, an economy, a profession and an art. Tourism has become an art. If only the tourism aspects of the YAR were given a degree of attention I have spoken with his excellency the prime minister today and I have absorbed his experience, in comparison with which my experience is dwarfed.

Tourism must be preceded by certain steps, meaning that the tourist must be provided with facilities.

Let me reorganize my thoughts and say again that the leaders here have absorbed the experience through which they have gone. Thus, security and stability are established first, then the citizen is given reassurance and prosperity and, third, the Yemeni people's customs and traditions are studied and then comes tourism, meaning that all these elements are tied to each other. These things follow each other in succession until we reach

tourism because tourism requires facilities and these facilities must not undermine the deep-rooted customs and traditions of the Yemeni people. This is what I imagine.

Before concluding our interview with Shaykh Ibrahim al-Subhi, we asked him about the outcome of the talks he held in San'a' during his visit and the issues on which the talks focused but he declined to answer because he had not yet completed the official talks and promised to give us an answer on the following day which was the day of his departure. Because he did not have enough time, we could not achieve our objective. We left, thanking him for his frankness and appreciating the tightness of his schedule which permitted us to take no more than half an hour of his time. As he concluded the interview by wishing the Yemeni people and the Arab nation success, we wish him luck and success and hope he will visit Yemen, which he has loved, again and again so that there may be numerous interviews.

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KUWAIT'S ROLE IN GULF WAR MEDIATION DISCUSSED

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic No 327, 28 May 83 pp 26-27

/Article by Riyad Najib al-Rayyis: "Rock of Gulf War: Oil Pollution or Political Pollution"/

/Text/ Whoever knows Shaykh Sabah al-Ahmad, the Kuwaiti minister of foreign affairs (without his other titles and positions), knows that there is deep-rooted hostility between Abu Nasir /the minister/ and despair, or Shaykh Sabah would not be today the second in seniority to Andrey Gromyko, the Soviet minister of foreign affairs, among the world's ministers of foreign affairs, keeping in mind that Abu Nasir is an Arab minister of foreign affairs and that there is cause in Arab policy for constant despair, even among those most strongly attached to the position. Shaykh Sabah is capable of leaving his position any time he wants. The steadfastness of the man who has lived with the Arab world's political changes for more than 2 full decades and who has known all the swamps in which the Arab diplomacy has been mired throughout a quarter century also knows that the art of persistence, patience, deliberateness and steadfastness will inevitably produce its fruits, if given enough care.

This is why Shaykh Sabah al-Ahmad sees in Winston Churchill's famous phrase that "the optimist finds an opportunity in every catastrophe whereas the pessimist finds a catastrophe in every opportunity" a sphere to prove his steadfast position of optimism at all times. His mediation between the Sultanate of Oman and Democratic Yemen, for example, took 10 full years during which he did not tire or get bored for a single moment, even though everything in those 10 years called for boredom and surrender. It was also his dream to see the creation of the Gulf Cooperation Council which he had advocated and had presented in one idea after another for 5 years until he realized the dream, thanks to his refusal of the impossible versus the possible in his diplomatic dictionary. Abu Nasir always smiled whenever a journalist came to him carrying the news of the failure of an effort or a mediation as if to say that the failure was temporary and that diplomacy takes a lot of patience, persistence and waiting until it finds a new climate through which it can try again and produce success from failure and hope from catastrophe.

We, the press observers with our traditional cynicism and our customary pessimism, could find no reason for Shaykh Sabah's clinging to his optimism, even during the periods which we did not consider critical, not to mention the times of difficult crises and of danger. We always

attributed his optimism to his knowing, by the nature of things, more than we knew and we did not find it necessary to communicate the contagion of pessimism to the only Arab politician and diplomat who saw the cup half full whereas we saw it half empty. Consequently, his task was to announce the happy events whereas we, by the nature of our work, conveyed the bad news.

It is indisputable that the Iraq-Iran war which has been going on for the past 3 years has been one of the most difficult problems faced by Shaykh Sabah al-Ahmad throughout the quarter century of his diplomatic life and one of the few times in which Abu Nasir's optimism has become the subject of such great doubt that it has reached the degree of despair, considering that Gulf policy, and Kuwaiti policy in particular, have been subjected to a difficult test.

Shaykh Sabah has waited, but has not despaired. He has waited for the movement of changes within the Iranian regime, for the military changes on the battlefield, for the change in the political conditions and for the restructuring of the alliances in the area. He has waited for the outcome of the mediations--Arab, international and nonaligned--to serve the purpose for which they had been initiated.

He waited until the oil spill occurred 2 months ago as a result of expansion in the area of the Iraq-Iran war. With his customary optimism, Shaykh Sabah realized that an opportunity was made available through this catastrophe which poses the threat of pollution to the Gulf waters and that this opportunity must be utilized. He began to work, invitations were issued and were followed by meetings and proposals between the Gulf states, Iran and Iraq in an endeavor to stop the march of the black goblin. Those meetings faltered because of the nature of the invitation and because of the conventional Iranian position rejecting any dialogue to discuss a stop to the fighting, even if it is temporary and for "environmental" reasons, not political reasons.

All of a sudden, the oil spill floating over the Gulf waters provided an opening to penetrate the siege of the Iraq-Iran war. A new phase of diplomacy, beginning with a serious and practical initiative to eliminate the spill, started. Gulf efforts, meeting anew with Algeria's long effort and mediation which have achieved no positive result so far, were started and an Iranian invitation, the first of its kind, was issued to Shaykh Sabah to visit Tehran last week. Shaykh Sabah flew to the Iranian capital, accompanied by Rashid 'Abdallah al-Nu'aymi, the UAE minister of foreign affairs, to give the visit a Gulf dimension within the framework of the Gulf Cooperation Council, thus refusing to attribute any political hue to this sudden visit and asserting that its purpose is to complete the meetings of the Regional Environmental Protection Agency which had previously met in Kuwait and discussed the best means to put an end to the problem of the Gulf water pollution created by oil leakage from the Iranian Nowruz field which was damaged as a result of shelling in the war. But the Kuwaiti minister of foreign affairs did not forget to note that there are political points in addition to the technical points that have to be discussed.

This was the first time the Kuwaiti minister of foreign affairs has met with Iranian officials since the inception of the Iranian revolution. Shaykh Sabah went to Tehran with a mandate from the Gulf Cooperation Council member states to discuss the political aspect of the pollution problem and the political issues connected with the oil spill. To put it more clearly, he went with a mandate to discuss the Iraq-Iran ~~relat~~ relationship, the ongoing war between the two countries and the political struggle centered around them in the area. This provided the first indication that Iranian intransigence has begun to soften, that the total Iranian refusal to open the file on relations until the war is brought to its conclusion has been penetrated by the floating oil spill and that Iran has been persuaded by the danger of the pollution. Shaykh Sabah's smile broadened.

During the 24 hours which the two ministers of foreign affairs spent in Tehran, they were joined in the Iranian capital by Algerian Prime Minister Ahmed Abdelghani under the pretext of "expanding the economic and political relations between the two countries." The discussions moved from the technical aspects of the oil spill problem to the political aspects of the issue. These are the most important aspects, or rather, the main reason for the presence of the Gulf delegation and the Algerian delegation in Tehran at the same time.

Of the three important meetings which took place in Tehran between Shaykh Sabah and Iranian President Ali Khameneii, Minister of Foreign Affairs Ali Akbar Velayati and Prime Minister Hosein Musavi. the most important was the meeting with Hashemi Rafsanjani, the speaker of the Iranian Chamber of Deputies. Rafsanjani represents the faction that calls for continuing the war, that is intransigent in its position toward Iraq, that rejects all the arguments for a cease-fire and that is making debilitating demands. From the outcome of these meetings, the Gulf delegation took the essence of the Iranian position and flew to Baghdad 24 hours later.

But before the Gulf-Algerian visit to Tehran took place, the political climate in Iran had begun to display flexibility by accepting the initiative of UN Secretary General de Cuellar to send an international committee to assess the destruction inflicted on Iranian cities as a result of the war--an initiative which came in response to an Iranian request. Iran considered that the UN secretary general is fully neutral vis-a-vis the ongoing conflict between itself and Iraq. This was the first time Iran acknowledged the neutrality of any regional or international team offering to mediate. De Cuellar last month had called an unofficial session of the Security Council during which it was agreed to send a technical committee to both Iran and Iraq to investigate the losses suffered by both sides in the war. After its visit to the two countries, the committee is to present a report to the UN secretary general who will, in turn, call an urgent meeting of the Security Council to discuss the results. Even though the committee's powers are totally confined to the technical aspects, it is unreasonable, as most diplomatic circles believe,

that the Security Council will discuss the committee report in isolation from any discussion on the Iraq-Iran conflict since its outset and consequently, the council will try to intervene with all possible means to put an end to the conflict.

In Baghdad, the visit of Shaykh Sabah and the Gulf delegation turned into mediation when only hours earlier it had been just a technical visit. This visit was able to open a gap in the wall of Iranian intransigence through which it is possible to begin the phase of serious discussion to put an end to the war.

The delegation met with Iraqi President Saddam Husayn and the two sides reviewed the Iranian position, whether pertaining to the oil pollution problem or to the political aspect of the issue, in addition to the major basic points which had been raised by the Iranians with the Gulf delegation in Tehran. The Iraqi position was extremely flexible, considering that the Iranian position had begun to assume the quality of serious moderation and of logical demands.

Because the problem of the oil spill and of the danger of pollution are organically and directly tied to the continuation of the Iraq-Iran war, it has become evident that to make it possible for the talks to achieve progress toward putting an end to the war and, consequently, toward containing the danger of pollution and preventing its recurrence, these talks must cover all aspects of the crisis and must culminate in putting an end to the fighting between the two countries.

In order that we may not be accused of being eternally pessimistic in the face of Shaykh Sabah's constant optimism, we must say that the initial rolling of the rock by the Kuwaiti minister of foreign affairs must inevitably gather in its way other "old and new" parties to exert further efforts at a time when both Iraq and Iran have begun to display a degree of positivism that can be translated practically. For the first time since the start of the war, there is real optimism among Gulf circles, implying that Iran is ready for a serious discussion to end the fighting on the basis that the Gulf Cooperation Council members undertake to rebuild Iran according to recommendations to be made by the Security Council's technical committee, with the guarantee of the Gulf Cooperation Council members tied to a Security Council resolution that makes it impossible for the Gulf states to back down or to procrastinate. At the same time, Algeria is to supervise the arrangements for a cease-fire. The two agreements are to be announced simultaneously and tied to each other.

These proposals are still, of course, test balloons released by both sides before landing on the ground of reality or exploding in the air. So that we may not drown anew in the illusion of optimism, we must admit that this phase of optimism is still at its start. But one of the main reasons that made the atmosphere of discussion in Tehran more flexible and the Iranian position less intransigent is Iran's awareness that it

is incapable at this particular stage to launch a major military offensive similar to the previous offensives which have failed. Moreover, for the first time since the outbreak of the war, real complaint on the size of the human losses suffered by the Iranians is beginning to be heard. If it is possible to make up for the material losses as a condition for stopping the fighting, compensating for the dead and the wounded cannot be a condition.

Added to this is the fact that after persecuting the Tudeh Communist Party, arresting its chairman, along with hundreds of party leaders, and insulting it with conventional television confessions and after declaring the dissolution and illegality of this party, the Iranian regime has finally suspended relations with Moscow and turned the faction within the regime calling for keeping channels with Moscow open in order to counter the U.S. siege into a weak, if not losing, faction. The final destruction of Iranian-Soviet relations has convinced some of the ruling circles in Iran that it is in the interest of Iran in this phase to stop the fighting for fear that the Soviet Union may throw its weight behind Iraq. However, torpedoing the relationship between Moscow and Tehran after having torpedoed Tehran's relationship with Washington since the outset of the revolution may project Iran as a truly nonaligned state, thus evoking the sympathy of third world countries and Islamic world countries, particularly in view of these countries' traditional fear of Soviet atheism on the one hand and U.S. imperialism on the other.

Greek mythology's Sisyphus stone which is being rolled by Shaykh Sabah in Gulf war diplomacy is still waiting to find for itself a path far from the abyss so that Abu Nasir's optimism may be in its place this time.

Whoever knows Shaykh Sabah also knows that the engineer of Gulf diplomacy is a skilled craftsman who projects his smile with the dimensions he wants. The Gulf people want to see him laughing this time.

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INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

SAUDI, GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL SUPPORT FOR LEBANON OUTLINED

Paris AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic No 316, 23-29 May 83 pp 17-18

[Article by 'Ali Hashim: "Saudi Arabia Is With Lebanon and Supports It Along Four Lines; Cooperation Council States Establish Their Position on Basis of Freedom of Lebanese Decision"]

[Text] The Gulf tour made by Ibrahim Halawi, Lebanese minister of economy, trade and tourism, has confirmed what AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI had previously said, namely, that if the Arab Gulf states are not with Lebanon in its agreement with Israel, they will not oppose it because they consider the agreement a Lebanese affair. Dealing with the other countries and sides as equals on the grounds of the sovereignty of each state, and supporting any decision adopted by a legitimate authority, as in the case of the PLO, these states at the same time support Lebanon's decision if this decision emanates from an almost unanimous backing by democratic institutions, as in the case of this decision, which has been adopted by the Council of Ministers and supported unanimously by the Chamber of Deputies, which had given its support to all of the government's political inclinations and movements leading to the conclusion of the agreement.

Saudi Arabia and People's Will

Saudi Arabia, the major Gulf state, headquarters of the Gulf Cooperation Council and the kingdom with boundless Arab and international influence, was the first to publish the statement on the Lebanese issue declaring "its respect for the free will of the Lebanese people, who have expressed this will through their constitutional institutions so that these institutions may exercise their right to restore their sovereignty and spread their control over all of their territory."

The Lebanese minister of economy did not visit Saudi Arabia and did not carry a message from the president of the republic to its king.

The reason is that Saudi Arabia has been following the Lebanese negotiations step by step and has been blessing every step leading to the salvation of Lebanon.

Saudi Arabia has not been on the periphery of what is happening. Prime Minister Shafiq al-Wazzan, accompanied by Ambassador Ghassan Tuwayni, took the draft agreement to King Fahd ibn 'Abd-al-'Aziz and consulted with him and with Crown Prince 'Abdallah and with Prince Sa'ud al-Faysal, the minister of foreign affairs. The prime minister then carried back the observations of the king and of the top Saudi officials, as well as the kingdom's support. Lebanon has taken these observations into account, considering that Saudi Arabia is a bigger sister whose observations emanate from concern for Lebanon's interest and the interest of the Arab nation in its entirety and from the premise that it, Saudi Arabia, is a safety valve for the Arab world that has raised the banner of just peace and that was behind the second Fez summit's adoption of the Arab peace plan.

Support With Reservation

Saudi support for the agreement concluded by Lebanon has come with reservations, i.e., without a direct reference to the agreement. This support has also shown reserve in choosing the words of the statement-declaration of support for the Lebanese people's will, the will expressed, as the Saudi statement says, in the meeting of the Chamber of Deputies and its unanimous support for the legitimate Lebanese Government's directions and movements.

The declaration came in the form of a statement made by Lt Gen 'Ali al-Sha'ir. Al-Sha'ir, who was previously Saudi Arabia's ambassador to Lebanon for some time, is one of the experts most familiar with the Lebanese situation and crisis. Indeed, al-Sha'ir followed this crisis from the beginning and played several roles that helped "loosen" the situation in Lebanon by helping in the adoption of the decision to oust the Palestinian fighters and the Arab Deterrence Forces from Beirut and the adoption of the decision for negotiation, with U.S. participation. Saudi pressure had a great impact in creating U.S. counter pressure on Israel.

U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz and before him presidential envoy Philip Habib were in constant contact with Saudi Arabia by way of quick visits or through telephone consultations and messages.

The Saudi position is now based on four lines:

--Supporting Lebanon at all levels to achieve the withdrawal of foreigners from its territory.

--Direct intervention in numerous ways to prevent the further deterioration of Syrian-Lebanese relations. In this respect, Saudi Arabia stands with Lebanon, not with Syria, as the Syrian officials say. If Syria persists in its explosive position, then it will have to be advised to be flexible, i.e., to oppose the agreement, which is its right, but without harming Lebanon and damaging its interests so that it will not be pushed into Israel's arms more strongly than it is now being pushed.

--Contain any Arab attempt to isolate Lebanon.

--Utilize the agreement as a means of reviving the negotiations, either through the Arab peace plan or through President Ronald Reagan's initiative, to achieve just peace.

Gulf States Approve

There remain the other Gulf states and these states are, of course, in full agreement with the Saudi position.

The Cooperation Council member states have been supporting and continue to support any decision taken by Lebanon to overcome its tribulation.

These countries, which had been hoping for an Israeli withdrawal for nothing in return, have been aware and continue to be aware of how much Lebanon has suffered from the number one issue and how much it has suffered in its negotiations to reach agreement with minimum possible losses.

Moreover, the Gulf states, which have adopted the Arab peace plan and which are seeking negotiations in which the PLO and Jordan participate to achieve withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza Strip, cannot oppose negotiations leading to Israel's withdrawal. The conclusion of the Lebanese negotiations has been so reasonable that it has not caused the separation of Lebanon from the Arabs and has preserved Lebanon's sovereignty over its land, with some security measures similar to the Arab-Israeli truce agreements and measures implemented on the spot in the Golan between Israel and Syria.

The Gulf states know that any future negotiation will not restore the West Bank and Gaza, if they are [ever] restored, except on impossible terms compared with which the terms contained in the Israeli-Lebanese agreement are nothing.

Moreover, if the Gulf states are exerting pressure, negotiating and maneuvering for recognition of the PLO, which is more of a symbol than a state, and if their endeavors seek the acceptance of this organization as a negotiator through their unguaranteed talks, then how can they stand in the face of a Lebanon negotiating to rid itself of the Israeli octopus, considering that Lebanon is a sovereign state with constitutional institutions and with an Arab and international role? This is unless the PLO, and the intransigent Arab states along with it, want Lebanon to join the occupied territories club and to then bemoan its luck in international lobbies.

Slogans Are Rejected

The Cooperation Council states have suffered heavily from the Arab disunity caused by parties that have no concern other than to scream and utter glossy slogans and that then accept defeats one after another, as if defeats are to their heart like butter on honey.

A prominent Gulf official has told AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI:

We have had enough slogans. Every time we arrive at some kind of agreement, we turn it down and then years later we start demanding what we had turned down.

Now we have to accept the reasonable and the possible and to prepare ourselves calmly and silently for the major liberation battle, that is, if we are truly sincere in our statements about this battle.

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INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

KUWAIT EXPANDING BUSINESS DEALINGS WITH WEST GERMAN FIRM

London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic No 172, 28 May-3 Jun 83 p 47

[Article: "Kuwait-West German Cooperation, First Arab Experiment in European Industry"]

[Text] Hoechst, one of three West German chemical industry firms, has proposed the appointment of a Kuwaiti representative to its supervising board.

It is worth noting that the government-owned Kuwait Petroleum Company is the biggest individual shareholder in Hoechst, owning a little over 24 percent of the firm's total stock.

Many rumors had been circulated about Kuwait's purchase of Hoechst stock, which was offered for sale before this news was confirmed last year. It is obvious that Kuwait had spent 2 years collecting the stock, thus assuring itself of a relative majority in the firm.

The board supervising Hoechst has recommended that the shareholders general meeting, scheduled to convene on 14 June 1983, elect 'Abd-al-Baqi al-Nuri to the board in his capacity as chairman of the board of directors and general manager of the Kuwaiti Petroleum Industries Company.

In accordance with West German regulations, representatives of the workers and the shareholders are elected to boards supervising joint stock companies. The board supervises the firm's policies in all spheres of production, whereas the board of directors runs the firm's daily activities. This board of directors is comprised of an executive manager assisted by a number of managers in charge of a firm's various departments.

Even though the executive manager has the full responsibility and powers to manage the firm, the board supervising the firm has the right to dispense with his services should the need arise. Generally, the executive manager formulates the firm's policy and follows up on its implementation. However, the presence of a strong personality on the supervising board often leads to the introduction of fundamental changes in the firm's policy. A Hoechst spokesman has pointed out that the firm and its Kuwaiti member have sought from the outset not only to secure Arab financial participation in the firm but also effective cooperation at the level of determining the firm's policy.

The spokesman has also said that the proposed appointment of a Kuwaiti representative is a step in this direction.

It is to be noted on this occasion that Arab investments are participating extensively in the German industrial sector, especially investments by Kuwait, which owns 20 percent of Metallgesellschaft, which produces metal and chemical products, and nearly 14 percent of Daimler-Benz, which makes Mercedes cars. Despite the vast sums they have invested in Germany, the Arab investors have chosen to stay behind the scenes in the German industry and business sector. The recent change in this position has raised speculation in German circles as to whether the Arab investments have begun to display some concern regarding their future in Germany and have thus been motivated to gain a minimum degree of supervision over these investments.

Streamlining Operation

In fact, less than a week after these speculations surfaced, Hoechst announced that it plans to obtain the major part of its ammonia needs from Kuwait and that this deal will be the first fruit of the expected cooperation between the firm and its major shareholder.

Professor (Ralph Samt), chairman of the firm's supervisory board, announced on the occasion that Hoechst and the Kuwaiti consortium have decided to "rationalize" their industrial operations in the countries in which they own joint interests, such as Tunisia and Egypt. Moreover, the two sides are discussing the possibility of setting up "production facilities" in the Near and Far East. The company president added that it is premature to say if the new arrangements will lead to improving the firm's profits in the current year of 1983 but it is expected that the improvement will be felt in 1984.

Despite the strengthened cooperation between the German and Kuwaiti sides, the firm president has excluded the possibility of Hoechst participation in a joint petrochemical project with Kuwait inside Kuwait itself. However, he has asserted that it is very likely that the Kuwaiti side will build an ethylene plant in the next 5 years to meet Hoechst's needs for this commodity.

Even though Hoechst is considered the biggest European consumer of ethylene, the firm does not possess the intrinsic ability to produce this substance, which is fundamental to the plastics industry and to the production of solvents. At present, Hoechst spends \$610 million annually to purchase the ethylene, styrene and ammonia needed for the fertilizer industry. Even though Germany's ammonia production dates back 70 years, the rising costs of energy have caused this production to become costly. This is why the firm is thinking of stopping, or at least not expanding, its local production of this commodity.

On the other hand, Hoechst has announced that it is building a new pier in (Flisingin), in the Netherlands, which will be technically capable of receiving its ammonia imports from Kuwait by the end of the current year.

GCC FINANCE MINISTERS DISCUSS FISCAL, ECONOMIC POLICIES

London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic No 171, 21-27 May 83 pp 45-46

/Article by Mahir 'Abbas: "Conference of Gulf Ministers of Finance and Economy; Cooperation Council: Approval of Gulf Investment Authority"/

/Text/ In an endeavor to push forward the mark of the Gulf Cooperation Council member states within the framework of these states' plan to build a comprehensive and complete economic edifice proceeding side-by-side with the political edifice and the cooperation among these states, the fifth conference of the ministers of finance and economy was held in Riyadh on the 11th of last May to crystallize the Council member states' aspiration to achieve the hopes for an economic unity that declares itself amidst the economic blocs and international organizations.

The ministers agreed on a number of important economic points that entrench and bolster their march toward building a complete economic edifice among the Council members. A Gulf economic source has told AL-MAJALLAH that the fifth conference of the finance and economy ministers of the Council member states has dotted the i's and crossed the t's regarding formulation of the steps to implement the first phase of the economic agreement and of moving these steps forward. The source added that the conference gained special significance by virtue of its being the first conference since the start of implementation of the economic agreement which went into force as of the beginning of last March and since the latest reduction in oil prices and the Council member states' announcement of their general budgets.

The fifth conference's agenda has been distinguished from the agendas of previous conferences by devoting attention to the fundamentals of this economic cooperation. The ministers put the final touches on the agenda, which contained 10 main points.

AL-MAJALLAH has learned that this agenda was drawn up by the ministers who began the conference proceedings only after deliberations which lasted 2 hours and which were confined to the heads of the delegations.

The agenda focused on several points which try to eliminate any obstacles or impediments standing in the face of implementation of the steps of the economic agreement and on bringing the viewpoints closer on the economic regulations in the Council member states. These points include:

Internal customs facilities in the Council member states.

Transit trade.

A report from the General Secretariat on a number of financial and economic issues.

A report from the governors of the currency establishments.

Measures pertaining to the freedom of engaging in economic activity by the citizens of the Council member states.

A program on the steps to establish the Gulf Investment Authority.

One of the results which emerged from the conference has been a comprehensive visualization and a complete agreement on all these points. At the conclusion of the conference proceedings, Ibrahim 'Abd-al-Karim also announced that a number of important results were achieved on issues pertaining to customs fees, to service fees concerning the movement of citizens and on the currency policies on the basis of the recommendations of the governors of the Council member states' currency establishments.

'Abd-al-Karim also noted that the ministers formulated a complete concept for several aspects of the Council's relationship with a number of international organizations and said that the ministers will present their concept to the Supreme Council during the meeting of the Cooperation Council leaders in Doha next November.

The ministers also agreed on the importance of unifying the positions of the Council member states on issues pertaining to customs fees on foreign trade after lifting customs fees on internal trade among them.

As to whether the conference dealt with the impact of the reduced oil prices on the economic policies, an authoritative source has told AL-MAJALLAH that this issue concerns more than one sector and that the conference did not examine it directly.

The Bahrain minister of finance, the conference chairman, noted that some of the issues with which the conference dealt, such as the service fees, were tantamount to a call advocating the importance of streamlining consumption and spending in the interest of the area's peoples.

An informed source has told AL-MAJALLAH that the ministers' discussion of this point is something new and a significant indication of the importance of building diversified economies to improve the economic income and the importance of devoting attention to natural resources in order to bolster the economy.

The source lauded the economic experiment being currently carried out by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia which is moving at several industrial and agricultural levels and at the level of non-oil mineral resources--all of which create more than one backbone for the economic structure.

King Fahd's Instructions

The major attention which the leaders of the six member states devote to the economic sphere and to comprehensive cooperation among these states in this sphere to build a strong edifice to face the various challenges is secret to no one. The Bahrain minister expressed this fact in a comment on his meeting with King Fahd ibn 'Abd-al-'Aziz of Saudi Arabia, saying that the king is interested in the Council out of his conviction and the conviction of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia that the Council is the hope of the Arab nation under the current circumstances. The minister added that the Saudi monarch instructed the ministers of finance as to what their role should be in the future out of concern for this area's economic affairs and intricate interests which form a fundamental mainstay for our cooperation and solidarity and for the unification of our efforts.

Thus, the degree of attention devoted to the economic aspect is reflected in the full cooperation among the Council member states.

One of the main points discussed by the fifth conference was a resolution on setting up and completing the structure of the Gulf Investment Authority whose capital has been set at \$2.1 billion, divided equally among the Council member states. Insofar as this authority is concerned, it has been approved by all the Council member states, with the exception of Kuwait which is expected to announce its final approval after presenting the issue to the Kuwaiti parliament to pass and ratify it. The Bahraini minister stressed that with Kuwait's approval, the authority's constituent assembly and board of directors will be formed.

The ministers, who concluded their meetings in 1. day instead of 2 days as originally scheduled, agreed to meet again on 25-26 October 1983 in Qatar. This meeting will precede the summit meeting in Doha. It has been learned that during this period, a number of meetings will be held by the various economic establishments in the Council member states to develop comprehensive economic formulas on the points which obstruct the path of economic cooperation and these formulas will be presented to the next conference which will, in turn, present them to the Supreme Council comprised of the Gulf leaders. The ministers have also made an important step in establishing the freedom of citizens of the Council member states to engage in economic activity in the five spheres agreed upon in the economic agreement, namely agriculture, industry, livestock and fishing resources, and engineering and contracting activities.

The new thing with which the ministers emerged from their meeting in Riyadh is the formulation of a clear picture of the financial and economic policy of the Council member states, as well as the conference's announcement that the steps to achieve economic unity and comprehensive cooperation are proceeding as planned in order to keep pace with the development of the Gulf's march forward.

ARAB BANKING ACTIVITIES IN FAR EAST DISCUSSED

London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic No 171, 21-27 May 83 pp 45-46

Article: "Arab Banks Contribute to Development of Far East Countries"

Text The commercial center area of Singapore has been witnessing for the past 2 years a concentrated Arab invasion seeking to occupy the luxury offices being built in this area and to transform them into branches of Arab banks.

In the past 2 years, no less than 8 Arab banks have set up branches in Singapore's commercial center with the aim of obtaining a share of the prosperous financial markets of the Far East countries.

When the Arab banks selected Singapore as the center of their banking activity in the Far East, the first attraction factor weighing on their decision was the economic growth rate that was being witnessed by Singapore and ranging from 9-10 percent annually. But the drop in oil prices has affected Malaysia and Indonesia negatively and the official estimates in Singapore do not expect the growth rate to exceed three percent in the current year.

Despite this decline in the area's economic conditions, the Arab institutions still believe that it is necessary for them to secure a foothold in Southeast Asia, especially the Kuwaiti institutions which consider themselves the pioneer in discovering the spheres available for Arab investments in the post-oil boom era.

Six Arab companies have set up offshore banks in Singapore in particular with the aim of dealing with the Asian currency unity market which was set up by Singapore in 1968. These companies are: The Arab Banking Organization, the Kuwaiti Bank of Asia, the Abu Dhabi National Bank, the Kuwaiti Bank of the Gulf, the Arab-French Banks Union and the Gulf International Bank. The Commercial National Bank (Saudi) and the Kuwaiti National Bank have also opened representative offices.

The latest comer to the Singapore market has been the Arab Banking Organization which has set up a bank with a record capital insofar as Singapore is concerned, namely \$1 billion, of which \$750 million represent

a fully paid subscription paid in equal shares by the Kuwaiti Ministry of Finance, the Libyan Secretariat of the Treasury and the Abu Dhabi Investment Organization. Within 4 months of opening its offices in Singapore, the Arab Banking Organization attracted assets amounting in value to \$240 million, most of which it has reinvested in various financial markets.

Most of the Arab banks have sought from their presence in Singapore to play the role of an institution with ample liquidity primarily seeking to place loans. But the diminishing oil revenues in the Gulf countries have made it more difficult to export this liquidity to Singapore. Consequently, these banks have turned into borrowing institutions competing with the other banks for local deposits.

It is normal that the Arab banks see in the growing volume of their local deposits an indicator of their sound commercial position. These banks have displayed evident eagerness to conduct themselves as commercial banks for fear of giving the local financial circles the impression that they have come to buy everything.

At another level, the major Islamic population density in a number of Far East countries has helped acceptance of the presence of the Arab banks. The expanding Arab banking activity in the Islamic Asian countries has shown the inclination of these banks to intensify their activities in these countries. In fact, the Saudi Development Fund announced recently that it is advancing its seventh loan to Malaysia, amounting to \$4.6 million, to finance the construction of modern hospitals. At the signing ceremony, Razaleigh Hamzah, the Malaysian minister of finance, did not miss the opportunity to note that the Saudi loan is considered a model of the "spirit of true Islamic fraternity." Last March, the Saudi Development Fund agreed to give Indonesia a loan of \$50 million on soft terms to finance the construction of modern roads in the country. With this loan, the total value of the Saudi loans made available to Indonesia amounted to \$170 million, some of which has been allocated for the construction of international highways in Java and to expand a fertilizer plant in Sumatra.

Western financial circles expect the presence of the Arab banks in Singapore to bolster Singapore's ability to manage a number of syndicated /musandakah/ loans and consequently to compete with Hong Kong's banks in this sphere. But these circles express their doubt on the possibility of Singapore replacing Hong Kong by virtue of the acknowledged experience of Hong Kong's banks in the sphere of syndicated loans and by virtue of the fact that the British colony has a bigger combination of international banks and is not subject, practically, to any government control over its financial sector.

The Arab banks which have entered the Singapore market strongly hope to grow with the growth of the economy of the Asian Far East countries and to contribute as much as possible, to this growth. However, these banks

are complaining of the strict banking regulations which limit the activities of the Singapore offshore banks to offshore operations that can practically be conducted from any other place. This issue has motivated some of Singapore's Arab banks to expand in the direction of Hong Kong which permits foreign banks to enter the local commercial markets both as lenders and as receivers of deposits.

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INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

ALGERIA-MOROCCO-TUNISIA-FRANCE TRADE REVIEWED

Paris EUROPE OUTREMER in French No 636, Jan 83 p 33

[Article: "North Africa"]

[Text] Exchanges of general goods with North Africa have increased only 6 percent overall, reaching 2.6 million tons in 1981. As in 1980, exports developed better, with an increase of 11 percent, as against a drop of 5 percent in imports.

France's No 1 customer, Algeria, purchased some 200,000 tons more than in 1980. Apart from agroalimentary products, the tonnage of which dropped 33 percent, all products increased, on the whole, by 13 percent. Manufactured products alone went up 20 percent, reaching 315,000 tons. On the other hand, imports of Algerian products remained at the low level of 52,000 tons, with the drop in agroalimentary products (wines) compensated for by a rise for manufactured products.

With Morocco, traffic is balanced at a little more than 400,000 tons in both directions. Imports--essentially citrus fruits and vegetables--continued to decrease (down 15 percent from 1980), thus losing 100,000 tons in relation to 1977. On the other hand, a slight upswing in French exports (up 7 percent) is noted, thanks to agroalimentary products, which totaled 145,000 tons as against 83,000 tons in 1980. The traffic in steel products went up by 11 percent, while fertilizers and chemical products dropped 34 percent, with manufactured products remaining stable.

Franco-Tunisian exchanges reached a total of 790,000 tons, thanks to the increase in imports of Tunisian chemical products (up 16 percent) and the doubling of exports of agroalimentary products (sugar). Imports of agroalimentary products (citruses) stayed at the 1980 level, as did exports of manufactured products and cement (39,000 tons). On the other hand, a drop in sales of French steel products (down 24 percent) is noted.

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EX-AMBASSADOR GHALIB ASSESSES ANDROPOV, SOVIET MIDEAST POLICY

London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic No 172, 28 May-3 Jun 83 pp 19-22

[Interview with Murad Ghalib, former Egyptian ambassador to Moscow and Soviet affairs expert: "Murad Ghalib Recalls: Yes, I Knew Andropov Personally and These Are My Impressions of Him; 'Abd-al-Nasir Threatened Soviets With Resignation, Telling Them: There Will Come After Me Somebody Who Can Reach Understanding With Americans"; date and place not specified]

[Text] Dr Murad Ghalib is considered one of the prominent Arab experts on Soviet affairs. He held the position of Egypt's ambassador in Moscow for several years during the administration of the late President 'Abd-al-Nasir. Under the administration of the late President Anwar al-Sadat, Ghalib was appointed minister of state for foreign affairs, then minister of foreign affairs, minister of information and Egypt's ambassador to Yugoslavia. He resigned his latest position in the wake of the Camp David treaty. AL-MAJALLAH met with Dr Murad Ghalib and conducted with him this interview, which focuses on the Soviet role in the Middle East, on Egyptian-Soviet relations and on his memories in this regard. The interview also deals with analyzing the personality of Soviet leader Yuriy Andropov. Following is the text of the interview with Dr Ghalib:

[Question] Did the expulsion of the Soviet experts from Egypt in 1972 arouse sensitivities between Egypt and the Soviet Union?

[Answer] Undoubtedly. Nobody can imagine how hurt the Soviet leaders felt as a result of that action or how deep that pain went.

[Question] But it is said that the Soviets had planned to withdraw those experts?

[Answer] There was an understanding that we would fight this battle (the 1973 war), that the battle was our battle, that we didn't want anybody to fight on our behalf and that when we attained the level whereby we could wage our battle, the Soviets would leave Egypt.

[Question] Then why were they hurt by the expulsion of the experts when they knew that they would leave Egypt?

[Answer] Because of the manner in which the experts were asked to leave the country.

[Question] Dr 'Aziz Sidqi had gone to the Soviets and asked them to withdraw the experts on their own, i.e., to make the decision on their own?

[Answer] The entire world had become aware of the decision [to wage the war]. Had the Soviets withdrawn their experts, then people would have asked: Why did they withdraw them? Why did they leave Egypt while it was on the threshold of preparing for war? The Soviets did not want to appear before the Arab world as if they were deserting Egypt while Egypt was preparing for war. The Soviet Union previously had been accused of withdrawing its experts in order to render the state incapable of performing its functions. This is why this point was so sensitive.

[Question] Did withdrawal of the experts affect the Soviet position during the 1973 war?

[Answer] The Soviet Union provided Egypt with the weapons with which it waged the battle even though it had expelled the Soviet experts. We concluded a weapons deal worth \$500 million after the expulsion of the experts and the Soviets supplied us with these weapons and with defensive weapons.

There were numerous opinions on this issue. The Soviet leaders are quoted as having said at the time: "We are committed to the Egyptian and Arab people, to help them liberate their land."

[Question] Was the issue this idealistic?

[Answer] I am not saying idealistic. But this is what happened. There is also no doubt that they thought that the regime in Egypt would appreciate this help.

[Question] Were there no crises between Egypt and the Soviet Union during 'Abd-al-Nasir's years?

[Answer] Sharp, real and serious crises, even violent crises reaching the level of personal vituperation, especially in 1959 and 1960, did occur. In the 1960's, differences erupted over weapons, the battle, political and military developments, management of the struggle and other issues.

[Question] Did 'Abd-al-Nasir agree to the Rogers initiative while in Moscow to protest the Soviet position?

[Answer] 'Abd-al-Nasir accepted the Rogers initiative as a way of providing the opportunity to build the missile wall. The Soviets did not approve of his acceptance of the initiative. The decision was 'Abd-al-Nasir's and Egypt's.

[Question] Did 'Abd-al-Nasir say that he would step aside to be replaced by somebody who would reach an understanding with the United States?

[Answer] At the end of 1970, 'Abd-al-Nasir said in Moscow: "Our air space has become open to the Israelis to strike as they wish. What is more, they are carrying out what we learned at the military college verbatim because they know nobody will confront them. They strike the airports and then the supply lines and other targets as they wish. This being the case, 'Abd-al-Nasir is not the man to capitulate. I will step aside and let somebody who can reach an understanding with the United States come after me."

[Question] Do you think that Anwar al-Sadat was appointed vice president for that purpose?

[Answer] The truth is that I did not interpret 'Abd-al-Nasir's words this way when I heard them. I also did not interpret Anwar al-Sadat's appointment as vice president in this manner. But now I can say yes in reply to your question.

[Question] How did the Soviet experts come to Egypt and was this in response to 'Abd-al-Nasir's request?

[Answer] Upon 'Abd-al-Nasir's insistence and in response to this insistence because the 1967 defeat was crushing.

[Question] Did 'Abd-al-Nasir meet with the Soviet leadership for this purpose?

[Answer] The late Soviet president, Podgornyy, and Marshal Zakharov came to Egypt in the wake of the 1967 defeat. Lengthy discussions were held regarding the defeat and the Soviets prepared a report on this defeat.

[Question] Did you read this report?

[Answer] Nobody can read a Soviet report. Numerous discussions were held on the issue and matters became clear and well known.

[Question] On the basis of those discussions, who was responsible for the 1967 military defeat: The military establishment or the political establishment?

[Answer] The side responsible fundamentally was the military establishment. But we cannot absolve the political establishment of its responsibility for that defeat. 'Abd-al-Nasir himself said this in his speech on the evening of 9 June 1967.

'Abd-al-Latif al-Baghdadi and the Russians

[Question] Did 'Abd-al-Nasir ask you to introduce 'Abd-al-Latif al-Baghdadi to the Soviet leaders?

[Answer] Yes. This happened in August 1970, nearly 1 month before 'Abd-al-Nasir's death. I was in Cairo at the time and met with President 'Abd-al-Nasir, who asked me to do so.

[Question] On what basis was this request made?

[Answer] What I understood was that President 'Abd-al-Nasir was preparing 'Abd-al-Latif al-Baghdadi for a new movement. Consequently, he asked me to arrange meetings between al-Baghdadi and the Soviet leaders.

[Question] Was 'Abd-al-Nasir preparing al-Baghdadi to become vice president of the republic?

[Answer] This is what I understood, even though 'Abd-al-Nasir did not tell me this directly. When he asked me to introduce al-Baghdadi to the Soviet leaders, I said to him: "Mr President, this issue signifies a lot." He replied: "You understand. Do it."

[Question] Were the Egyptian-Soviet relations sound relations under 'Abd-al-Nasir's administration?

[Answer] Our relations with the Soviet Union were special relations because of the circumstances surrounding Egypt at the time and because of the Israeli policy of aggression.

[Question] Despite this, do you think Egypt was a nonaligned country?

[Answer] Yes, it was a nonaligned country.

[Question] Then why is it said that Egypt is an aligned country when it has special relations with the United States?

[Answer] The issue is: Who is the Arab world's enemy? Israel. So how can we have a special relationship with the United States, the strategic ally of Israel? The United States wants Israel to be stronger than all the Arab countries collectively, including Egypt. When I say that I have special relations with the United States, it is difficult to accept the aid, even coordination between the United States and Israel, as in the case of the invasion of Lebanon, for example. We want relations with the United States by virtue of its role, power and scientific progress. We are not against this. But the question is: How can we have special relations with a strategic ally of Israel?

[Question] How can a balance be established between the two superpowers in this area?

[Answer] The Soviet Union is present in the area and it has good relations with a number of Arab countries. We don't want our area to enter the sphere of polarization or to be monopolized by a superpower. We want good relations with both camps. But we are entering the phase of polarization and there is a crisis within the Arab liberation movement. Therefore, we must establish a dialogue with the Arab forces so that we can overcome the serious stage of sharp polarization and of the ongoing struggle of which the area will be the direct target. It is enough to cite in this respect the statement of the commander of the U.S. forces in Europe who has said that if a

third world war erupts, it is most likely that it will be in the Middle East and the Indian Ocean. This area is the likely theater of the third war. This means that as Arabs, we must awaken and think of how to overcome this situation.

[Question] How can dialogue or a meeting be held between Egypt and the Arabs under the shadow of the Camp David treaty?

[Answer] The treaty constitutes a major obstacle, no doubt. But we must exert efforts to create a new situation. Acknowledgement of Camp David is not an individual phenomenon. The phenomenon is forcing the Arab countries to accept Israeli domination and to conclude peace with Israel on Israel's terms. There has to be a dialogue among the Arabs aimed at enabling the area to overcome what is imposed on it.

Who Is Andropov?

[Question] You knew Yuriy Andropov, the new Soviet leader, years ago. What is your evaluation of the man and what are your recollections of him?

[Answer] Many years have passed since my meeting with him. Though man changes, there are certain things that do not change and that are keys to his personality. I contacted Andropov when he was secretary of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee and the official in charge of relations with other parties. I will not forget that when I sat with him, and Sha'rawi Jum'ah was with us, he analyzed the situation in the Soviet Union with utter precision and frankness and did not hide the problems it was facing and the need to enhance the people's standard of living. He spoke frankly and accurately of the difficulties that were being faced by the Soviet Union in achieving this goal. This is an important characteristic in a prominent man. He makes you feel secure and makes you feel that the discussion is among friends and that there is no need to hide anything.

Andropov was ambassador to Hungary in 1956 and, under those circumstances, he could have departed from Hungary with bad or tense relations whereas in fact he departed with good friendships and with cordiality because of his frankness and his precise analysis.

He was also ambassador to Romania. Even though Romania has a special position in the socialist camp, Andropov managed the relations well. Despite the differences, Romania is in the Warsaw Pact and most of its trade is with the Soviet Union.

Andropov headed the State Security Commission (i.e., intelligence) and we met once in the presence of Amin Huwaydi, the Egyptian intelligence chief. Andropov had maintained his qualities, frankly discussing the problems, the international relations between the two superpowers and Middle East problems from the angle of Arab-international relations and relations with the two superpowers. His conversation was clear and precise. Muhammad Hasanayn Haykal once asked me: Who do you think has a future among the second line [leaders] in the Soviet Union? I answered immediately: Andropov. This was

more than 10 years ago. Haykal recently reminded me of this incident. My assessment has always been that he is a party man dealing with the outside world, an expert on international relations and contacts and one of the Central Committee's two secretaries. Moreover, he headed the State Security Commission. All this has provided him with a broad view of international and internal affairs.

Andropov's assumption of power in a delicate phase of Soviet-U.S. relations and his facing at the outset a sweeping U.S. attack in all spheres, especially the international arms race, concerning other parts of the world, and the problems of the Middle East, of the Indian Ocean and of the Rapid Deployment Force, which is 200,000 strong--all this means that he is qualified for the task and that his previous work as a liaison officer between the Central Committee and the other parties and committees and the Security Commission enables him to understand the military forces necessary for the confrontation and realize that the Soviet Union needs serious efforts.

[Question] Do you expect a change in Soviet policy with Andropov?

[Answer] Strategically, Soviet policy does not change. What happens is that the Soviet Union is faced with new positions and with the personality, disposition and emotions of the U.S. President himself and important problems arise in various parts of the world with which it has to deal. Strategically, the Soviet Union has a consistent policy in confronting issues and problems.

As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, its most important preoccupation insofar as the foreign policy is concerned are the relations with the United States, with Europe and with the Middle East, which represents to it the second front behind the European front. For the Soviet Union, relations with China are also an important issue.

[Question] Do you think it is possible that relations between China and the Soviet Union will improve under Andropov?

[Answer] The dialogue has begun. This is a new and good development. But so far, no fundamental progress has been achieved. This is what Gromyko, the Soviet first deputy prime minister and minister of foreign affairs, said recently.

[Question] Do you think that the new Soviet leadership will have a new concept as far as the Middle East is concerned?

[Answer] The Middle East is one of the most important areas as far as the Soviet Union is concerned. The Soviet Union has with the Middle East direct borders estimated at thousands of kilometers and it also has with it extremely important interests. It does not want the Middle East to turn into a hostile area. The Soviet Union wants good relations with all Middle East countries while fully realizing the enormous interests of the West and of the United States in the Middle East, the most important being oil.

[Question] Does the Soviet Union have designs on Middle East oil?

[Answer] This issue was raised once on the basis of a report by U.S. intelligence and the whole world started saying that the Soviet Union would need Middle East oil. It then turned out that this is groundless because the Soviet Union has enormous oil and gas reserves that will meet its needs for many years to come. It also became evident that it has no designs on the oil but that it wants to deal with the Middle East on purely commercial bases, like any country dealing with any other country.

[Question] Then why does the Middle East pose a danger to the Soviet Union and why do the Soviets consider it the second front, as you have said?

[Answer] The danger of the Middle East comes from the enormous U.S. presence. Cold war has entered this area, which has become the object of struggle between the superpowers.

[Question] There are those who believe that the Soviet Union does not put this area among its priorities because it is preoccupied with the arms race and other issues.

[Answer] I disagree with this view. It is true that Moscow is concerned with the arms race and with the possibilities of a third world war, with talk about a first strike and its importance, with nuclear war and the possibilities of winning it and with management of such a conflict if Europe and the United States enter it because this is a truly fearful prospect. The European front is a fundamental front. But the Middle East area, the intensifying international tension, armaments and the attempt to encircle the Soviet Union have brought the cold war into the area and have turned it into an area of major polarization. The Camp David treaty and what has happened in Lebanon are a part of the polarization now witnessed by the area.

[Question] If we move closer to the problem and talk of the Soviet Union's position vis-a-vis the Arab-Israeli conflict, where would you place the Soviet position?

[Answer] The Soviet position continues to be that it is better for the Arabs that the problem be internationalized, i.e., solved by way of the United Nations. The Soviet Union wants to be a party equal to the United States in solving the problem. It believes that its absence gives the United States and Israel the opportunity to deal with the area exclusively. The Soviet presence will improve the Arab negotiating position because it will be a force countering the United States. The Soviet Union has no interest in seeing Israel stronger than the Arab countries. It wants Israel to return to the 1967 borders. The Soviet Union does not have the same ambitions as Israel. Consequently, its presence is beneficial to the Arabs, as it is beneficial to the Soviet Union, of course.

[Question] But there is a new reality in the wake of the Camp David treaty. How can the issue go back to the United Nations?

[Answer] It is obvious that the talk about peace in the Middle East is untrue. Israel said that the war in Lebanon was for peace in the Galilee and the opposite has become obvious. The war was for the purpose of expelling the Palestinians and for achieving Israel's ambitions in Lebanon itself. Israel has ambitions in the area and in every country in this area. If the Arab countries agree to see Lebanon subjected to Israel's pressures and to see it conclude a peace treaty similar to the Camp David treaty, then this means that the Arabs are encouraging Israel to launch war and aggression. If each country concludes a separate peace treaty as a result of an Israeli attack, then we are telling Israel: "Get more arms as long as this is the path to peace." In such a case, these treaties will be war treaties and not peace treaties.

Egyptian-Soviet Relations

[Question] Do you expect anything new in the Soviet perception of Arab-Soviet relations?

[Answer] I believe that the Soviet Union wants to deal with all of the Arabs. It wants to normalize Egyptian-Soviet relations and wants the exchange of ambassadors to be resumed. This prepares the path for developing these relations. Trade and economic relations have attained a large volume, now amounting to nearly \$500 million annually. There is a number of large, rather the largest, industrial plants built by the Soviet Union in Egypt, such as the iron and steel plants, the shipbuilding yard in Alexandria and the High Dam power plant, which is being renewed by the French and the Americans, who will be joined by the Soviet Union. There is also the aluminum complex, which was inaugurated by President al-Sadat and to which nobody has made any reference, in addition to numerous other factories. There is no doubt that these plants require renewal and expansion and I believe that it is important that the Soviet Union carry out this work. I have disagreed with those who say that our relations with the Soviet Union have been confined to arms shipments in times of tension. This statement is untrue. If we want industrialization, then where will the production of our factories go? Do we give it to the Arabs? Only within narrow limits. The socialist bloc market is the market that can absorb a large share of Third World products that bring to this world a large part of the costs of its industrialization. This issue must be viewed from a broader perspective.

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PROMINENT WRITER DISCUSSES VARIOUS DOMESTIC, INTERNATIONAL ISSUES

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[Interview with Mustafa Amin, prominent writer, by 'Abd al-Karim Abu al-Nasr: "Mustafa Amin Expects Important Changes in Egypt!"; date and place of interview not specified]

[Text] "I expect free elections to be held in Egypt, and expect political parties to resume their activity."

"There are those who are resisting Mubarak's trend toward democracy, and such people did not learn anything from the assassination of al-Sadat."

"Egypt has become free of the Camp David treaty, but tearing up the paper would mean reoccupation [of Sinai]."

"The policy of the U.S. is an extremely foolish one. It is one which wins elections but loses the world."

"The 'city thieves party' is operating underground, and is circulating rumors against the current regime."

"The U.S. does not dominate our country."

"If free elections were held in Egypt today, the people would elect Mubarak as president."

Mustafa Amin, the prominent writer, expects important changes to take place in Egypt. He in particular expects, on the basis of his information, appraisal of the situation, and vast experience, that free People's Assembly elections will be held in Egypt, that political parties in Egypt will once again publicly exercise their activities in an atmosphere of democracy, and that new political parties will emerge on the Egyptian political scene. These new parties will include a party established by two members of the Revolutionary Command Council. However, Mustafa Amin is of the opinion that the trend toward democracy which is being pursued by President Husni Mubarak is being opposed by those whom he calls the "city thieves" and is being resisted by some of those

who were at Mubarak's side on the day that al-Sadat was assassinated--and Mustafa Amin feels that these people did not learn anything from Sadat's assassination. This great writer also feels that Egypt has in fact become free of the Camp David treaty and that Egypt is no longer sitting in the lap of the U.S., but rather alongside the U.S. He also is of the opinion that U.S. policy in the Middle East is an extremely foolish one, and that this U.S. policy is one which wins elections but loses the world! In this comprehensive private interview with AL-MAJALLAH, Mustafa Amin talks frankly and courageously about many matters.

[Question] About a year ago, in an interview which we held with you, you said that "Egypt is in its first year of freedom." Is Egypt still "in its first year of freedom"? How do you assess the experiment in freedom and democracy which has gone on during the administration of President Husni Mubarak? What remarks do you have concerning this?

[Answer] The most important thing in Egypt now is that a writer is able to express his opinion, attack the government, and debate any decision made by President Husni Mubarak. After he has done this, no order is issued to prevent him from writing, he is not sent to jail, he is not forbidden to write for the press, nor is he transferred to the Railroad Administration, the Telephone Administration, or the Ministry of Public Works--and this is what happened all during the last 30 years. I personally have not had a single word censored from [my column called] "Fikrah" [Ideal] ever since 28 November 1981, whereas before that I would have several lines of my column taken out, or half of it would be crossed out, or else the whole column would be censored and then I would be told to write another column. It has already happened several times that President Mubarak has expressed an opinion concerning a given issue, the next day I would write something opposing this opinion of his, but President Mubarak would not get angry, nor would any of his ministers get angry. One new thing that is happening in Egypt is, for example, that I would write about a given issue in my column and the next day the minister concerned with this issue would reply to what I wrote. The principle used to be that ministers did not respond to what was written by journalists and writers unless they wanted to issue an order prohibiting them from writing, dismissing them from their job, or sending them to jail! What this means is that President Mubarak is not playing the role of chief editor. But some people in Egypt who are working for newspapers and magazines are still acting as if they were overseers who work at the ruler's private country estate. After the press was nationalized in Egypt I said that our newspapers had come to be run like "country estates" owned by the person who was president of the republic at the time. I said that they were "country estates" which were fully independent of the state and that the laws of the state did not apply to them. Freedom is not freedom when I alone enjoy it. Right now I am enjoying this freedom, and so are others.

Some journalists in Egypt still consider newspapers and magazines to be their "private estates." After chief editors used to write for millions of readers in Egypt, they began writing for the government. When nationalization of the press took place in Egypt, they said to us: "Individuals are not permitted to own newspapers!" But after nationalization, one individual came to own all of

the newspapers. When nationalization of our press took place, my understanding was that the press would then become something like a public park which all people could come into. But what I discovered was that the press became a private park which the ruler alone was allowed to stroll around in. But the new thing that President Mubarak has done is that he has revived the opposition newspapers and allowed them to write what they want to. One result of this has been the fact that the circulation of the opposition newspapers has increased. The number one opposition newspaper has a circulation of 200,000, the one in second place has a circulation of 180,000, and the one in third place has a circulation of 150,000. This is something new, and it indicates that the Egyptian people are thirsting for freedom. Of course some people in Egypt are unhappy about the opposition newspapers. They are not used to seeing such stiff opposition expressed. What they have been used to during the last 30 years is seeing opposition in the form of whispering. After this long silence, the loud echo of the current opposition hurts their ears. These people are saying that the activity of the opposition newspapers is something which is creating chaos in Egypt. These people are used to the silence of the graveyard. But when people arose out of their graves and hoisted their shrouds as banners, the people who had been used to only hearing their own voices for 30 years were surprised. Let us return to the question: Are we still in our "first year of freedom"? In 1974 we were in our "first year of freedom," and 2 years later we found ourselves back in kindergarten. However, what has happened this time is that we are still in our "first year of freedom." One question which we are asking is: Why are the Egyptian opposition newspapers sometimes writing such violent articles now? The simple answer is: When you put your hand over my mouth for 30 years and then take it away, you cannot expect me to quietly say to you: "Please be my guest and have a cup of coffee. Please have a Coca Cola." Instead of this, I will be shouting some curses that have been burning inside me for 30 years, and only after that will I quietly say to you: "Please be my guest and have a cup of coffee. Please have a Coca Cola." I believe that the violent tone of the opposition newspapers will quiet down after a while, when people become used to freedom.

Freedom--A Decision by Mubarak!

[Question] Does this mean that freedom in Egypt is still something which is the result of a decision made by President Mubarak?

[Answer] Yes, freedom in Egypt so far is still something which is tantamount to being the result of a decision made by President Mubarak. Every day the disciples of the school of tyranny are threatening us and sayint that a decree will be issued which will prohibit freedom, that we will be marching backward, or that President Mubarak is a new Nassier or another Sadat. My information tells me that Mubarak is Mubarak, and only Mubarak. This is the hope that we have. However, the "crows in town" and the "city thieves" are attempting to wipe the smile off the face of the Egyptian people. Instead of telling the Egyptian people what I am asserting every day about the fact that we are marching forward, they are threatening the Egyptian people and telling them that we are going to march backward. In my opinion, the decade of the eighties is quite different from the sixties or seventies. The effects of the last 30

years cannot be overcome in the space of 3 minutes. My opinion is that we should pursue our course along the forward path.

Elections and Activity by the Political Parties

[Question] What does this mean in practice?

[Answer] Marching forward means beginning to eliminate a number of the laws of ill repute which exist in Egypt. Such laws are the Emergency Law (which is tantamount to martial law) and the Press Law which puts the press in the position of being the illegitimate child of Egypt's Higher Press Council. I believe that they named this council the Higher Press Council because its members used to meet on the 12th floor. Now, however, they are meeting on the second floor. This is why I propose changing the name of the Higher Press Council! We should also eliminate the Suspicion Law. This is a law which gives the minister of the interior the right to arrest you if he sees you sitting with your legs crossed in the presence of the minister of public works! Also, we must prepare for the upcoming People's Assembly elections which are going to be held in Egypt in 1984. The new members of the People's Assembly will be elected by means of these elections. Some people have tried to put through the idea of having these elections held using the system of party lists of candidates in order to guarantee that the party in power, the National Democratic Party, get the majority of seats in the People's Assembly. But we have learned that President Mubarak has ordered that these bills be withdrawn from the People's Assembly and that we go back to using the system of electing representatives from election districts--which was the system used ever since the establishment of representative political life in Egypt. Elections of representatives in Lebanon, for example, are held on the basis of party lists of candidates because Lebanon has 17 different religious sects. But Egypt, thank God, does not have this sectarianism. When there is a democratic government, there is no more sectarianism and no more religious fanaticism. Sectarianism is something which emerges only when there is a dictatorship. Right now Egypt has no sectarianism. We hope that the political parties which right now are active underground will be granted the opportunity to be active above ground and in a public and legitimate fashion. I anticipate, for example, that the Wafd Party will become active once again because the decision issued by Fu'ad Siraj-al-Din to dissolve the Wafd Party was not a legal decision. The reason for this is that the majority in the party did not support this decision. It was only the minority which did so. Perhaps it would be useful to dwell for a moment on this issue. The "dissolution" of the Wafd Party took place when Dr Mustafa Khalil was the head of the ASU [Arab Socialist Union] during the administration of the late President al-Sadat. Fu'ad Siraj-al-Din, head of the New Wafd Party at that time, sent a memorandum to Dr Khalil in which he informed him that the majority of persons in the party had decided to dissolve this party. Dr Khalil then asked Siraj-al-Din to forward to him a list containing the names of the persons in the majority who had approved the dissolution of the party. However, Siraj-al-Din never did send this list to him. Thus, the decision to dissolve the Wafd Party was a decision with no foundation. I also expect that 'Abd al-Latif al-Baghdadi and Kamal al-Din Husayn (members of the Egyptian Revolutionary Command Council), along with

Mumtaz Nassar, will form a new party called the "Justice Party" or called by some other name. The task of such a party will be to defend the principles of the Egyptian revolution and combat deviations from this revolution. The significant fact in this context is that the other political parties were formed as a result of a decision made by the late President al-Sadat. These latter parties include the party in power, the National Democratic Party; the NPUG, an opposition party led by Khalid Muhyi al-Din; the Socialist Labor Party, an opposition party led by Ibrahim Shukri; and the Liberal Party, led by Mustafa Kamil Murad. When al-Sadat was in power, he would go so far as to get a group of persons together to have them join the Socialist Labor Party, which was an opposition party! He also appointed Mustafa Kamil Murad head of the Liberal Party, thereby making him the leader of the opposition in Egypt! Before this we had never heard of the leader of the opposition being appointed by a Republican Decree. Later on, al-Sadat dismissed Mustafa Kamil Murad from his position as leader of the opposition. These parties tend to embrace several parties or trends within the framework of a single party. For example, the Rally Party includes Nasserites, communists, and socialists. I believe that the Nasserites now will form their own party in Egypt, and I believe that the communists will do the same thing. The Islamic groups also want to form a party, but there are those who are opposed to the formation of an Islamic party because they feel that this would automatically mean that a Christian party should be formed. If the Wafd Party once again resumes its public activity, I expect that most of the Copts will join it. At this point we would do well to remember that the 1919 revolution was what united the Muslims and the Copts. When Sa'd Zaghlul formed his first government, he brought a list of the names of the members of his government to King Fu'ad. The king took the list, read the names in it, then returned the list to Sa'd Zaghlul and said to him:

"There is a mistake in this list. The list contains the names of ten ministers, eight of whom are Muslims and two of whom are Copts (Murgus Hanna, minister of public works, and Wasif Butrus Ghali, minister of foreign affairs). According to tradition, nine of the ministers should be Muslims and only one of them should be a Copt." Sa'd Zaghlul then replied:

"This is not a government of traditions, but rather a revolutionary government. When the British exiled us to the Seychelles, they exiled six Egyptian leaders--four of whom were Muslims and two of whom were Copts. When the British gave their orders to carry out the executions, they executed seven Egyptian leaders--four of whom were Muslims and three of whom were Copts. When they were firing upon the revolutionaries, they did not take into consideration matters such as proportional representation. For this reason, when we form our government we are also not taking into consideration proportional representation."

King Fu'ad then signed the decree [approving the formation of Sa'd Zaghlul's government].

In those days things in Egypt reached the point where Wasif Butrus Ghali, while he was in Paris, was elected as a representative from the Biba election district--even though not even a single Copt lived in this election district.

I believe that the upcoming People's Assembly elections will enable each party to assume its normal form and size. Also, I expect that these elections will be free elections.

The "City Thieves Party"

[Question] Some analysts are saying that President Mubarak's administration has opened up the way to freedom and democracy not because of the strength of this administration, but rather because it has been unable to stem this tide after al-Sadat's assassination. What is your opinion about this?

[Answer] My opinion is that repression is the result of weakness and freedom is the result of strength. A strong ruler does not resort to tyranny unless he is unsure of his position. I believe that what these analysts are saying is nothing more than rumors. Rumors such as these are being circulated by the "city thieves." Egypt has a party called the "city thieves party." This party is active and operates underground, and it will remain underground as long as it does not have the courage to come out into the open. The members of this party are seen in the Court of Ethics, and their leaders are selected by the attorney general. These people feel that the sunshine of day is their enemy and the darkness of night is their ally. It is easy to steal at night, but stealing during the daytime is something which is difficult and is hard work. This is why they are calling for the lights to be put out and this is why they feel that the sun is something which is hostile to their law and foreign to their lexicon. Of course the members of the "city thieves party" are people who are powerful and they have a great deal of money. Nevertheless, I believe that this party is far weaker than the Egyptian people, and I believe that the Egyptian people are capable of roundly defeating this party in any free People's Assembly elections. Whenever the "city thieves" sense that freedom has come to the city to reside and settle in it--rather than coming to the city as a tourist who stays at the Hilton Hotel and then moves on to another city--the "city thieves" are overcome by fear and terror and then they start circulating rumors. Sometimes some of the people who spent 30 years in jail and in prison camps, and who suffered torture during that time, are the ones who fear and believe these rumors.

They Learned Nothing From al-Sadat's Assassination

[Question] There is no doubt that the experiment with the opposition which is going on right now in Egypt is an important experiment. However, there are those who say that the Egyptian opposition--the opposition parties, individuals in the opposition, and opposition newspapers--is not undertaking the role that it should and is not playing the opposition game as is done in the Western democracies. There are those who say that the Egyptian opposition is having no real effect on the political, economic, and social decisions made by the government. They are saying that the opposition and the government stand worlds apart. Is this an accurate assessment? What is your opinion about the role which the Egyptian opposition is playing right now?

[Answer] There is no doubt that the Egyptian government is taking the opposition fully into consideration and that the opposition newspapers are letting

their voices ring loud and clear--although these voices occasionally appear to be louder and bigger than the actual weight of the opposition. The fact is that one cannot be content to have an opposition which is appointed by the president of the republic. There must be an opposition which is established as a result of popular elections. This can actually be carried out by permitting Egyptian political parties to exercise their political activity openly rather than underground. The Wafdist are active, the communists are active, and the Nasserites, Muslim Brothers, and others are also active. But this activity on their part is not an activity which is considered legitimate, and it is not out in the open. The opposition, instead of being outside the People's Assembly, should be inside the People's Assembly and its activities should begin there. I anticipate that this will happen, although there still are people who oppose democracy. The strange thing is that there are some people in Egypt who oppose President Mubarak's trend toward democracy and his determination to achieve democracy even though they themselves were sitting alongside Mubarak in the reviewing stand when al-Sadat was assassinated. Such people did not learn anything from al-Sadat's assassination.

Egypt Has Become Free of Camp David

[Question] We notice that relations between Egypt and Israel are relations which are cool or tense, and we notice that "normalization," for all practical purposes, has come to a halt. Do you expect matters to go beyond this? That is, do you expect President Mubarak to make the decision to abrogate the Camp David treaty--especially since this treaty is one which paralyzes the role which Egypt would normally play in the Arab world?

[Answer] Israel is the one that thwarted the Camp David treaty by virtue of its attack on the Iraqi nuclear reactor plant, its occupation of Lebanon, its vicious treatment of the Palestinians in the occupied territories, and its establishment of settlements in these areas. All of these things constitute graves where the Camp David treaty has been buried.

[Question] But is this treaty not still alive from the legal and official point of view?

[Answer] What does it mean when you say "alive from the legal point of view"? How can the Camp David treaty really be alive when every day we are protesting Israel's policy, we are opposing Israel's occupation of Lebanon, we are demanding that the PLO play a role in the peace negotiations, and we are demanding that there be a Palestinian government in exile? I believe that Menahem Begin, by means of his policy, actions, and positions taken, has freed Egypt of the Camp David treaty. Right now Egypt has become free of the Camp David treaty. The principal purpose of the Camp David treaty was to isolate Egypt from the Arab world, both as far as positions and relations were concerned. What is happening right now is that President Mubarak is drawing closer to the Arab nations by virtue of the positions which he has taken--and not only by virtue of his statements and speeches. Some people do not believe that I am a Muslim if I perform the five daily prayers, make the pilgrimage to Mecca, fast during the month of Ramadan, recite the Muslim creed, and give

alms. Such people say: "You are not a full-fledged Muslim because you have not kissed the hand of the Shaykh of al-Azhar." What more can an Arab nation such as Egypt do than Mubarak has already done? He has helped Iraq, he has taken his stand in support of Lebanon, and, during one meeting with President Reagan, he said that "the occupation of even a single square inch of Lebanese territory is tantamount to occupation of Egyptian territory." What more do they want? Do they want Egypt to tear up the paper (the Camp David treaty) so that it can be said that Egypt no longer respects its obligations and treaties and so that Israel can once again occupy Egyptian territory--so that we will once again have to begin negotiations to liberate our territory just like the Lebanese are now conducting negotiations to liberate their territory? Do they want Egypt once again to have to taste the bitter dish of occupation? We had this occupation already for many years, and this has been enough.

There Is No Need to Certify the Fact That Egypt Is an Arab Nation

[Question] How, then, could one describe relations between Egypt and the Arab nations right now? What steps should be taken to develop these relations and to restore them to what they used to be?

[Answer] From time to time some people in the Arab world ask the question: Who is going to undertake the first step in order to restore relations between Egypt and the Arab nations? I believe that Egypt has already undertaken the first step--in fact, it has already undertaken more than one step. One of these first steps was when Mubarak demanded, a few days after he came to power, that the chief editors of the newspapers not attack any Arab nation--even though this nation might attack Egypt and its president. Mubarak also undertook another such step when he sent weapons to Iraq after Iraq requested them. And he is still sending weapons to Iraq. Furthermore, a number of Egyptians volunteered to serve in the Iraqi Army to fight against the Iranians. Mubarak has also undertaken other steps such as supporting the PLO, taking the position to support Lebanon against Israel, and giving his backing to any Arab position which opposes the enemies of the Arabs. At this point it should be said that Egypt is an Arab country, and that there is no need to certify or prove this fact. Egypt has been an Arab country for a very long time. For several generations we have been on record as being Arabs. We were Arabs when the 1919 revolution took place. This was a revolution which was followed by the revolutions of the other Arab nations--revolutions which were sometimes affected by the 1919 revolution and sometimes used it as a model. In fact, the residence of the leader of every revolution came to be called the "House of the Nation" and the leader of every revolution came to be called the "Lofty Leader"--as was the case with Sa'd Zaghlul. We have been Arabs for a very long time. We acted as Arabs when the French imprisoned Bisharah al-Khuri, Riyad al-Sulh, and a number of the other Lebanese leaders. When this happened, demonstrators in Egypt called for the downfall of France and King Faruq sent his famous telegram to Bisharah al-Khuri, who was imprisoned in the Rashayya fortress, assuring him of his support. We were Arabs when we helped the Algerians by sending them arms, and as punishment for this support of ours for the Algerian revolutionaries, Egypt was bombed by the French in 1956. We are Arabs by virtue of the fact that so many Egyptians have fallen on the field of battle

fighting for the Arabs. We fought as Arabs for the Arabs in the wars in 1948, 1956, 1967, and 1973, and the result was that 200,000 Egyptians were killed and 500,000 ended up either missing or badly wounded. When you walk in the streets of Cairo, you see thousands upon thousands of handicapped persons who have lost their arms, legs, or other parts of their bodies. They are testimony to the fact that Egypt is an Arab nation. Let me add to this the fact that Egypt has used, and is still using, all of its influence with the U.S. and the West to support the causes of Palestine and Lebanon. In every meeting that President Mubarak has held with President Reagan, President Mitterrand, Prime Minister Thatcher, or with any Arab leader, he has talked about Palestine and Lebanon just as much as he has talked about Egypt. At these meetings he has talked no more about Egypt than he has about Palestine and Lebanon. The media attacks which took place between the Palestinians and Egypt after the resolutions passed by the most recent session of the Palestinian National Council in Algeria is something which is constantly taking place between fellow-Arabs. We do not reproach our Palestinian brethren for any of the remarks which they might say because we consider that a person deprived of his homeland has the right to say whatever he wants to. If we do not have the right to defend ourselves to the point of hurting anyone, then it is our duty to forget [the insults which we receive from others]!

Mubarak Between the U.S. and Russia

[Question] How does President Mubarak deal with the U.S. and the Soviet Union, in comparison to the way in which the late Presidents Nassier and al-Sadat dealt with them? What do the U.S. and Russia want from Egypt?

[Answer] I am against having Egypt throw itself into the arms of either of the two camps. It is in the interests of Egypt that it have good relations with both camps. I was against Egypt throwing itself into the arms of Russia and opposing the U.S., and I am now against Egypt throwing itself into the arms of the U.S. and opposing Russia. Egypt, as well as all other small nations, needs to have the friendship of both camps since neither of the two camps possesses absolute power. There was a time when Egypt threw itself into the arms of Russia, and after that Egypt threw itself into the arms of the U.S. Today, there is a type of balance in Egypt's relations with Washington and Moscow. Our relations with the U.S. are very good, but our policy is independent of that of the U.S. We differ with the U.S. concerning Palestine, concerning the nature of our relations with Israel, and concerning the policy of the U.S. in the Middle East. We are utilizing our friendship with the U.S. in order to exercise pressure for the sake of the causes that we believe in. Events have proven the fact that it is a mistake to allow the U.S. to remain in the hands of Israel. Furthermore, I believe that we should have good relations with Russia as well. If I have good relations with the U.S., this does not mean that I should allow a pro-U.S. party to be formed in Egypt or allow the U.S. to intervene in Egypt's internal affairs and appoint some ministers and chief editors of newspapers or object to the appointment of certain other ministers and chief editors. Not at all. Egypt is determined to be totally independent. And it is on this basis that we should also maintain relations with Russia.

The U.S. Does Not Dominate Egypt

[Question] Nevertheless, for some time now articles and statements have been published in Egypt which say that Egypt is dominated by the U.S. Is this true?

[Answer] No, this is not true. Today Egypt is not dominated by the U.S. or by any other country. We have good economic, commercial, cultural, and political relations with the U.S., and we also buy weapons from the U.S. But, at the same time, we also buy weapons from France, Italy, Britain, China, and Japan. What I am trying to say is that the Egypt of President Mubarak is not an Egypt which is sitting on the lap of the U.S., but rather is sitting alongside the U.S. This sitting area also has room enough for the Soviet Union to sit down there. Egypt does not intend to use Russia to fight the U.S., nor does it intend to use the U.S. to fight Russia. This is a policy which has proven to be a failure.

The Next War Will Be a Nuclear One!

[Question] What, then, do the U.S. and Russia want from Egypt?

[Answer] The great powers are not charity organizations. Apparently only the Arab nations are charity organizations which extend help and sacrifice themselves for others in the name of God. Every great power does everything possible to promote its own interests, and it is only after taking care of this that a great power considers the interests of other nations. I want Egypt to be a nation which is an independent and stable nation in the Middle East because this will consolidate peace--which is in the interests of both parties. I do not want my nation to be a theater of war where the U.S. and Russia fight each other. I prefer to see it be an arena where the two great powers meet with each other [and talk]. When I am helping to achieve peace in the area, I am serving the interests of the U.S., Russia, and the Arab nations all at the same time. However, when I act as the fuse for a powder keg, I am blowing up the U.S., Russia, and the Arab nations all at once--especially since the next war, if it occurs, will be a nuclear war.

"We All Constitute a Fifth Column"

[Question] Since the fifties the policy of the U.S. has had the objective of isolating Egypt from the other Arab nations. Is the U.S. still continuing with this policy?

[Answer] If the Arab nations would unite, it would not be possible for either the U.S. or Russia to carry out any such plan against us. Our schisms and disputes are what is paving the way for some of these plans hatched by foreign nations to be implemented against us. I believe that all of us, with our schisms and disputes, constitute our own "fifth column."

Corruption Has Become Worse in Egypt

[Question] Where has President Mubarak succeeded, and where has he failed?

[Answer] He was successful when he began a campaign to purge Egypt of corruption and corrupt individuals. He brought to court a number of individuals who had exploited the influence which they had, such as 'Ismat al-Sadat, Rashad 'Uthman, and Tawfiq 'Abd al-Hayy. However, I do not believe that the state apparatus is capable of eliminating all corruption and corrupt individuals because corruption is something that has become worse and spread throughout Egypt. Turning on the spotlights is something which will serve to uncover corruption and corrupt individuals, and it will frighten other individuals newly embarking upon the path of corruption. But turning on the spotlights means having freedom of the press. Freedom of the press means that there will be few thieves, and shackling the press means that there will be many thieves! Having freedom of the press means giving our nation people such as Tal'at Harb, and having a shackled press means giving our nation people such as 'Ismat al-Sadat. The second thing that Mubarak has succeeded in is the fact that he has improved relations with the other Arab nations. The third thing is that he has strengthened Egypt's position internationally. Egypt, after having only one friend (the U.S.), now has a number of friends. Experience has taught us that a single friend is not able to do very much for us. The fourth thing is that Mubarak has promoted a climate of freedom and democracy, has opened up the jails, and has eliminated sectarian strife. We, of course, wish to see things happen faster, but it is only fair for us to recognize that Mubarak inherited a legacy that was heavy with debts and burdens--and he is gradually paying off these debts and successfully dealing with these burdens. Some of us have wished to see these debts paid off faster, but the debts are so enormous that they cannot be paid off within the space of 1 and 1/2 years. Something which has been destroyed over the course of 30 years cannot be rebuilt in less than 30 months. We are rushing to build a skyscraper, but we do not wish to wait until all of the rubble has been cleared away [before starting to build it].

[Question] If free elections were held, do you believe that the Egyptians would elect Mubarak as their president?

[Answer] If free elections were held today, the Egyptians would elect Husni Mubarak as their president. I know for a fact that all of the political parties which have formed, and all of those that are going to be formed, would support the election of Mubarak as president of the republic.

The Great Achievement

[Question] What great achievement do you expect to see accomplished by President Mubarak?

[Answer] The great achievement which I expect to see him accomplish is the holding of free People's Assembly elections and the restoration of normal government, normal laws, and the assurance of the observance of human rights in Egypt. My opinion is that, if the observance of human rights were assured in Egypt, this would then have its effect on a number of the other Arab countries where human rights are being trampled upon. We exported to some of these Arab nations things such as prison camps, emergency courts, and different

types of restrictions, but now the time has come for us to export human rights to them. I would like to mention the fact that every coup d'etat carried out by military dictators in every Arab nation has always declared, in its first public statement after the coup d'etat, that it was necessary for the sake of liberating Palestine to dissolve the parliament, restrict freedom, and impose dictatorial rule. But not one single dictator has been able to liberate even one square inch of Palestine.

U.S. Policy Wins Elections, But Loses the World

[Question] What is your assessment of the role that the U.S. is playing in the Middle East right now?

[Answer] U.S. policy in the Middle East is a policy which is extremely foolish. Any enemy of the U.S. could not do more damage to the U.S. than the U.S. is already doing to itself. U.S. policy is one which wins elections, but loses the world. It is difficult for us to imagine that American minds, which are responsible for so much scientific progress and which put mankind on the moon, are unable to comprehend the truth of the situation in the Middle East and are unable to realize the truth about the positions taken there.

"We Created Israel"

[Question] Is it true that the Middle East right now is living through a so-called "Israeli era"?

[Answer] Wars are won by free people and are lost by slaves. If our situation were different, it would be impossible for Israel to be raising hell in the Middle East the way it is doing this right now. Shackled hands are unable to fire a cannon, closed eyes are unable to hit a target, and tongues which have been cut off are unable to raise morale. Give me freedom, and I will give you victory. I believe that we are the ones who created Israel. We are not the backward nations that some people accuse us of being. When a car turns over, it is not the fault of the car, but rather the fault of the driver. With many of the cars that we use, we are not using their engines and we are not putting gasoline in them. We are only honking the horns in the cars and are imagining that the cars are moving!

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CRISIS IN MEDICAL PROFESSION DETAILED IN TALKS WITH DOCTORS

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[Article by Rabi' Abu al-Khayr and Sulayman 'Abd-al-'Azim: "40,000 Young Doctors Complain of Their Conditions; Union Defends Interests of Prominent Doctors Only; Why Don't Young Doctors Elect Members They Want to Council?"]

[Text] A total of 40,000 young doctors representing 70 percent of the Doctors Union membership are looking for their place on the medical profession map. They have been deceived by the glitter. These doctors graduated in the past 10 years. In the first 5 years, 17,000 doctors donned the "white gown." In the past 5 years, a number of doctors exceeding the previous figure by 35 percent stormed the medical arena. This latter number alone, 23,000 doctors, represents more than 40 percent of the current Doctors Union membership, which totals 56,000. Statistics show that nearly 4,800 doctors graduate annually from the 10 medical colleges in Egypt. Qasr al-'Ayni Medical College alone includes 12,000 students whereas the biggest school of medicine in the United States, Indiana University, has no more than 350 students. Here, there are 50 students in practical clinical training [in each college] whereas the number does not exceed 3-4 students in the United States and Britain. More than 20 students use the same microscope here and the patient is surprised to find more than 20 stethoscopes competing in an attempt to reach his ailing body. A single case is exemplified by at least 80 students. Thus, the students are trained "verbally." Dr Hamdi al-Sayyid, chairman of the Doctors Union, admits that the standard of medical graduates started to decline 15 years ago. Dr Ahmad al-Banhawi, chairman of the Consultative Council's Medical Committee, says: The standard of medical education in Egypt is high! A number of young doctors have abandoned medicine, not out of aversion to blood but in search of a reasonable salary. These doctors have found that the hotel business and tourism meet their desire. One of these doctors works in the automobile business in the afternoon.

On the other hand, every governor wants to establish a school of medicine in his governorate. This tendency is wrong, according to Dr al-Banhawi. Besides, is it reasonable that the salary of a specialized doctor be only 60 pounds [per month]? The young doctor's problem is large and acute and it will get worse when we learn that 25,000 more doctors will be graduated in the next 5 years. These are not all the figures. There are between

the lines other important figures that paint a picture close to the difficult reality under which 40,000 doctors live. The visible victim is perhaps the young doctor, but is there an unknown victim?

Who treats whom is a question the young doctors are raising nowadays.

The have said that they are sick with chronic problems and that they live in extremely difficult conditions. They have also said that their maladies have turned into endemic diseases, exactly like bilharzia, and that sedatives are no longer useful in treating these maladies.

The medical map says that there are two kinds of doctors: The first group comprised of the prominent and veteran doctors who have taken their place in Egyptian society and who in the past got the best clinics easily. This group has come to represent a sort of a dominant force in the medical profession by virtue of its geographic and moral position. Its geographic advantage lies in the excellent location of its clinics in the best quarters and buildings. Its moral advantage lies in its hospital jobs. At the most, this group does not exceed 30 percent of the medical profession. The second group is the crushed majority, which has no clinic and no reasonable salary. But what are the problems of the members of this group and has the sublime human profession entered the market of supply and demand? Has the bright profession lost its glitter?

Face to Face With Their Problems

We had to meet the people concerned with the issue to familiarize ourselves with their problems closely--problems they never tire of talking about. We have interviewed more than one doctor in more than one place. We have gotten together with various groups of young doctors specializing in various fields. We have gone into some university hospitals and some general hospitals. We have talked to them at popular clinics, rural health units and school health units.

What have they said?

The result is close to a chronic ailment from which they all, without exception, complain.

The main problem is that they get their B.S. in medicine after 6 years, i.e., 72 months, of study whereas the graduate of a business school gets his B.A. in just 28 months. In the end, both graduates earn an equal salary. Upon graduation, the doctor finds himself facing a year of training called the "internship year," and we don't know what distinction they mean. He is then assigned [as resident doctor] for a renewable 1-year term. Despite all this, the doctor is treated the same as his colleague the graduate of the school of arts and wastes 3 years during which the colleague will have obtained three salary raises or a higher grade. The doctor earns just the regular government salary plus 15 pounds [monthly] for clinic allowance. This allowance has not increased since 1936.

One doctor said ironically: This allowance is called many things, such as the full-time allowance, clinic allowance or nature-of-job allowance.

Their problems become more sharply defined with residency, work in the clinic, travel abroad, conscription and higher studies. Even their problems with their union have become, in their words, an obstacle in their way. They have told us verbatim: Frankly, 90 percent of Egypt's clinics are run by young doctors and 99 percent of the rural clinics are run by young doctors during the residency period or after this period (as acting clinic directors). They do not do this out of their love for the work or for the patients as much as they do it as a way to meet expenses.

Union for Prominent Doctors Only

When we talked with them about the union, the discussion heated up and turned into a violent attack. They all asserted that the union represents the prominent doctors only and that this is why 80 percent of the members do not pay dues after obtaining their license to practice medicine following graduation.

A young doctor who is a conscripted first lieutenant in the armed forces said: I personally have gone to the union only twice, the first time upon my graduation in 1979 to pay my subscription fee and get my license to practice and the second and last time to collect the aid advanced by the union to any doctor who joins the armed forces.

From Reality

Inside Qasr al-'Ayni Hospital, the interns raised a problem from which they all suffer, namely, the scarce training opportunities during their work, considering that the internship year is primarily a training period the doctor has to serve immediately upon graduation--a year at the end of which he becomes a resident doctor. There are in the hospital hundreds of interns distributed over the various sections. All the interns, without exception, want to gain experience and skill during their presence in the admission or emergency sections of the hospital. Dozens of interns and hundreds of patients have come in search of a cure. A single patient looks up to find more than 20 stethoscopes racing to reach his heart!

'Adil Khadr, an intern, decided to spend the internship year at Qasr al-'Ayni Hospital because it is one of the biggest university hospitals in Egypt. He said: Despite the high standard of education of the people working in the university hospitals, the training opportunity a young doctor gets in these hospitals is much smaller than the opportunity that another colleague gets at any other hospital controlled by the Ministry of Health.

But why?

The main interest of the prominent professors at any university hospital is directed at the teaching faculty, including instructors and tutors, and the intern comes at the bottom of the list. This is evident in the surgery

sections in particular by virtue of their being specializations that require more practical than clinical effort. Despite this, if a young doctor can manage to gain experience in these hospitals, he becomes more fortunate than his colleague in a general hospital, especially in pediatrics and internal medicine because they require more extensive clinical work. As for surgery specialization, the young doctor in a general hospital is luckier than his colleague at the university hospital.

Assignment Is Another Problem

At the end of the internship year, the doctor finds himself facing a "rural assignment" for a renewable period of 1 year. All graduates of the schools of medicine are subject to this assignment, except for incoming foreign graduates who total 5 percent of all medical students and who are distributed by the Ministry of Health in the republic's governorates according to their grades. The top graduates in every one of the 10 schools of medicine are exempted from this assignment.

In 1979, the number of graduates of the schools of medicine amounted to 4,499 students, including 530 from the fraternal Arab countries. The number of graduates subject to assignment was 3,961, 75 percent of them males. In 1981, the number of graduates rose to 5,413 doctors, including 590 incoming doctors. A total of 4,833 were subject to assignment.

In our talks with a group of assigned doctors, it has become evident that a large percentage of them goes to rural areas without knowing anything about their task there or about what to do. They have found that they are required to treat patients suffering mostly from endemic diseases, such as bilharzia and malnutrition. They are also required to manage the health units. This is why most of them fall captive to the "nurses" and people with pull.

At a doctor's office, we accidentally met a colleague of this doctor who is assigned to one of the rural units in al-Fayyum Governorate. The colleague told us verbatim: We are mere civil servants sitting behind our desks. Our future is vague. I feel that my profession is no different from that of a grocer. I practice every day under the cover of the white gown a different job that I don't understand. Treatment? What words!

Another doctor whom we interviewed briefly told us frankly: I am Ibrahim al-'Abbasi. I have spent 4 months of my assignment period in Bani Suwayf rural area. The official work hours begin at 0800 and end at 1200. But we used to wake up at 0900 and begin the work lazily at 1030. By then the line of waiting patients had to pay fees. We collected the fees and split them equally with the unit nurse.

Problems of Rural Doctor

We went to a rural health unit to investigate the problems of the rural doctor on the spot. Our choice was the health unit in al-Barajil, al-Jizah Governorate. This unit was established by the revolution in 1954 when it

thought of spreading the system of collective units throughout the country. The goal was to have each collective unit include a hospital, a school and a village council. Now that nearly 30 years of the experiment have passed, have the revolution's aspirations been achieved?

We asked Fathiyah Muhammad 'Ali, a resident doctor who graduated from al-Azhar School of Medicine in 1980, about her problems at work:

"Numerous and varied problems. I have with me another doctor, who is my husband, and the two of us are responsible for managing the hospital, examining the patients and dispensing the medicine because there is no pharmacist in the unit. The hospital suffers from a shortage of drugs. The drugs dispensed are limited and monotonous and any citizen in the Egyptian countryside knows them, namely, penicillin and vitamin tablets and capsules. In most cases, there are drugs enough for only 1 month of the year. I am also required to examine the students of the elementary school within the unit's jurisdiction and to follow up on the children's vaccination campaigns against measles and poliomyelitis." The hospital has a surgery that has been closed for the past 20 years. When we asked the reason, Dr Fathiyah 'Ali said: There is a shortage of surgeons and anesthesiologists. What is surprising is that some minor surgeries were performed in this room before it was closed. It can be used to perform tonsillectomies, especially since 80 percent of the elementary school children suffer from tonsillitis, according to Dr Fathiyah, and most of them need to have their tonsils removed. For the rural health units to perform their role in the desired manner, there have to be groups of specialists in various fields, such as internal diseases and chest and heart diseases, so that the assigned doctor can gain experience and training and the patient gain a greater benefit, with the patients being treated by the unit instead of having to be transferred to the general hospitals.

Clinic Allowance Is Also Problem

At the Imbabah Contagious Diseases Hospital, young doctors raised the problem of the clinic allowance. They said that a doctor collects this allowance until he gets his M.S. degree and then the allowance is terminated on the grounds that the doctor is then allowed to open his own office. Dr 'Ali Ahmad al-Dib, a contagious diseases specialist, proposed as a solution to the problem that the doctor collect the allowance provided that he pledges to the union in writing that he will not open a private practice. If the opposite is proven, then the doctor would be penalized administratively and financially.

Dr Jawdah 'Abd-al-Rahman, a contagious diseases specialist, wonders how the clinic allowance can remain the same, without any increase, since 1936. The amount of the allowance has been 15 pounds [monthly] for the past 47 years whereas a doctor's salary in 1936 was 15 pounds. A doctor could then find an apartment and open an office with this sum. If I am required to work three times weekly from 0800 until 1300 on the following day, then where is the cash recompense equal to this effort? We collect 3 pounds per shift, i.e., the equivalent of 13 piasters per hour of overtime work!

It is well known that specialization in contagious diseases [fevers] is a scarce specialization. Throughout the republic, there are only 165 such specialists. Despite this, the problem of enrolling these doctors in higher studies remains unsolved. This has caused these doctors to view the higher studies system as unfair insofar as their rights are concerned. This is why they demand that registration for the M.S. degree be confined to the contagious diseases specialization alone, as is the case in advanced countries. They also demand that contagious diseases be separated from internal diseases. Whereas they study contagious, internal and parasitic diseases for 2 years, their colleagues who specialize in internal medicine study internal diseases only. Their third demand is that the designation of the M.S. degree they receive be changed from one in the medicine and health of tropical areas, which the public does not understand, to M.S. in general internal and contagious diseases or M.S. in general internal and endemic diseases.

Mahjub Muhammad Hamzah, a resident doctor, said that he gets 5 pounds monthly as a contagion allowance, although this is not enough to buy a box of capsules if he catches an infection. Meanwhile, a colleague who graduated with him at the same time and who works at the health insurance hospitals gets 100 percent of his salary in allowance. Has work in these hospitals become exploitation work?

Problems of Conscribed Doctors

At the Port Said General Hospital, Dr 'Abd-al-'Aziz Qishtah, a surgery specialist, raised the problems experienced by conscribed doctors, noting that after having spent 4 years in the armed forces during which he obtained a diploma in surgery and worked as assistant surgeon for 2 years, he has not been able to work in Ministry of Health hospitals which make it conditional that he spend 2 years as assistant surgeon before obtaining the grade of assistant specialist. He added: The period of my service in the armed forces has not been included for the purpose of seniority even though I acquired my B.S. in medicine in 1970. I have found myself compelled to again work as assistant surgeon for a period of 2 years at the ministry's hospitals before obtaining my certification as an assistant specialist. I have to wait for 5 more years before I get the degree of specialist. Thus, this problem has caused me, and others, to lose 2 years. Is it our fault that the armed forces selected us as reserve officers?

Dr 'Umar Ahmad 'Isa, assistant surgeon at Bulaq al-Dakrur General Hospital, said: Our colleagues who have been conscribed as ordinary soldiers or who have no military service to their credit precede us reserve officers in enrollment for the M.S. degree. Even among us military medical officers, a doctor assigned to a military hospital enjoys the advantage of enrollment for the M.S. degree whereas a colleague assigned to a military unit that is remote from the hospitals is denied such an advantage.

Salary Is Crux of Issue

One of the young doctors said: "Government salaries neither fatten nor keep starvation away." At the Heart and Chest Surgery Institute in Imbabah, we asked three doctors if the government salary is the main problem for any doctor. Their answers were unanimous: Yes.

Dr Usamah Muhsin said: For the patient to trust his doctor, the latter has to maintain a certain social appearance. But when we speak of what the doctor should have compared with what he really has, we find, for example, that my basic salary has not exceeded 45 pounds monthly even though I graduated in 1976. With the work allowance added, my salary becomes 59 pounds. When we try to improve our income by opening private offices, we face a dilemma. We either neglect the heart patient in the hospital or neglect our private practice. This is why the majority of the heart doctors don't open private offices, because the loser ultimately is the patient.

Dr 'Adil al-Banna added that there is a difference between a doctor and a civil servant. A doctor, for example, cannot be at all negligent while performing heart surgery whereas a civil servant can stash a dossier somewhere and obstruct the work without even being censured. We stay with the patient for 2 consecutive days without any rest break in order to provide him with medical care. This is our duty and we are treated differently, with moral and material appreciation. The problem is that people deal with the doctor as if he is a person with no concerns or problems. They have formed the idea that the doctor is a "materially comfortable" man whereas the reality does not support this. My salary, for example, is less than 60 pounds and I am required to maintain a proper appearance before the patient and to smile while around him so that he will feel psychologically relaxed, while I am tied in knots inside. To be frank, I would have chosen another profession if I didn't love this one. But this is my fate.

Dr 'Adil al-Banna added: I have a colleague who graduated from Qasr al-'Ayni School of Medicine in 1975. He has his private practice and works at a hospital in the morning. Even though he has an M.S. degree, he works in the automobile business in the afternoons. I have another colleague who is an assistant pediatrician. At night, he works at the reception desk of the Holiday Inn.

Dr Nadiyah 'Abd-al-Wahhab, an assistant internal diseases surgeon at al-Khalifah General Hospital, said: I acquired my M.S. degree 2 years ago and I have refused promotion to assistant specialist so that my clinic allowance will not be cancelled because I cannot open a private office as a result of the high key money demanded. The decision to promote me to the position of assistant specialist at Dar al-Salam Hospital was made 2 months ago. I have turned down the promotion because of the long distance between the hospital and al-Marj, where I reside. I have sacrificed an extra year, which I have spent as assistant surgeon, in order to keep the allowance. Besides, 5 hours of my life are wasted daily in getting to the hospital and back to my house. If I go to Dar al-Salam Hospital, the lost time would increase by 1 hour. What is surprising is that the areas of al-Amiriyah,

al-Matariyah and 'Ayn Shams have no hospital. Manshiyat al-Bakri Hospital is the closest to the residents of these areas. What is also surprising is that the internal diseases section in which I work has a host of doctors. It has 19 specialists, 12 assistant surgeons and 25 interns, even though there are no more than 16 hospital beds in the section, meaning that there are three doctors for every bed. This reduces the chances of training and learning, keeping in mind that there are hospitals suffering from a shortage of doctors.

Opening Excessive Number of Offices Is Wrong

Dr Nadiyah added a serious opinion: Solving our problems does not at all lie in opening an excessive number of private offices, meaning that not every doctor should have a private practice so that the sublime profession does not turn into commerce dominated by commercial laws, including cheating and deception. We cannot compare the doctor to a merchant.

Dr Huda Muhammad Radwan, an internal diseases specialist at al-Khalifah General Hospital, said that nobody believes her when she says that her net income so far is 60 pounds despite 10 years of experience.

She added disapprovingly: How can the clinic allowance be taken away from me just because I have gotten my M.S. degree and even though I don't have a private office yet?

Dr Huda Radwan also said that she does not collect a contagion allowance even though she treats cases that expose her to infection. Why shouldn't we collect a contagion allowance and an allowance for full-time service, with the allowances increased gradually according to the doctor's degree and in a manner similar to the administrative doctors at the Ministry of Health?

Nobody pays any attention to us or to our problems. We don't even feel the presence of the union, which is the doctors' legitimate representative. This is why we find that the majority of the young doctors do not pay their dues, except once, when they want to get their license to practice medicine. When the union's election dates approach, the hospitals pay the subscription fees of the doctors working there. This fee is 12 pounds and is deducted from the doctor's salary in monthly installments.

Muhammad Amin, an intern at al-Husayn Hospital, said that the young doctor feels that the veteran professionals have established themselves at the top of the profession and that their financial situation allows them to view the young doctors' problems only from above. What is worse, the profession's veterans, constituting only 0.5 percent of the doctors in Egypt, are the cause of the young doctors' crisis because their opinions dominate the union's policies and the union serves only the interests of the prominent doctors who control it.

Working in Prominent Doctors' Offices

A doctor may also resort to working in the offices of prominent professors in return for a certain percentage on which both sides agree. This was asserted by Dr Muhammad 'Izz-al-Din, an assistant instructor at al-Azhar School of Medicine who graduated in 1976 and who is assigned to the Heart Institute. The percentage may range from 2-5 for assistants in some surgeries. This percentage is not set and is subject to the prominent professor's evaluation.

When we asked him about his salary, he said: There is no need to reveal it because I am ashamed to say what it is. Suffice it to say that I don't have the money to buy books and references and that at times I resort to borrowing these books from my professors. This might be an individual case not repeated elsewhere.

Dr 'Ali Basyuni, an assistant surgeon at the Port Sa'id General Hospital, said that a doctor's relationship with the books does not end with the college years. I need to familiarize myself with the latest methods of treatment and diagnosis. But my salary, not exceeding 50 pounds, does not permit me to buy the medical magazines and periodicals. This is reflected in the level of the doctor's ability and skill, whether in terms of diagnosis or of performing surgery. Dr Fawzi al-Sharbini, a bone specialist at Port Sa'id Hospital, asserted that even though 15 years have passed since he began practicing and even though his wife is also a doctor, he has not yet been able to obtain an apartment to equip it as an office because the key money demanded is 7,000 pounds. Where could he find such a sum?!

Dr Salwa Nasif, an assistant specialist in internal diseases at al-Khalifah General Hospital, raised the issue of the stress allowance the doctor should get, saying: Often, the specialist is called on to work after the official hours, whether day or night. Such summons are supposed to be in return for wages and there has to be a codified stress allowance for doctors. Each year, 100 doctors die from arteriosclerosis, ulcers and diabetes.

Cure Required for Doctors

Doctors working in the school medical units also have their problems. They say that the school units are the "doctors' exile" because the doctors suffer from countless problems, most significant being the lack of internal scholarships, which the Ministry of Health allocates for doctors to get their M.S. degree, when such units are compared with the hospitals. Moreover, the doctors working in these units do not get any incentives like those that doctors in the hospitals get because of the absence of low-fee treatment in the school units. Moreover, doctors engaged in preventive medicine and in preventive health inspection are denied the contagion allowance even though they work in the field of preventive medicine, with the exception of doctors dealing with skin and endemic diseases.

What is surprising is that the doctors are the group that has no specific medical care system even though they treat others. The profession's code

of ethics states that a doctor may not charge fees to a colleague, his wife or his children. But if a doctor's immediate relative, such as mother, father or brother, gets sick, then the problem arises.

One of the doctors we interviewed told us that a solution must be found to this problem because it is unreasonable for a doctor to be searching for a place in which to have a relative treated. We said: You are doctors, so what is the solution?

They said that this problem is the responsibility of the Doctors Union and the Ministry of Health. If the Doctors Union has not yet found a solution to this problem, then it is a union that is remote from our problems.

Union of One-Half Percent

At the Doctors Union, we interviewed Dr 'Amr 'Abbas, Young Doctors Committee secretary, and asked him about the committee's plans for solving the problems of the young doctors.

He said: At the meeting of the doctors general assembly last January, the committee presented a plan for solving the doctors' problems. We said that the doctors' main problem is their meager salaries, not the problem of allowances. Government laws concerning wages have not been applied to us. Three years must be given to the doctor as seniority years [upon his starting the job]. Moreover, the labor laws set the work hours at 8 hours daily and these laws are applied to all civil servants, with the exception of interns, rural doctors and assisting doctors. The committee proposed that doctors be treated on the basis of the official work hours, that they be paid one and a half times their wages for overtime work during weekdays and two times their wages during holidays. We also demanded that the name of the clinic allowance be changed to examination allowance and that a 100-percent allowance be paid for full-time service.

[Question] But the doctors complain of the failure to pay the contagion allowance to some groups of doctors.

[Answer] The contagion allowance must be paid to all doctors, with no exceptions. Not only communicable disease and chest doctors are exposed to contagion. This allowance should be called the vocational hazards allowance. We also demanded that the night duty allowance be codified for resident doctors and that the allowance for assignment in remote areas be increased so as to encourage doctors to work in such areas. We further demanded that the internship year be considered for (credit) upon enrollment for higher studies.

What Do Professors Say?

Every coin has two faces. What do the deans and professors of the schools of medicine say?

Dr Ahmad al-Banhawi, chairman of the consultative council's health committee and dean of 'Ayn Shams School of Medicine, believes that it is untrue that medical instruction in Egypt is not good. The proof of this is the success of any doctor emigrating to the United States, England, Germany or France. These countries have a large number of young Egyptian doctors who have excelled over their colleagues, the graduates in these countries.

The problem does not lie in the number of professors because we have enough professors to instruct twice the number of students enrolled.

The basic problem is perhaps the lack of space to accommodate the number of qualified students enrolled in the schools of medicine annually. There aren't enough laboratories for this number and there are no lecture halls. Moreover, the number of patients and of hospital beds needed to instruct and train a young doctor is declining sharply as a result of the frightening annual increase in the number of medical students.

Moreover, how can the large numbers that apply for the M.S. degree be accepted all at once, keeping in mind that half the number of students enrolled for this degree are supposed to get their degree every year. The problems began to accumulate in past years when the general practitioner felt that the B.S. degree was not the end of the road qualifying him to be a good doctor. This is why the number of doctors with a B.S. applying for the M.S. degree rose sharply. This is why we are also forced to accept them in turn. A doctor may have to wait 4 or 5 years before he can enroll for the M.S. degree. We are not responsible for this problem. Rather, the shift by patients to specialists is what has put the general practitioner in this dilemma, and the only way out of this is to enroll for the M.S. degree. But the Ministry of Health and the schools of medicine cannot enroll this enormous number at one time.

Young Doctor Is Done Injustice

The chairman of the consultative council's health committee added: I agree with the young doctor that the last 3 years of his studies should be added to his service so that he is treated equally with the graduates of other colleges. This demand is fair, especially when we see that the young doctor works more hours than his colleague, the civil servant employed in a government agency. These doctors are assigned 24-hour shifts three times a week. Therefore, they are entitled to collective allowances and incentive pay that equalize the graduate of the school of medicine with the graduates of the liberal arts colleges.

As for their demand for an increase in the clinic allowance, this is impossible to meet because all of the unions will then demand that the allowances paid to their members be raised. Egypt's resources are limited.

There is another thing that must be pointed out. The young doctors who have graduated in the past 10 years constitute more than 70 percent of the union members. Consequently, they represent a major force that has an influence on who is to represent them in the union. Why don't they elect

whomever they want in the union? They have no justification for not doing so because they constitute the majority of actual voters. If they don't like this council, they can elect another one.

Censure

Every doctor wants to open his private office as soon as he graduates. This is his right. But what I want to say is that the young doctors must curb their tendency to open offices everywhere because the state is now inclined toward generalizing the public health insurance system and treatment will be carried out in the near future in hospitals and institutes. Private doctors' offices are gradually on their way to declining in number. The young doctors have broad opportunities to work in the health insurance system. And why don't they turn to the countryside?

I believe that if they set up their offices in the cities it will be difficult for them to find patients. Here, I want to censure them as a professor who has taught them medicine. Why does every one of them want to reach his goal the easy way? Every day, one of them comes to my office to request that I intervene so that he will not be assigned in the Sinai. These doctors must not forget or disregard the fact that they have acquired their education in Egypt free of charge at a time when there is no school of medicine in the world that teaches its students free of charge.

Medical Experience at Outset

But what does Dr 'Umar 'Askar, a prominent Egyptian surgeon and former professor of surgery at Qasr al-'Ayni School of Medicine, say? He believes that the young doctor confronts at the outset of his career the problem of not having adequate experience. He has not learned enough to be able to treat patients. It may happen that this doctor suddenly finds himself alone in a hospital facing a man who has had an accident. If the doctor cannot rescue the victim, then he is not a doctor. I have also noticed that "modern-day" doctors use antibiotics excessively because they cannot make a correct diagnosis. This doesn't mean that the college professor does not give the student the basic instruction or that he withholds anything from his students. The professor gives them what he has, and what he has is not abundant. The difference between the old generation of professors and the present generation is that we learned by the method of the "doctor staying next to the patient's bed," i.e., learning at the bedside. The current generation of professors has been denied this opportunity. Consequently, what they have is not a lot. What do these professors convey to the students now? I recall that when we taught medicine in the 1940's, we had a hospital section with 100 beds and no more than 10 medical students. The share of each doctor was 10 beds whereas the patient nowadays finds himself swarmed over by 20 doctors, each seeking to examine him.

Dr 'Umar 'Askar added: The world's surgery training centers include hospitals for dogs and laboratory animals and contain surgery rooms equipped with the latest equipment sterilized and organized in the best manner. I

wish the surgeries in Egypt would attain the level of those for test animals abroad.

I confess that the professors, and I am one of them, are responsible for the decline in standards of medical care because we have accepted this decline. Had we refrained from working or had we refused to perform surgery when the operating rooms had no medical scissors and sterilized cotton, conditions in these operating rooms would not have deteriorated to their present level.

We are responsible for this. But we are not responsible for closing the doors of international medical conferences in the face of the Egyptian doctor in the 1960's. These conferences provide a great opportunity to exchange modern scientific knowledge and developments in the medical field.

When we examine the professor's time, we find it full of lectures, office and hospital work, practical follow-up of the world's medical news and the doctor's social activities within his family environment, in addition to no less than 10 M.S. theses to be evaluated annually. So what is expected of the professor?

I proposed a solution to this problem more than 15 years ago, namely, establish a school of internal medicine in which retired prominent professors work so that we might benefit from their experience of more than 30 years. I presented this plan to Ministry of Health officials. But by some magic, the plan turned into winter meetings in Aswan and summer meetings in Alexandria!

Confrontation With Union Chairman

We took the young doctors' complaints and opinions to their legitimate representative and the result was a heated dialogue with Dr Hamdi al-Sayyid, Doctors Union chairman. He said:

All that the young doctors raise is real and true. They are in a severe material dilemma.

It is truly regrettable that the union has been struggling for years to establish a distinction between university graduates according to their period of study. When law No 83 loomed on the horizon, the profession's demand was that a distinction had to be made between someone who has studied for 4 years and somebody else who has studied for 6 years and that relative seniority be given upon appointment according to the period of study. In other words, what I mean is that medical graduates should be given a relative seniority of 3 years.

Today, high school graduates are interested in medicine, despite all the risks, difficulties and hardship. At least 4,500 students out of a total of a half million high school graduates enroll in the medical schools, i.e., 1 of every 2,000 high school graduates enters the schools of medicine. When this student graduates, he finds himself facing a problem he did not

anticipate, a limited salary--and no allowance added to this salary to help meet exorbitant inflation. He also finds himself in another kind of tragedy, namely, no place in which to practice advanced medicine because the medical installations are in an extremely poor condition. This doctor's dreams of attaining his practical, psychological and intrinsic aspirations, not to mention material aspirations, are dashed. He tries to translate the experience and education he has gained into an offering but cannot do so because of extremely difficult circumstances. A part of these circumstances concerns equipment, a second part concerns government spending on health and a third part concerns accumulation. We have expanded by establishing new schools of medicine and enrolling large numbers of students, forgetting that these students will want to practice the profession in good medical institutes when they graduate. This accumulation [of graduates] has caused the doctors to feel frustrated upon graduation. The state has frustrated the graduate by teaching him and then expecting him to work for pennies. The state has frustrated the graduate by making him work in a frustrating environment. The worst frustration is that the graduate's educational aspiration to enroll in higher studies and to gain experience is not achieved because the study and training opportunities available are smaller than the increasing demand as a natural consequence of the increased number of students in the schools of medicine. It is enough to know that the number of grants available annually does not exceed 1,700 whereas the number of doctors graduated by the schools of medicine annually amounts to 5,000, on the average. At least half of each year's graduates are supposed to be enrolled in higher studies. Medicine has now become a discipline of higher studies. A doctor graduating after 7 years is just a basic doctor or a doctor who is not fully trained.

Even after completion of the higher studies, a doctor is not supposed to be content with what he has learned. He needs training, retraining and yet constant training to acquire new knowledge. If this is not achieved, then we are entrusting the citizen to a doctor who is not adequately trained or a doctor who has stopped his training at a certain point. Therefore, the state must guarantee that each doctor pass through three phases: The phase of undergraduate medical education, which must be a good education, with the number of students balanced against the resources of the colleges; a second phase that should last 3 years at a minimum; and the doctor must acquire a degree so that society will feel reassured and entrust its members to them.

Dr Hamdi al-Sayyid added that the profession is in a dilemma. Its members suffer from financial frustration, psychological frustration, educational frustration and frustration regarding the future. We have been screaming for 8 years, and we have presented the problem to officials in the colleges, in the People's Assembly, in the executive agencies and the minister of education, the presidents of the universities and the Universities Higher Council. Yet, we are accused of seeking to monopolize the medical profession.

The state has put us in this dilemma. This is indicated by the state's 5-year plan as reflected in the health sector. The number of hospital beds will drop from 1.9 beds per 1,000 citizens to 1.7 beds because the population

growth by 7 million people during the plan will not be accompanied by an increase in the number of beds so that we maintain the [current] "low ratio." The average ratio is 5-7 beds per thousand persons in the semi-advanced countries and 9-11 beds per 1,000 persons in the advanced countries. We have not even achieved the 2 beds per 1,000 level and have not maintained the current level. On the contrary, the situation is deteriorating at a time when 25,000 students will be graduated in the next 5 years who will not find a place in which to be trained. The situation will deteriorate further if we stand by and watch this farce.

Finally, we will raise a question that needs a quick answer before the high school general examinations start: Will the young doctors remain captives of their rosy dreams for long?

[Box on page 29] General Practitioners Represent 60 Percent of Doctors

There is an international percentage which says that 40 percent of the graduates must enroll in higher studies and acquire M.S. and Ph.D. degrees, with the rest remaining as general practitioners. The general practitioner handles 60 percent of all patients, reduces the number of Egyptian patients frequenting [specialized] clinics by 60 percent, absorbs 60 percent of the specialist's troubles and represents 60 percent of the total number of doctors. He is the first line of defense in the medical service who refers 80 percent of the patients and cases to the specialist.

[Box on page 30] Orderly Controls Comprehensive Clinic

In the quarters of al-Wayli, al-Matariyah, 'Ayn Shams, al-Marj, Imbabah, 'Izbat al-Nakhl, 'Izbat 'Uthman and in the main al-Wayli Street, there are comprehensive clinics and secret clinics controlled by orderlies who take for themselves 40 percent of the fees paid by every patient. After being examined, the patient goes to the entrance of the clinic to purchase penicillin, sulfa, (al-rawand) and other drugs dispensed by the government hospitals. The seller is the orderly himself. In these clinics, the orderly lances boils, changes dressings, does circumcisions and gives injections. We asked a doctor at al-Wayli clinic about this and he answered: "Insofar as the work here is concerned, it is a matter of fending for yourself."

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MAURITANIA

DECREASE IN IRON EXPORTS REPORTED

Paris EUROPE OUTREMER in French No 636, Jan 83 p 32

[Article: "Mauritania--Drop in Iron-Ore Exports in 1982"]

[Text] If one considers the tonnage of the shipments of Mauritanian iron ore, Nouadhibou could--depending on the year--claim first place among the ports of French-speaking Black Africa, ahead of the port of Abidjan. Nevertheless, the Point Cansado installations, which belong to the National Industrial and Mining Company (SNIM-SEM), through which the ore is exported, are not a true port. They include a pier 245 m long and a loading tower that can handle ore ships of 150,000 tons deadweight.

In 1982, because of the world steel crisis, iron-ore exports dropped even more sharply--14.7 percent--going from 8,973,000 tons in 1981 to 7,653,352 tons. The number of ships loaded dropped also--from 134 in 1981 to 119 in 1982.

At Nouadhibou itself, the public port comprises the fishing port and the commercial port. The latter has two berths for 150-m ships. In 1981, the traffic was 70,000 tons leaving and 142,000 tons arriving, including 86,000 tons in transshipments. The exports consisted mainly of fishing products, for the hinterland is desert.

At Nouakchott is one of the last wharves in Africa. Apart from Dakar, it still remains the maritime outlet for central and southern Mauritania. In recent years, total traffic has been slightly over 200,000 tons, more than 95 percent of which is incoming freight. Improvements in offloading have been made while the placing in service--planned for 1984--of the deep-water port that the Chinese are constructing is awaited. This port, whose initial annual capacity will be on the order of 500,000 tons, will include in particular a 732-m gangway, an 810-m protective jetty and a 585-m pier providing three berths. Because of the characteristics of the coast--which is sandy, low and rectilinear and has a permanent bar--construction of the installations has run up against numerous difficulties and the studies have taken a long time (construction began in April 1979).

Finally, it can be noted that the traffic between Mauritania and the French ports and vice versa totaled 2,303,730 tons in 1981, including 2,234,615 tons to France and 69,124 to Mauritania. The main ports concerned were Dunkerque (1,685,000 tons), Marseille (486,000 tons) and Bordeaux (110,000 tons).

DECREASE IN PHOSPHATES EXPORTS REPORTED

Paris EUROPE OUTREMER in French No 636, Jan 83 p 31

[Article: "Morocco--Drop in Phosphates Exports"]

[Text] Morocco's ports (8 international ones and some 10 of a regional character) handle 98 percent of the country's trade exchanges. This traffic is reported to have been on the order of 33 million tons for 1982--a tonnage which, according to a study carried out by the Moroccan General Economic Confederation (CGEM), should triple between now and the year 2000, as regards both exports and imports.

Traffic in 1981 reached 31,569,000 tons, as against 30,786,000 tons in 1980, for an increase of 2.5 percent (source: Ministry of Equipment). Exports, which consist essentially of products of mineral origin, semifinished products and food products, went down slightly--0.8 percent--largely because of the drop in exports of phosphates, which in 1981 represented 76.7 percent of export traffic. Exports of phosphates came to 15,645,600 tons in 1981 (down 4.5 percent). Imports (energy, cereals and chemical products) are up by 9 percent, at 11,181,000 tons, of which about 27.9 percent was hydrocarbons (3.12 tons), and about 3.2 million tons of cereals. The number of ships entering and leaving Morocco's ports dropped 1.9 percent, with 17,752 vessels, with a total net tonnage of 41,600 tons [as published].

As regards passenger traffic, the port of Tangiers received 922,463 passengers in 1981, including 492,139 departing (up 13.5 percent) and 430,264 arriving (up 20.8 percent). Casablanca, for its part, handled 4,920 departing passengers (down 14.8 percent) and 4,229 arriving passengers (down 23.5 percent).

We do not yet have exact figures available for Moroccan maritime traffic as a whole for 1982. Nevertheless, information obtained from various sources gives us a partial picture of the evolution of this traffic.

According to the Lighterage Administration of the port of Casablanca, the traffic (not including phosphates) of the Moroccan ports was 14,527,400 tons (up 1.6 percent), including 6,578,300 tons of miscellaneous goods (down 4.7 percent), 2,353,400 tons of ores (up 21.5 percent) and 5,585,700 tons of hydrocarbons (up 2.6 percent).

Except for the traffic of the port of Casablanca, the traffic of the Moroccan ports that we give below does not include phosphates (source: RAPC [Lighterage Administration of the Port of Casablanca]):

The port of Casablanca, with total traffic of 17.1 million tons, including 12 million tons leaving and 5 million tons arriving, dropped about 11.8 percent in 1982, because of the drop in demand for phosphates and citrus fruits. On the other hand, there was a considerable increase in the chemical products and steel products imported.

Agadir: 1,051,400 tons, including 554,800 tons of miscellaneous goods, 208,000 tons of ores and 288,600 tons of hydrocarbons.

Mohammedia: 4,185,900 tons, including 85,100 tons of miscellaneous goods and 4,100,800 tons of hydrocarbons.

Safi: 3,048,700 tons (up 17.5 percent), including 1,533,500 tons of miscellaneous goods and 1,515,200 tons of ores.

Tangiers: 649,400 tons, including 551,500 tons of miscellaneous goods and 97,900 tons of hydrocarbons.

Nador: 656,800 tons, including 284,500 tons of miscellaneous goods and 372,300 tons of ores.

Saharan ports: 31,300 tons of miscellaneous goods (up 44 percent).

Jorf Lasfar (went into operation in June 1982): 118,600 tons.

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TUNISIA

FOREIGN TRADE BALANCE REPORTED TO BE IMPROVING

Tunis DIALOGUE in French No 455, 27 Jun 83 pp 24-25

[Text] The unfavorable situation of our foreign trade is one of the government's main concerns. The drop in the price of oil exported continues to have an ever greater effect on the trade balance and the deficit increased sharply during the first three months of 1983. Actually, during that period, the provisional results of foreign trade published by the INS [National Institute of Statistics] show a 50-percent rise in the foreign trade deficit as a result of a 14-percent drop in exports, while imports rose 12 percent over the first three months of 1982.

Nevertheless, the Ministry of National Economy is expected to show an improvement in the coming months. Two major reasons explain the pronounced increase in the foreign trade deficit:

The first is due to the speed with which import authorizations were granted this year, in order not to hinder the productive apparatus and ensure a satisfactory supply of materials.

The second reason concerns the value of crude oil exports, down 42 percent as a result of the smaller quantities exported -- an artificial, deliberate drop due to strong tension marking the oil market during the period -- and the impact of the lower price of the product on exports themselves.

This optimism has just been confirmed by statistics for the month of April, which showed the beginning of a recovery in the trade balance due to the combined effect of a resumption in exports and a slowdown in imports. The rate of cover of imports by exports was 84 percent in April 1983 compared with 62 percent in April 1982.

Rate of Cover: 45.7 Percent

An examination of the provisional results for foreign trade during the first three months of 1983 therefore reveals a drop in exports and an increase in imports. Actually, exports declined 13.7 percent or the equivalent of 38.5 million dinars, while imports rose 12 percent or the equivalent of 57.5 million dinars.

(In Millions of Dinars)

	First Three Months			
	<u>1982</u>	<u>1983</u>	<u>MD</u>	<u>%</u>
Imports	471.8	529.3	+57.5	+12
Exports	280.4	241.9	-38.5	-14
Deficit	191.4	287.4	+96.0	+50
Rate of cover	59.3%	45.7%	-13.6	-22

One noteworthy fact: The deficit in the trade balance increased 50 percent, or the equivalent of 96 million dinars, and the rate of cover of imports by exports, which was 59.3 percent at the end of the first three months of 1982, dropped to 45.7 percent during the same period in 1983.

Imports: 12-Percent Increase

For imports, food products, equipment and consumer goods were the cause of the increase registered. However, this increase (up 57.5 million dinars) was softened by the drop in oil imports due to the halt in the purchase of crude going for refining at STIR [Tunisian-Italian Refining Company].

With respect to food products, imports rose over 81 percent due to the increase in purchases of grain, meat, tea, soybean oil, potatoes and fruits, especially eating apples. Regarding grain, imports during the period in question rose 144 percent and totaled 25.7 million dinars. This great increase essentially results from accelerated execution of the provisional program of the Grain Office in anticipation of an increase in international prices for the coming months.

Concerning consumer goods, an increase of 38 percent or the equivalent of 29 million dinars was registered during the first three months of 1983. It was mainly caused by textiles and articles cut for manufacture and re-exportation, domestic electrical appliances, pharmaceutical products and bookstore items.

With respect to capital goods, imports rose from 107 million dinars to 151 million, an increase of 41 percent between the first two quarters of 1982 and 1983. It should be noted, in fact, that during the period under consideration, there was a concentration of equipment purchases in certain economic as well as social sectors. It involves the textile industries, transportation (mainly rail), agriculture (tractors for mountains), pumps and compressors for hydraulics and the extraction of oil, generators and transformers and equipment for posts and telecommunications.

Exports: 14-Percent Drop

Regarding exports, provisional achievements for the first three months of 1983 showed a value of 242 million dinars compared with 280 million for the same period in 1982, a drop of 14 percent or the equivalent of 38 million dinars. Aside from the decline in the energy sector (down 43 percent), nearly all sectors experienced sometimes rather substantial increases, starting with food, which rose 37 percent. The increase in food products is explained by a rise in quantities, as in the case of dates and olive oil, and an increase in export prices, as in the case of fishing products, citrus fruits and wines.

In the energy sector, exports registered a decline of 58 million dinars due to crude oil, whose exported volume totaled 643,000 tons, compared with 978,000 tons during the first quarter of 1982, and whose average price dropped from 131 dinars a ton to 110. This drop of some 16 percent is equivalent to that retained by OPEC on the price of a barrel of oil: from \$33 to \$28 between the first two quarters of 1982 and 1983. However, it should be pointed out that if one draws a picture of the movement of crude oil exported and imported between the two quarters in question, the situation does not look so unfavorable.

	First Quarter 1982		First Quarter 1983	
	In 1,000 Tons	Value MD	In 1,000 Tons	Value MD
Imports	339	43	0	0
Exports	978	128	643	71
Net Exports	638	85	643	71

For mineral raw materials, there was an appreciable increase (up 25 percent) mainly stemming from natural phosphates, whose shipments in quantity increased, going from 218,000 tons to 301,000 tons. The price went from 21.1 to 22.6 dinars a ton. With respect to semi-finished products, an increase in value of 10 percent was observed during the first quarter of 1983 as a result of appreciable sales of phosphate products, especially phosphoric acid and super-phosphates. For the former, there was an increase in quantities shipped (181,000 tons compared with 120,000), with the value going from 11.6 million dinars to 19.6 million. For supertriple phosphate, there was an increase in the quantities exported (up 42 percent), plus an increase in the average price (of 8 percent). As for the other phosphate fertilizers (DAP, MAP, and so on), they also experienced an increase in the average price (up 4.8 percent), while quantities shipped declined somewhat (94,000 tons compared with 106,000). This affected receipts (11.7 million dinars compared with 12.6 million).

Consumer goods rose 16 percent, or the equivalent of 9.5 million dinars, between the first quarters of 1982 and 1983. It was articles in the textile sector (hatmaking, ready-to-wear, and so on) and shoes that caused the development.

From Surplus to Deficit With United States

Geographically speaking, Tunisia's trade balance continued to be negative with European countries, which control over three-fourths of our commercial trade with other nations. With France, our main trading partner, the deficit grew much worse, going from 51.4 million dinars to 58.4 million between the first quarters of 1982 and 1983. The same trend could be observed with the Belgium-Luxembourg Economic Union, Greece, and especially Italy, which, after a surplus of 21 million dinars during the first quarter of 1982, showed a deficit of 9.3 million dinars in 1983 (same period). With the FRG, our deficit decreased somewhat (16 million dinars compared with 25 million), thanks to an improvement in Tunisian exports to that country. With the American continent, our deficit deteriorated even further this year (47 million dinars compared

with 12 million), as a result of the deterioration of our commercial trade with the United States. Our exports dropped over 44 percent, while our imports more than doubled, or from a surplus of 6 million dinars in 1982 (first quarter) to a deficit of 32 million at the close of the first quarter of 1983.

With Asia, our deficit went from 65 million dinars to 35 million during the same period of time. At the root of this trend is mainly the drop in our imports (essentially of crude oil) from Saudi Arabia.

Finally, with the African continent, our trade balance, which has always shown a surplus for years past, registered a deficit for the first time (2.7 million dinars). The deterioration stems from a decline in our commercial surplus with Libya (1.9 million dinars compared with 4.1 million) and the growth in our deficit with Morocco.

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EDUCATION MINISTER DISCUSSES ARAB, MAGHREB POLITICAL SITUATION

Riyadh AL-YAMAMAH in Arabic No 756, 15 Jun 83 pp 42, 43

Article by Hasan Misri: "The Tunisian Minister of Education to AL-YAMAMAH: Merging the Fez Resolutions with the Reagan Initiative Is Difficult but Not Impossible"

Text Because Tunisia, the site of the Arab League, is in the center of the Maghreb, where there are early signs of a renunciation of the complexes of the past and peripheral local disputes, conversation with any Tunisian official is of special importance. The Tunisian minister of education speaks here to AL-YAMAMAH about the internal situation in his country, its identity, and the latest developments in the Palestinian cause.

By invitation of the international conference on education, human rights, security and disarmament matters related to that held at UNESCO in the French capital, which was to be attended only by the permanent delegates to UNESCO, the ambassadors accredited to the French capital and educational experts in their countries, along with a group of representatives of international organizations, all these persons attended — except for the ministers of education in the so-called "progressive" countries, and the ministers of the European and American countries and the countries of the Eastern Bloc, which manufacture heavy armaments.

The Tunisian minister of education, Mr Fredj Chedly, whose country hosts the Arab League and the centers of cultural unity whose establishment has been anticipated, seems to be optimistic. He brings hope concerning the cultural situation in Tunisia and a warning about the international cultural situation, and is interested in the possibility of Arab solidarity over Palestine and other Arab causes. On the sidelines of the conference, I met at length with the Tunisian minister, and this conversation took place:

AL-YAMAMAH: Your excellency the minister, the first of my group of questions about Tunisia, the Maghreb, developments in the Palestinian cause and international cultural exchange is about culture in Tunisia and the statements which have been made about "deviation and extremism," which have developed in a specific time into an "armed confrontation" between the authorities on the one hand and members of the opposition, in particular the extremists, on the other. What steps has the Tunisian government taken to avert "social extremism?"

Chedly: I would like to pause here before the two words "deviation" and "extremism." I believe that they are not applicable to Tunisia and Tunisian society. What one can find in Tunisia, or what we can speak about, takes the form of a healthy phenomenon, not an unhealthy one.

This healthy phenomenon is apparent in the fact that the Tunisians we have taught for 25 years since independence and to whom we have given the scope to express their own identity and to articulate what they are thinking about have become more and more involved in daily life and articulate about their views on social and political life and the Moslem Arab Tunisian identity, and how they envision it.

The fact remains that in the broad spectrum of this trend and in the broad spectrum of this absolute freedom which we find among the Tunisian people, some people of necessity deviate and some perforce go to excess regarding freedom for the opinions they advocate or the articulation of views or analyses on certain positions and matters.

We exhort these people to do good deeds, and we call for the pursuit of a responsible dialogue between the regime and some of these people, which we elevate to the level of true democracy.

This dialogue enables every group of the people to express its opinion truthfully and to discuss and articulate opinions without equivocation, dissimulation or cowardice, on grounds that dialogue ultimately results in the fact that the hand of God is on the side of the group and that the final word belongs to the majority. You and I might disagree and defend our own opinions, but at a responsible level, and not turn this dialogue or disagreement into a personal matter. If it becomes apparent that you are in the right, I will go along with you; if it is apparent that I am in the right, you will go along with me, and as a consequence the essence of higher interests and the interests of the nation will prevail.

Regarding the cultural aspect, that has two sides:

The first is represented by education, which is considered a broad, important area in the lives of peoples and nations, especially with regard to a civilized country on the road to growth like Tunisia, which has suffered a great deal from colonialism and almost lost its identity and its character during the period of colonialism, which brought great suffering upon it.

Our first concern, when Tunisia became independent, was to regain our identity, enable our sons and daughters to have an education and to concentrate on man, on grounds that he is the point of departure, on grounds that he is the beginning and the end.

From the time Tunisia became independent, we have mobilized and still are mobilizing, more than one third of the budget on behalf of education.

The proof is that just in primary and secondary education, more than one quarter the population is in schools.

However, it was not enough to adopt the choice referred to above in advance, concerning the concentration on man, who considers that education is of prime importance, because education requires a conception, a clear vision and programs.

What we inherited from colonialism represented a tragic feature of our life, because it was characterized by usurpation and disruption.

The usurpation was apparent in the laxity colonial activities created in culture and education, not to mention that the French language overwhelmed the Arabic language for many years, as did foreign life, and Arab Islamic cultural values were almost obliterated. We had to make education a national process and endow it with an Arab Islamic character. Our goal is to put the school in permanent contact with the environment.

AL-YAMAMAH: Regarding the recent Tunisian-Algerian agreement, which the countries of Europe welcomed in an unusual manner, how do you view this agreement in terms of solidarity and its effect on the cultural situation in Tunisia?

Chedly: The conclusions we reached recently in the agreement represented a foundation stone along the road to the creation of the Maghreb. Let me speak in greater detail: once upon a time we dreamt of the vision of this portion of Arab territory, the Maghreb, where borders would disappear and cultural, economic and historic cooperation would arise. There are constant connections, the link of a common womb, among the people of the Maghreb, although the colonial power was the same. We faced and resisted the French colonialists together. The leaders of the Maghreb combined their holy war to confront this colonialism, until the Maghreb Bureau was created and they sought refuge in Cairo.

The unification of the Maghreb does not conflict with the unification of policies within the Arab nation.

In order to cope with the West and its economic blocs, we are condemned to cooperate, form blocs and become integrated, because one cannot talk about industrialization in Tunisia or Algeria (that has been tried), or in Morocco; if the Maghreb is unified, its situation will improve economically, and it will become able to proceed from a premise of strength, not weakness. The disputes that have appeared are haphazard ones, because they are against the logic of history.

AL-YAMAMAH: Events have consistently affirmed, for 30 years, that an economic aloofness exists among Arab countries, especially among the countries of the Maghreb, and that this has been accompanied by an increase in the progress of bilateral relations between each country in the Maghreb and western, especially European, countries. What then is your conception of the logic of history?

Chedly: The issue is one of maturity. It is a cause of sorrow that there is no cooperation or integration at all among Arab countries. It is sad that we should find that some Arab countries turn to foreign countries to obtain products which are to be found in a specific Arab country, and perhaps in better quality. We see European countries, in spite of the internecine disputes, clashes and historic enmities among them, and in spite of the fact that they

are not bound together by a language or a heritage, nonetheless being united in terms of economic destiny.

The Arab nation has access to advantages which are not available to others in the form of unity of language, religion and civilization.

AL-YAMAMAH: Do you believe that the good minds that have emigrated could come back to the Arab world from the Western world some day? What is the destiny of Arab intellectuals and workers in the West in general?

Chedly: The brain drain is not just restricted to Arab countries. The painful thing is that the developing and weak countries are the ones that have in the relative sense supplied the advanced world with good minds, at a time when they have been in urgent need of them.

The reasons for this emigration are:

First, some higher Arab personnel cannot find a climate which would make it possible for them to work.

Second, there are no factors to encourage them to stay in their countries; this phenomenon indicates backwardness.

My personal opinion is that the Arab countries now have the material and cultural resources to enable them to encourage their higher personnel.

Tunisia has managed to give some fraternal Arab countries aid in the form of higher personnel in the area of engineering, teaching and so forth.

We consider these personnel, who are working in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia or elsewhere, to be doing their job in Tunisia; they do not fall in the category of the brain drain.

Workers went to France for a specific time to get through the economic crisis our country went through, or difficult periods after independence, in the hope that they would return to their country; this fact will help induce them to return to their country.

AL-YAMAMAH: The Palestinian cause is going through difficult circumstances. What is Tunisia's view of the future of the cause?

Chedly: President Bourguiba had well known positions of a political nature, and he declared them in Jericho and the countries of the Arab East, but he was not understood at that time. He was one of those who suffered problems and ill-repute in view of their plain speech and positions. He called for an international political resolution to the 1948 agreement on partition as a first stage; the Israeli rejection of this resolution could have been a rejection of the resolution that established it as an independent state, and it would have been possible to resist it from within following this initial stage. Our experience with the French colonialists is proof of that. The Palestinian cause represents a tragedy, but unfortunately it has been all timings to all people

for years and years. We said that the Palestinians must speak for themselves and that we should not traffic in that cause, as Arabs, whatever our tendencies might be. The Palestinian cause is too lofty to be contingent on certain people's positions.

AL-YAMAMAH: Have the Palestinians been presented the objective circumstances for taking the reins of affairs into their own hands since 1948, in your opinion?

Chedly: They have not been presented these circumstances, but they have without a doubt started to feel as if they have, in spite of attempts at cooperation on the part of one body or another. What we hope is that the Arab world will measure up to the crucial threat and will forget haphazard, sporadic and political threats.

Every dispute among us weakens our efforts and strengthens the enemy. The war between Iraq and Iran is leading to a weakening of forces and a waste of the powers that could be rushing forth to the advantage of the Arabs and the Moslems. In addition, there are the material and human losses; the most recent tragedy is the oil slick in the Gulf.

All this because there are disputes we were not able to transcend by making intelligence prevail.

AL-YAMAMAH: What about the plans for a resolution which have been put forth on the Arab and international stage?

Chedly: In my personal opinion, the Arab people chose when the Fez summit meeting took place.

Had there been other options, they should have issued forth through consultation and agreement, after matters had been turned on their heads. What concerns us is that our policies be unified in any position we take.

If we turn in any direction in disarray, we will lose the game and our chances will be gone.

It is necessary to return to the summit so that our policies may be unified.

Mr 'Arafat said that the Reagan initiative contains positive features, and the position is now difficult.

Tunisia has absolutely not deviated from the Arab ranks, but there must be alternatives. I read recently that the Israelis want the Jordanians not to reach agreement with the Palestinians.

AL-YAMAMAH: In the event an emergency summit conference is held, what views are there about the possibility of restoring a realistic solidarity to Arab ranks?

Chedly: A summit conference would contain positive elements. It is not important whether we reject a given point. The important thing, rather, is what we do; in the event of rejection, what plans do we have?

What is the alternative?

AL-YAMAMAH: What chances are there that the coming summit will be held?

Chedly: There is a great possibility, because it is necessary. At the Fez summit, agreement was reached on a minimum of concessions, as Mr Abu 'Ammar said, and a minimum on issues below which we must not go. Along with the Fez recommendations came the Reagan recommendations, which we can frankly state contain positive features. How can we reconcile the one with the other? Even the Reagan recommendations did not please Israel.

AL-YAMAMAH: If the recommendations of the coming summit are compatible with Reagan's recommendations, will that mean a greater rift in Arab ranks and perhaps clashes, especially in the atmosphere of the continuation of the destructive Iraqi-Iranian war?

Chedly: What I would like is for the war to end at this point.

A summit meeting will in no way lead to infighting; rather, it will make matters clearer, because a rift among brothers is not far away. Therefore there will be one of two things; either the people who meet will reassert the Fez resolutions, or they will turn away from them on a basis of flexibility and diplomacy.

11887
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TUNISIA

UGTT ACTIVITIES IN ICFTU FROZEN OVER PALESTINIAN ISSUE

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 5 Jul 83 p 3

[Text] (TAP)--Habib Achour, president of the UGTT [Tunisian General Federation of Labor], announced at a press conference yesterday afternoon that the UGTT has decided to halt its activities within the ICFTU (International Confederation of Free Trade Unions).

The president of the UGTT added that the decision was made by the Executive Bureau of the Union following a meeting devoted to an examination of the results of the 69th International Labor Conference and the 13th Congress of the CISL, held in June in Geneva and Oslo respectively.

Achour reviewed the work of the conference and the congress and the efforts made by the UGTT delegation to point up the matter and give it the attention it deserves.

He noted that the Palestinian problem had drawn the attention of the Geneva conference, observing that the resolution on the Near East had figured at the head of the other resolutions. But, he said, the General Assembly did not adopt the resolution, which gathered 225 votes, while 169 delegates abstained from the balloting.

Achour pointed out that the imperialist-Zionist alliance headed by the United States engaged in intense activity at the conference in order to hinder any decision on behalf of the Palestinian cause. Likewise, well before the conference, the American Government dispatched envoys to governments and trade unions of many other countries, he said, in order to urge them to vote against the resolution on the Near East.

Achour said that one American official, accompanied by other officials from the American Embassy in Tunis, had contacted the trade union confederation before the Geneva conference and had used other means to try to influence the UGTT so as to bring it in line with a position suiting the United States. "The UGTT, represented by the majority of its Executive Bureau, emphasized to the American delegation the inconsistency of its country on matters such as human freedom and nations' rights to self-determination," Achour continued, recalling that while it demanded the right to self-determination of the peoples of Afghanistan, Poland and Latin America, the United States denies that same right to the Palestinian people and tries to harm any effort aimed at gaining that right for the Palestinian people.

Speaking of the results of the ICFTU conference, Achour noted that it had followed the same policy as the International Labor Conference with respect to the Middle East. Thus, he explained, the United States and Israel have made enormous efforts to contact participating trade unions and dissuade them from voting for the proposed resolution filed by the UGTT reaffirming the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination, emphasizing the need for Israel to recognize the right of the Palestinian people to build an independent state on the soil of their homeland and to evacuate all Arab territories occupied, in keeping with the UN resolutions.

Achour said that the congress had passed a motion on the Near East presented by the secretariat of the ICFTU after rejection of the UGTT motion.

He claimed that, compared with other motions denouncing restrictions on freedoms in Chile, South Africa, Namibia and Afghanistan and calling for harsh sanctions against the regimes of those countries, that of the ICFTU was hollow.

The president of the UGTT noted that the members of the Tunisian trade union delegation had left the conference room as a sign of protest against the vote, emphasizing the decision of the trade union confederation to freeze all activities within the ICFTU.

Achour stated that the UGTT would contact rank-and-file workers throughout the world in order to expose the actions of ICFTU officials and their positions favorable to Zionists, positions incompatible with those of the rank and file.

In response to questions from newsmen, Achour said that only the congress has the power to make a decision on the future "withdrawal" of the UGTT from the ICFTU. He added that the Tunisian trade union confederation will concentrate its action on contact with Arab and African unions and with rank-and-file workers throughout the world, denouncing the previously described attitude on the subject of the Middle Eastern conflict, although it had previously published a motion recognizing the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination.

The president of the UGTT accused the ICFTU of trampling underfoot even its own statute, which affirms the right of peoples to enjoy their freedom and act toward that purpose.

He also indicated that the UGTT intends to continue its efforts aimed at changing the position of the ICFTU through its international contacts, while expressing the hope of finding favorable support for the Palestinian cause within the confederation.

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TUNISIA

VARIOUS TOP FIGURES IN GOVERNMENT DISCUSS LEBANESE, PALESTINIAN PROBLEM

London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic No 1388, 10 Jun 83 pp 33, 35

Article by Zaki Shihab: "Mzali and Essebsi to AL-HAWADITH in Tunisia: No Steps after the Fez Summit and No Violations of the Rights of the Lebanese!"

Text Officials in Tunisia always remember, and point out, that in 1965 the Arabs rejected President Habib Bourguiba's recommendation that the partition of Palestine between the Arab and Jews be accepted and that they turned around and accepted it 17 years later, at the Fez summit.

The Palestine cause is present today in Tunisia, in the form of the Liberation Organization leaders and some fighting men, following the departure from Beirut.

Tunisian officials are asserting their realism at this stage more than at any time in the past, and consider that the Israeli option is war and refusal to recognize the rights of the Palestinian people. They do not believe that Israel will recognize the organization, if the organization recognizes Israel, although they do hope that the American position will change in favor of the Arabs.

As regards the agreement between Lebanon and Israel, officials in Tunisia prefer not to declare a position, for fear that they will be unfair to Lebanon, because they "have not yet read the verbatim text of the agreement." However, they are in favor of Lebanon's right to liberate its territory from Israeli occupation.

The Tunisian prime minister, or premier, Mr Mohamed Mzali, replied to Al-HAWADITH's questions at a meeting which the director of protocol in his office wanted to be just a "chat;" although Mzali was open to every question on a number of subjects.

The Tunisian foreign minister, Mr Beji Caid Essebsi, plunged into various controversial topics on the Arab stage.

With Premier Mzali, the first question was:

AL-HAWADITH: How do you view the future of the solution to the Palestinian cause, in the light of current facts and the fragmented Arab situation?

Mohamed Mzali: I view the Palestinian cause with much bitterness indeed, because of the deteriorated state that has now come to pervade it, with the tragedies and massacres that have afflicted our Palestinian brothers and the inability of

the international community and the great powers to influence the Israeli entity to recognize this people's right to decide its destiny by its own hand. The horizon seems somewhat strained, and thus great effort will be needed in the context of public opinion and the media if we are to promote the Palestinian people's legitimate struggle.

Israel is still adhering to the logic of military force, not to rights for the Palestinian people nor international morality. It is in Europe or America, I said that the Palestinians do not suffer from leprosy: one will have to talk with them today or tomorrow. The European community recognizes the rights of the Palestinian people and the right of self-determination, but the American government unfortunately has not.

AL-HAWADITH: In your meeting with the American president, did you notice any chance of a change in his view in the area's favor?

Mohamed Mzali: His view has changed somewhat, but the power of the Zionist "lobby" and the influence of the press in Israel's favor make the possibility of action in the government context limited.

I believe that the Arabs have the duty of taking intelligent media initiatives in order to familiarize people with the legitimacy and sacred nature of their cause.

AL-HAWADITH You said that in your meetings with Americans and Europeans you encouraged them to take the initiative to talk with the Palestinians. Have you encouraged the Palestinians to speak with the Israelis?

Mohamed Mzali: The Palestinians are receptive. If their rights to a nation are recognized they will be prepared for many things. Now they have no identity or passports. They move about with passports of other countries. They have also been prosecuted by some other Arab regimes; what they need as much as water and air are a nation and an identity.

AL-HAWADITH: You talk about an American position and a European position, but is there any unified Arab agreement on coping with this matter?

Mohamed Mzali: There is the Fez agreement. It should be noted that it is not a comprehensive agreement. That is true, but most Arab countries, I would not say all, leave matters to the Palestinians. We support them regarding the platform and the policy they choose.

AL-HAWADITH: I believe that the Tunisian position is exemplary.

Mohamed Mzali: Tunisia's position is dictated by the intellect, as it was when our Algerian brothers were our guests during the revolution. We support the Palestinians and are not their guardians. By what rights could we be?

AL-HAWADITH: Was the Tunisian-Algerian summit meeting the beginning of the establishment of a nucleus for the unity of the countries of the Maghreb?

Mohamed Mzali: The meeting between Presidents Habib Bourguiba and Chedli Bendjedid, and the agreement they reached regarding the marking of border signs and brotherliness and conciliation during the inauguration of the gas pipeline are further proof of the fertile nature and stability of the cooperation; this must of course be a model for the condition that must characterize relations among Arab countries.

Beji Caid Essebsi, the Tunisian minister of foreign affairs, started his conversation with us by apologizing for being late to the meeting. He said, "As you see, I have been receiving a Lebanese delegation, the Minister Baha'-al-Din al-Bassat, who came to inform us of the agreements Lebanon had reached with Israel."

AL-HAWADITH: Since the meeting is still fresh, what is your opinion about the agreement, now that you have read its sections?

Beji Caid Essebsi: They informed us of its contents and scope. We ourselves interpret it as violation of the rights of the Lebanese and others. We understand the problem and will study the agreement so that we can take a position which will be in keeping with what must be accomplished, which is the restoration of Lebanese sovereignty over all Lebanese soil and the deliverance of Lebanese territory from the shackles of the Israeli army.

AL-HAWADITH: Do you believe that the withdrawal of foreign forces from Lebanon will take place just with the signing of this agreement, regardless of its contents?

Beji Caid Essebsi: We are not in favor of the agreement in any way. We endorse Lebanese sovereignty, which must extend over all Lebanese territory. We endorse the unity of Lebanese soil, because Lebanon is an Arab country and will always be drawn to the Arab world. Lebanon is a country which has become a target of Israel, and it is the international community's responsibility to work to support Lebanon so that it can bring about the withdrawal of the Israeli armies from its soil.

AL-HAWADITH: Do you believe that the Syrian rejection gives the Israelis a justification to stay in Lebanon?

Beji Caid Essebsi: No. Then he continued: "Is the purpose of your visit to discuss the issue of Lebanon or the issue of Palestine?"

AL-HAWADITH: Tunisia is a moderate country. It has offered the organization's leaders headquarters. What role can it play in service of the Palestinian cause?

Beji Caid Essebsi: Tunisia is a realistic country and it adheres to principles. When it is a matter of principles, we are more adamant but when it is a matter of roads that will lead to the attainment of peripheral goals or matters, we of course have flexibility. With respect to the Palestinian cause, we support that, not because the Palestinians are Arabs but because it is a just cause. In this context, we side with everyone who has good intentions. Therefore,

when the Palestinian leaders suffered difficult circumstances in Beirut after the Israeli aggression, and these leaders asked to be given refuge in Tunisia, Tunisia gave its agreement without any hesitation, because we believe that such agreement lies within the framework of our commitment to support just causes.

AL-HAWADITH: Since the Palestinians are here, are you in a position to be able to give them advice?

Beji Caid Essebsi: It is Tunisia's policy not to interfere in the internal affairs of the Liberation Organization; perhaps that was the main reason which prompted the Liberation Organization to choose Tunisia. However, that does not mean that we do not have opinions on the resolution of the Palestinian cause. Nor does it mean that we are not engaging in talks with the organization.

Our view on this organization is related to the majority view on the Israeli-Palestinian dispute, and consequently friction between Israel and the Arab countries. The issue is that there are two ethnic groups in the area. One is the Israeli ethnic group and the other is the Palestinian ethnic group. The solution, in my opinion — although it is not just — is to partition Palestine between these two ethnic groups, in conformity with the resolutions of the United Nations. Although this resolution was rejected by some Arab countries in the past, in 1965, because they favored military confrontation with Israel, the Israeli military options with the Arab countries have unfortunately led to the further occupation of territory. Recently things have moved forward and the Arab countries, at the latest Fez conference, agreed to the Tunisian recommendation of 1965. However, we must of course take the new developments that have arisen since that date into account.

Partition, in spite of the injustice of it, is a solution that can be applied. If it is supported by the international community, it will be satisfactory to both parties, and thus we will be putting a limit to war and will be enabling the countries of the region to rebuild their economies and develop their resources.

AL-HAWADITH: But how can one induce Israel and the United States to sit at the same table with the Palestinians and hold negotiations to accept this proposal? Is President Reagan's plan, in your opinion, a step toward a solution?

Beji Caid Essebsi: First, we must stress that the Arab plan that has been advanced is a peace plan. Of course the success of the Reagan plan is contingent on the acceptance of it by the other side, and this is not in prospect as far as Israel goes. The Israeli solution is always to choose war. How can we deal with it when its option is always against peace?

Our hopes are that the American position will be more flexible. We know that America is Israel's basic ally and that it gives it unlimited support. It has powerful influence inside the country and, as long as we see that Israel does not want peace, especially since Israel, as I have pointed out, is backed by great moral and political support.

AL-HAWADITH: Some Egyptian officials believe that if the Liberation Organization recognizes Israel, that will create a new situation. What is your view?

Beji Caid Essebsi: At the time, we thought that that might be a point of departure toward a solution, especially since America also advocated that, but we are afraid that if the organization does recognize Israel, Israel will not reciprocate and will not recognize the organization.

AL-HAWADITH: Wouldn't the organization's recognition of Israel create a new situation?

Beji Caid Essebsi: I do not believe so, because even if America were to recognize the organization, Israel does not want to do so.

AL-HAWADITH: Is it true that Tunisia presented a demand to the organization to reduce the number of its fighting men?

Beji Caid Essebsi: I have no knowledge of such a demand. That does not apply to the situation and is not correct.

AL-HAWADITH: As long as Israel does not want to effect recognition, is the only solution the military one?

Beji Caid Essebsi: Tunisia, as a country, has always been calling for a political solution and has always tried to exert influence in favor of this political orientation, but it is realistic for us to acknowledge that the results have not been brilliant and that there are people who are calling for something other than a political solution and saying that Israel will submit only to force. Unfortunately, it appears that actual conditions tend to support them in this theory, and that is what I am afraid of.

AL-HAWADITH: In the event the various forces withdraw from Lebanon, naturally the Palestinian forces will be among them. Does Tunisia intend to accept new forces, if the organization so asks?

Beji Caid Essebsi: We will not outstrip events. When the organization asked to come to Tunisia and asked us to accept a number of fighting men, we responded to it in the affirmative within 10 minutes of its request. I do not know first of all whether the organization will make the request, but it appears that you are optimistic about the withdrawal of Israeli armies from Lebanon, and I believe that you ought not be hasty about the question, because the Israeli army has not yet left Lebanon.

AL-HAWADITH: Your excellency the minister, it seems that you are pessimistic. Do you believe that the occurrence of a Syrian-Israeli confrontation in the region is imminent?

Beji Caid Essebsi: I am neither optimistic nor pessimistic. I am a realist. Realism and responsibility dictate that we take the situation as it really is. I expect anything from Israel: the recent and distant past have proved that Israel is capable of doing anything the mind can conceive of, even start

a new war, and not just against Syria. There are complications; Syria is now linked by treaty to the Soviet Union, and there now are Soviet advisors in Syria. Assuming that Israel did do something there, it would directly create a complex new situation, and we believe that America must do something to alleviate the situation.

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TUNISIA

FINANCIAL EXPERT DISCUSSES VARIOUS MARKET, ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

Beirut AL-IQTISAD WA AL-A'MAL in Arabic No 49, Jun 83 pp 61, 62

[Interview with Mansour Moalla, minister of planning and finance: Repercussions of Oil Recesssion on Tunisia; in Tunis, date not given]

Text The Tunisian minister of planning and finance, Mr Mansour Moalla, talked with AL IQTISAD WA AL-A'MAL, reviewing trends in the Tunisian economy with the decline in oil revenues and its repercussions on the government budget and the sixth plan. He also reviewed the subject of the floating of the dinar and developments in Arab investment in Tunisia, especially with the regulation of the establishment of agricultural corporations.

Here is the conversation:

Question: What has been the effect of the decline in oil revenues and prices on Tunisia, negatively and positively, especially since the Tunisian economy has come to rely on revenues from oil exports?

Minister Moalla: The obvious effect has been a drop in revenues and foreign currency reserves, which is a negative repercuSSION. That has been matched by a drop in the prices of certain primary materials. However, the rise in the rate of the dollar and the fact that we are compelled to buy refined fuel have, all in all, been reflected in a balance of payments deficit and in our foreign currency reserves.

Arab Investment Has Acclimatized

Question: What is new in foreign investment activity in Tunisia? Have Arab investors emerged from their hesitant state?

Minister Moalla: The processes of forming joint investment enterprises have been completed; the most recent of these was Kuwait's 35 percent participation in the Tourist Financial Company and the agreement regarding the 70 million Kuwaiti dinars which Kuwait will be contributing in the coming stage to projects whose framework will be outlined, and which will be run and participated in, by the Tunisian Agricultural Development Bank.

These projects will be along the lines of the projects which the Tunisian-Saudi Investment Company ventured to carry out.

Question: Does that mean that problems that existed regarding the prohibition of non-Tunisians from owning land and the prohibition of the formation of corporations in agriculture have been solved?

Minister Moalla: Yes. That was done after we issued a law related to agricultural investment, by virtue of which we granted permits to what are called agricultural investment companies, which can lease land, reclaim it and invest in it for long periods (30 years in the first stage) while not owning this land.

In the law we issued, we provided the necessary guarantees for Arab investors without infringing on the issue of land ownership, a sensitive issue which was created in the wake of French colonialism and experience with the French colonists.

Floating the Dinar

Question: What progress have you made in the draft to eliminate currency surveillance and float the Tunisian dinar?

Minister Moalla: This process is related to the diversification of exports and our foreign currency receipts. It is necessary that a number of conditions be met before we proceed with the draft on floating the dinar: the important thing is that measures have been taken to facilitate certain activities preparatory to the floating of the dinar. In the context of trade, it is possible to import permitted raw materials through the bank directly. In the case of exports, there are no export permits, except in the case of certain agricultural exports; in the case of other commodities, the volumes exported must be declared to the authorities, then the foreign currency must be submitted to the Central Bank and changed into Tunisian dinars.

With regard to financial dealings and consulting operations, there is complication in these. One should bear in mind that it is very easy to get permits to remit profits if the profits do not exceed 10 percent of capital. The issue is complicated, and therefore the Arab governmental sector has made broad strides in investing in Tunisia, while the private sector is still cautious about getting into investment projects, out of fear over the subject of taxes, although tax exemptions in Tunisia are adequate. I have talked with many Arab investors, who have said that they pay taxes in every country (America, France and Japan) and consider that the exemptions granted by Tunisian legislation in the first stage are adequate. There remains the basic complication, which lies in the remittance of the currency exchanged.

Our Investment Relations with Kuwait Are Extremely Important

Question: Following the outpouring of Arab investment in Tunisia, how do you evaluate the behavior of Arab investors?

Minister Moalla: Our experience with Arab governments and governmental organizations has been dominated by an atmosphere of cooperation and mutual understand-

ing. The most important aspect of the matter is that investors have started to interact positively with Tunisian laws, and that in itself is an important development. One should point to the investment relationship with Kuwait, which has assumed a very important character.

Repercussions of the Oil Recession

Question: In the light of new developments in the world, do you have any intention of amending the sixth plan?

Answer: We intend to amend the budget annually and adapt it to general conditions, but it is difficult to amend the general objectives of the plan. What happens is that there is a periodic review of what has been done in preceding periods in light of the annual amendments made in the economic budget, and, at the end of the plan, we carry out a comprehensive evaluation of what has been accomplished in it.

It is worth pointing out that we paid heed to this point when we set out the sixth plan, and that can be observed if one makes a comparison between the former and current plan. That is, the sixth plan was founded on conservative estimates of available resources, local and foreign both. It also embraces non-expansionist goals, and gives priority to equilibrium, the reduction of imports, increased savings, the creation of new job opportunities and the harmonious distribution of investment among all sectors; if there is any general effect, it will most probably be the reaffirmation of this approach.

The Goals of the Sixth Plan Are Realistic

Question: What basic change does the sixth plan aim at introducing into the Tunisian economy?

Minister Moalla: The sixth plan has the aim of achieving five main objectives:

1. Raising the volume of investment to 10 million Tunisian dinars /sic/, or about 30 percent of gross national product, as compared with 34 percent, with the aim of guaranteeing the targeted conditions of development, increasing the volume of machinery and commodities in inventory and increasing hard currency reserves in order to make foreign payments and pay off debts.
2. Realizing a rate of growth of 7.3 percent a year in current prices and 6 percent a year in fixed prices.
3. Increasing consumption by 6.8 percent in fixed prices, that is, a little less than the rate of growth of production (as compared with 7.5 percent in the fifth plan), in order to realize public savings of 6.45 billion dinars.
4. Increasing exports by 8.3 percent a year in fixed prices as compared with an increase in imports of about 6.2 percent a year; the basic objective is to control the balance of payments deficit and keep it at about 7.4 percent of national product.
5. Creating 270,000 job opportunities in the non-agricultural sectors and 130,000 in agriculture.

I would like to emphasize a final point, which is that we are most concerned to achieve balanced growth and reduce the margin to which our economy is dependent on oil revenues or other factors over which we do not have total control, by determining realistic goals, relying basically on intrinsic resources and our own savings, then administering the economy with a high degree of intelligence and effectiveness.

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MINISTERIAL COMMITTEE REFUSES INVESTMENTS IN NUCLEAR PLANT

Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 24 Jun 83 p 3

[Article by Charles Hoffman]

[Text]

The Ministerial Committee on Science and Technology has turned down a request for a government guarantee of about \$25 million by potential Israeli investors in an experimental fusion reactor that a U.S.-based company wishes to build here.

The project, if implemented, will cost an estimated \$300m. Israeli investors are considering raising \$100m. of this.

Science and Development Minister Yuval Ne'eman, a world-renowned physicist, said that such a reactor would probably be more useful for research than for energy production.

In an interview with *The Jerusalem Post*, Ne'eman said that the potential investors now realize that the reactor, known as a Riggatron, won't be able to force the price of oil down to 50 cents a barrel in five years, as the developers claimed two years ago.

The concept for the reactor was developed by the International Energy Systems Company (INESCO), which wishes to build two reactor facilities, one in Israel and the other in California. The government decided last year to provide a site for the project, but not to invest in it.

Ne'eman said the investors are now seeking some cushion from the state to protect their investment in a project that may not have any direct energy payoff.

The process of nuclear fusion, which releases energy as the nuclei

of hydrogen atoms are fused, has never been successfully harnessed to produce electricity. The energy released by the sun is produced by fusion, as is the force of the hydrogen bomb. All existing nuclear-power plants are based on fission, which splits the nuclei of uranium atoms.

Ne'eman explained that in the U.S., which is investing \$2 billion this year in fusion research, the goal is to reach the state of "ignition" in 10 years. ("Ignition" means heating the hydrogen atoms in the reactor to the point where a chain reaction of fusion processes is set off.)

The next stage, and the crucial one for practical energy production, would be to bring the fusion process to the point where the energy released is greater than the energy used to stimulate the reactions.

Ne'eman said that the Riggatron might reach ignition quicker than conventional experimental reactors, thus leading to an experimental breakthrough. But he does not believe that the design is appropriate for the next stage of development leading to net energy production.

He added, however, that the INESCO project will probably yield some important technological spin-offs, and that it is important for scientists in Israel to gain experience in fusion research. If the project falls through, he said, there could be other, cheaper ways to advance fusion research here.

IDF IMPLEMENTS NEW TRAINING PROGRAM

Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 4 Jul 83 p 3

[Article by Joshua Brilliant]

[Text] TEL AVIV. — The Israel Defence Forces have been training less than previously, because soldiers have been busy in Lebanon, according to the outgoing head of the IDF training branch, Aluf Uri Simhoni. But a new training programme will reduce the time needed to prepare recruits.

Simhoni told military correspondents that training bases had been empty part of the time since Operation Peace for Galilee but he did not reveal by how much the training programmes had been curtailed. He maintained that the drop in fatal training accidents was due to the fact that units have been training less.

To compensate for this fall-off in training, the IDF has been sending to the field mobile units with highly sophisticated training aids. Trucks with such devices are now in Tel Aviv for the IDF exhibition to open on Thursday.

Simhoni, who is leaving for Washington tomorrow to take up his post as military attaché, said the IDF was revamping its entire training programme to make courses easier to cope with. However, training will not be safer, and compared with the programmes of other armies the IDF's will continue to be the most dangerous. Trainers want to simulate real war situations as closely as possible, he explained.

Simhoni said that the IDF learns from accidents. Following one fatal incident it dropped a certain requirement for trainees. Details of that incident cannot be revealed.

The new training programme was devised with the help of Yehonatan Smilanski, psychology and educa-

tion expert at the Hebrew University.

The programme was first introduced in a basic-training course. Some three months ago the General Staff decided to extend the programme to all basic-training courses.

Eventually, other programmes will be amended. The goal is to institute the change throughout the IDF by 1985, reporters were told.

The teams preparing the programme decided what the trainee had to know, dropped unnecessary material and added new subjects. They also decided trainees must practise the material they have learned at the end of each chapter rather than the end of the course. Thus, when trainees reached the final stage they did not find themselves trying during their first time in the field to apply all they had learned.

The results in one course had shown that the programme could be shortened from 15 weeks to 11 and that soldiers with poor marks fared better, since they had more opportunities to rehearse.

In some ways life will be easier for new recruits: volunteers for reconnaissance units, naval-commando or similar tough units will undergo only one admissions test. If they are rejected their files will be transferred to another unit. Thus, if they cannot reach a crack unit they will — it is hoped — not feel dejected when they reach a regular combat unit.

The IDF decided also not to over-exert new recruits because results are better if exercises are gradually intensified.

ARTILLERY CORPS CHIEF REVIEWS LESSONS LEARNED FROM WAR

Tel Aviv BAMAHANE in Hebrew no 34 4 May 83 pp 7-8

[Interview with Brig Gen Arie Mizrahi by Ron Shwartzman, date and place not specified]

[Text] "The main lesson learned by the artillery corps following the Galilee Peace War is that we need to be larger"--said artillery corps chief Brig Gen Arie Mizrahi in a special interview to BAMAHANE. Mizrahi is soon to leave his command to move into another senior position in the IDF. He says the war proved that "we are heading in the right direction." The artillery corps chief further discussed the benefits of targeted fire and the corp's reliance on computers to identify hits.

[Question] Brig Gen Mizrahi, what lessons did the artillery corps learn from the Galilee Peace War?

[Answer] Given the impressive victories won by the corps, the principal and immediate lesson learned was that we need to be larger. The second lesson is that our new battle procedures and methods proved themselves and the tactics we taught were proven effective. This certainly shows that we are moving in the right direction.

[Question] Compared with previous wars, this time the war focused on attacking specific points, not areas. How did you deal with that?

[Answer] I always fought against the notion that the chances of a hit are proportionate to the number of shots fired. As it turns out, it is indeed possible to achieve precision and effectivity, and to hit the same limited target of 20 or 30 meters without covering an area of several acres with a large quantity of expensive explosives. We are striving for effectivity. In this war, we followed the battle strategy: Maximum precision.

[Question] How do you explain the extensive use of the artillery corps by storm troopers?

[Answer] We had established a relationship with the storm troops by performing exercises together before and during the war.

An important factor here is the initiative of our communications men, the auxiliary commanders, and also the encouragement of the target shooters. This multilateral initiative created wide cooperation.

[Question] How is the battle spirit, which constitutes an important part of a soldier's motivation, passed on to the auxiliary soldiers?

[Answer] For years, I have felt the need within the artillery corps for a more intense battle spirit. There were attempts made to create this feeling through ongoing reportings of battle events. But this is not real enough. So I tried to instill initiative in the men, by allowing them to make certain decisions on their own. These tactics gave us a feeling of greater integration within the IDF, which is an army based on initiative.

Another thing that helped us was direct fire at close range. This is good from a professional point of view. It creates a feeling of participation in battle among the soldiers and commanders. One shot like that is enough for a whole unit, and everything else is done with greater spirit.

[Question] Upon your return from the United States, you were appointed commander of the artillery training base which today is considered one of the best in Israel. What, in your opinion, makes that base special?

[Answer] I learned a lot from the Americans. Not battle strategy, but training methods and exercise techniques, which they are really very good at.

In terms of organizing a base, I changed the system under which every branch was trained in all functions. Now, each branch specializes in one area and transfers that expertise to the entire corps. First, this system achieves a savings in training personnel. Second, it allows for greater expertise in given functions and third, the same trainer teaches officers, reservists and new recruits. In this way, I created functional unity. Further, we have made advances in the education of the trainers themselves. This has become a professional function. The course is now the envy of the entire army.

[Question] What training methods and systems, developed in the artillery corps, have been adopted by the entire army?

[Answer] One training aid we use is imagination. We have a regular armored vehicle with computerized firing equipment in which we train soldiers before they go out in the field. Another example is the range finder switchboard. The goal is to create cooperation among soldiers despite the fact that only one of them actually serves as range finder. The exercise plan we developed, called TALAM (Learning by Functional Components), will apparently be implemented throughout the IDF.

[Question] Do artillery units use a computer to identify a target?

[Answer] Yes.

[Question] Will the artillery corps be more computerized in the future?

[Answer] Even today, due to the nature of the job we perform, the corps is highly computerized. In the future, we will expand the use of the computer into additional systems. As our familiarity with the computer becomes more extensive, we will be the first in the field, and not just insofar as military systems are concerned.

[Question] Will the computer allow you to raise the level of the ordinary soldier?

[Answer] Man's intelligence does not stem from the function he fulfills. It is, rather, important for a soldier to understand why he is fighting. Computers cannot replace man in the area of decision-making, so we still need men with above average thinking abilities. Increased means will require men with even higher intelligence.

[Question] What qualifications are required today of a soldier in the artillery corps?

[Answer] The same as for any other soldier in a Golani unit or in the paratroopers. He must be battle-oriented, a fighter...and intelligent.

[Question] How do you rate your soldiers as infantrymen?

[Answer] In this area, there is room for improvement, and we are working on it. When we built the basic course for the artillery corps, we emphasized the area of infantry fighting.

[Question] You spend many hours amongst soldiers in the field, soldiers of every rank. What have you learned about their feelings toward the corps from your extended visits?

[Answer] The Galilee Peace War significantly changed the soldiers' feelings. Today, the feeling is one of satisfaction and pride. This information streams in to me from various sources. First--personal contact with commanders and soldiers alike. Second--regularly conducted interviews. And third--psychological studies performed within the corps. Another indication is the numbers of volunteers. This number has been increasing annually. What's interesting is that the reasons soldiers give for volunteering is not because they've seen corps propaganda, but rather what they've heard from friends serving in the corps who recommend it. Others say they were attracted by the opportunity to fight and use their heads at the same time.

[Question] You have dealt extensively with bereaved families. What kinds of activities were you involved in?

[Answer] I feel that this an area of special importance. In the Yom Kippur War, my unit suffered 22 casualties. Over the years, I kept in touch with the families, not for official reasons, but as a person. When I took this post, we sought out the bereaved families and set up a communications network

with them. It is an organization comprised of our reservists who help these families in every possible way. We created a meeting program with the families. And now, we are interested in setting up a permanent site.

[Question] What is your evaluation of the Arab artillery?

[Answer] The Arab artillery is good. One must distinguish between western artillery (used by Jordan, for example), which is modern and advanced--and eastern artillery (such as that used by the Syrians). Recently, there has been a dangerous development, inasmuch as the Arabs are integrating western systems to improve firing precision and they are beginning to arm themselves with self-propelled artillery. In my opinion, we will face the difficult problem of confronting that system in the next war, if there is one.

[Question] What changes has the artillery corps undergone during your tour of duty?

[Answer] The corps has undergone numerous changes over the last 3 years. I can't point to a single drastic change, but there is at least one development that I managed to introduce--the artillery corps has become a fighting unit, daring and aggressive. In terms of the men, one of the conspicuous changes in the regular forces and reserve units alike is that commanders at all levels are younger.

9811
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PERAH PROPOSES LAW FOR EDUCATING ILLITERATE SOLDIERS

Tel Aviv BAMAHANE in Hebrew no 32 20 Apr 83 pp24-26

[Interview with MK Yehuda Perah by Orna Kadosh, date and place not specified]

[Excerpts] Every year, 6,300 youths enlist in the IDF who have not even completed elementary school. A new law proposed by MK (and Dr of Education) Yehuda Perah, seeks to guarantee these soldiers the equivalent of a 9-year educational program. Another law, also proposed by the MK from the Liberal Party, which has already been passed, is the law for subsidizing released soldiers.

MK Yehuda Perah, a member of the Liberal faction within the Likud, recently proposed two laws related to soldiers. The first, which has already been passed, provides that a released soldier who goes to work in preferred sectors--industry, construction and tourism--will receive, in addition to his salary, half the unemployment allocation for a period of 6 months to a year, according to his choice. The second proposal, which was cleared by the Ministers of the Treasury and Defense, and awaits a house vote, calls for a guaranteed elementary 9-year education program for the thousands of soldiers who enter the IDF each year without it. Toward this end, the Treasury will budget an additional 30 million shekel a year to the Defense Ministry.

[Question] MK Perah, how is it possible that the school system, where you were once an administrator, turns out 6,300 soldiers every year who have not completed eight grades of school, some of them illiterate?

[Answer] That is the cardinal question. I know for a fact that there are drop-outs from the school system--I call it "defoliation"--despite the fact that theoretically, it is impossible for anyone entering the army to be illiterate. My claim is that we're not smart enough to invest our best resources in the early grades--pre-school and elementary school. Kids who fail reading drop out of school. Failing to read causes them to lose social status and self-confidence.

There are other factors as well--to no small degree broken homes and other family-related issues. If I tried to find fault with the system that created this, I would not be solving the problem. My ultimate goal as an educator, as a member of the Knesset committee on education, is to reach a zero drop-out level. I feel that today, we are treating the branches and not the roots of the problem.

[Question] What are the implications?

[Answer] We've turned our schools into Zionist factories. Goals are important, but the methods are poor. In my opinion, there is great merit in independent study programs, in assigning independent projects to students. Because after all, there is more knowledge in the library than any teacher can impart. The frontal teaching method has meant that we've raised a generation of dependent students. And a large portion of what the teacher says falls on deaf ears. If the students did absorb everything that was said during the 12 years of their education, they would all be genuises. The current situation is that slow, even average students, need private lessons. The entire system does not adequately allocate individual attention to pupils.

[Question] You talk about the "system." Who do you mean?

[Answer] I believe that teachers are not teaching, except for a few isolated teachers who behave differently and should be blessed. I am highly critical of the achievement-oriented method used in high schools, which destroys learning.

[Question] Your proposed law, which seeks to institutionalize this system, is a way of coming to terms with the existing situation. Are you sure it is the role of the IDF to provide soldiers with an elementary education?

[Answer] Education should be the responsibility of all the institutions in a person's life. In any framework, people should learn and be educated. Life is school and we learn from every phase of life.

[Question] That's possible, but why not invest some of the resources to ferret out these pupils long before they reach the IDF?

[Answer] There are laws that are designed to deal with that: The law of compulsory education, through the ninth grade; and the law guaranteeing free education up to high school. The problem is one of ensuring that these children not only sit in classrooms, but learn, that they become involved and want to stay in school through the 12th grade.

[Question] What are the central problems, as you see it, in the IDF education system?

[Answer] The central problem is insufficient time. To complete his education, a soldier has only the duration of his service. Therefore, he must achieve certain goals within but a few months. This requires superior teaching. Women serve 2 years in the IDF, and during this period, they have to be trained. They start teaching and then their tour of duty is over. They barely manage to build up any teaching experience. The period of their training is very short and they have to be taught teaching methods, educational psychology, curriculum and achievement testing. Things that are usually learned over a long period of time. We are trying to resolve the problem by recruiting certified teachers--academics--and by signing the good teachers up

for permanent service. Existing manpower must be exploited. Another route is to develop pre-army courses for teacher training. I took a close look at the program, with one of the head education officers. In my opinion, they're doing a marvelous job.

[Question] MK Perah, one of your other proposed laws, which has already been passed, is the law which provides subsidies to veterans. What prompted you to propose that law?

[Answer] Many young people feel they are better off with 80,000 lira unemployment compensation per month, than working and earning a salary of not much more than that. Unemployment compensation has a negative impact on society--unless you're talking about the sick and elderly. 80,000 workers cross into the State of Israel every day from the territories. I have nothing against that, but it doesn't make sense for our boys to sit around unemployed while others serve them.

The law I proposed offers them in addition to their salaries--half the unemployment compensation they might otherwise receive, under the condition that they work in industry, tourism, construction or even gas stations, and if they remain employed for at least 6 months. This will make it worthwhile for them to work. And therefore, instead of supporting them, we are giving them a positive incentive to work. The law fights laziness and unemployment and stimulates young people to be productive. I am sure that they are not happy being unemployed and receiving hand-outs.

[Question] And what happens at the end of 6 months or a year?

[Answer] A young man who has entered the work force will not want to lose a year of seniority. He may be close to a promotion. I am simply increasing the chances that he will continue to work.

9811
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ISRAEL

BRIEFS

OFFICER TRAINING FOR WOMEN--An officers' basic training course, the first of its kind, will be offered for women in the infantry and armored corps at the IDF officers' school in southern Israel. The exercises planned for the female cadets are identical to those performed by male cadets. Until now, women from field units went through officers command training programs at the central orientation base for women soldiers in central Israel. But this program did not prepare them for high level positions in field units. When the problem was aired, the IDF considered a suggestion to train the women at a higher level and in a different framework. Lt Col Amira Dotan, chief officer in the women's corps, told BAMAHAINE that the course is experimental and will therefore be offered to a limited number of women at first--only ten. But, she says, that number will be increased if the trial proves successful. The officers school this week completed the arrangements necessary for the women's arrival. In a sector set aside for the female cadets, women's corps living quarters were set up, as well as showers and bathroom facilities. The BAMAHAINE reporter was told that everything is prepared and ready to receive the new cadets on Thursday of this week.

[Text] [Tel Aviv BAMAHAINE in Hebrew no 34 4 May 83 p 5] 9811

SIGNING OF PANAMA TREATY--WASHINGTON--Israel last week became the 21st country to sign the Treaty concerning the Permanent Neutrality of the Panama Canal. Ambassador Meir Rosenne signed the treaty at a ceremony at the Organization of American States headquarters here. Israel was asked to sign the treaty by both the U.S. and Panama, as well as by several other Central American states. Egypt has already signed the treaty. Rosenne expressed hope that Israel's good relations with most Central American states will continue. He said Israel is especially proud of its record in cooperating with these countries in economic and political areas. [Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 3 Jul 83 p 2]

CSO: 4400/435

POLITICAL PRISONERS IN 'AMMAN PROTEST TREATMENT

Nicosia AL-HURRIYAH in Arabic No 20, 12 Jun 83 pp 24-25

[Article: "Memoranda From al-Mahatta Prison in 'Amman Expose Official Neglect and Terrorism: Stop the Inhuman Attack Against the Political Prisoners."]

[Text] The political prisoners in al-Mahatta prison condemned the inhuman practices of the prison administration, especially Colonel Ghalib al-Damur, the prison director, vis-a-vis them. They also exposed their poor cultural, nutritional and health conditions, and the attempts to seize the personal possessions which they gained during long years of struggle for the sake of improving the conditions of political imprisonment.

All this is set forth in the two memoranda which the political prisoners sent, with the signatures of 72 prisoners from various parties and organizations, to the chairman of the Human Rights Commission in Jordan, the director of the office of the International Red Cross in 'Amman, the members of the National Advisory Commission, the heads of the workers and trade unions, the League of Writers, the Women's Union, and the PLO office in 'Amman.

The following is the text of one of the memoranda published by the Defense Committees for Democratic Freedoms a few days ago, along with the names of the prisoners who signed the two memoranda:

The Political Prisoners

<u>Name</u>	<u>Sentence</u>	<u>Date of Imprisonment</u>	<u>Charge</u>
1-'Arif Muhammad 'Abdullah al-Zughul	for life	16/10/76	(membership in the Democratic Front
2-'Umar Radi Qasim Shaqu	15 years	15/1/78	the Democratic Front
3-Nahad Ahmad Hasuna Abu Ghush	15 years	10/12/79	the Democratic Front

<u>Name</u>	<u>Sentence</u>	<u>Date of Imprisonment</u>	<u>Charge</u>
4-Mazin 'Abd al-Wahid al-As'ad	5 years	22/12/79	the Democratic Front
5-Shakir 'Attiya Ibrahim Salama	5 years	25/10/80	the Democratic Front
6-Talal Ibrahim Yusuf al-'Azzam	under arrest	25/8/81	the Democratic Front
7-Yusuf Muhammad 'Ali 'Umaru	under arrest	5/10/81	the Democratic Front
8-Muhammad Da'ud 'Abd al-Rahim Abu Mayla	under arrest	10/12/81	the Democratic Front
9-Muhammad Munib Sa'id Abu Halawa	3 years	14/1/82	the Democratic Front
10-'Abd al-Rahman Muhammad 'Abd al-Rahman Talib	under arrest	1/8/82	the Democratic Front
11-'Adnan 'Abd al-Rahim Nasir al-Aqra'	7.5 years	1/8/82	the Democratic Front
12-Sami Hasan Jabr	under arrest	10/5/82	the Democratic Front
13-Hasan 'Abd al-Rahman Abu Shamla	under arrest	19/1/83	the Democratic Front
14-Musa Mahmud Muhammad al-Fadilat	for life		FATAH
15-Musa Husayn Salin al-Birri	7.5 years		FATAH
16-'Ali Muhammad Musa al-Bariqi	7.5 years		FATAH
17-Hilal 'Ifan 'Ayyash	7.5 years		FATAH
18-Fu'ad Fawzi Musa Hasan	under arrest		FATAH
19-'Isa Muhammad Hasan Mansia			
20-Husayn Muhammad Husayn			
21-Ribhi Mahmud Jabr al-Fatafita			
22-'Imad Mahmud 'Abd al-Qadir al-Khawaja			
23-Muhammad Qasim Muhammad al-Dik			
24-Muhammad Khalid 'Ali al-Nahawi			

<u>Name</u>	<u>Sentence</u>	<u>Date of Imprisonment</u>	<u>Charge</u>
25-Ziyad Yunis Talal Kashur			
26-Husayn Muhammad 'Abd al-'Isawi			
27-Muahmmad Sibhi 'Abd al-Halim al-'awiwi			
28-Raghib Musa Gharbawi			
29-Anwar Sa'id Salim Zaydan			
30-'Abd al-'Aziz Muhammad Tantur			
31-Khalil Ibrahim Khalil 'Ashur			
32-'Abd al-Latif Jamil 'Abd al-'Isawi			
33-Salih Muhammad 'Alush	for life		FATAH
34-Lutfi Muhammad 'Alush	10 years		the Popular Front
35-Husayn 'Ali Ra'd	15 years		the Popular Front
36-Ahmad Salih Muslih	under arrest		
37-'Imad Nayif 'Ali al-Mulahhim	10 years		the Jordanian Communist Party
38-Hashim Bidyawi al-Gharayiba	10 years		the Jordanian Communist Party
39-Barik 'Abd Mansur al-Hadid	10 years		the Jordanian Revolutionary People's Party
40-Nimr Jamil al-Hurani	under arrest		al-Sa'iqa
41-Yusuf Salim Hammad			
42-'Adnan Muhammad 'Ajjaj			
43-'Adnan 'Attiya Ijwid			
44-Akram Ya'qub Abu Zayd	5 years		the General Command
45-Ibrahim Muhammad Sulayman Salih	for life		the Arab Liberation Front
46-Yusuf Lafi Sharrab	3 years		the Arab Liberation Front
47-Rizq Sibhi 'Abd al-Salam	3 years		the Arab Liberation Front
48-Muhammad Jum'a 'Awid Abu 'Umra	under arrest		the Arab Liberation Front

<u>Name</u>	<u>Sentence</u>	<u>Date of Imprisonment</u>	<u>Charge</u>
49-Mahmud Muhammad Nuwayhi	10 years		the Palestinian Liberation Front
50-Rasim Ramadan al-Hindi	10 years		the Palestinian Liberation Front
51-Salah Sa'd Ziyab al-Tuni	for life		the Palestinian Liberation Front
52-Jamal Khalid Mur'ib	3 years		the Struggle Front
53-Mazin Nawwaf Mansi	under arrest		the Struggle Front
54-Mustafa 'Isa Hawari	under arrest		the Struggle Front
55-'Abdullah Fawzi Sha'ban	under arrest		the Struggle Front
56-Muhammad Misbah 'Abd al-Qadir	3 years		FATAH
57-Taysir al-Bitaniyya	10 years		FATAH
58-Muhammad 'Abd al-Qadir al-Khatib	10 years		the Communist Workers Party
59-Wahid Yasir Muhammad Qirsh			
60-Yasin Zayid Yasin			
61-Farj Muhammad 'Abd al-Rahman Abu Shala			
62-Samir 'Adnan al-Misri			
63-Hamdan Arshud al-Hawari			
64-Muhammad Jum'a Barhuma			
65-Ghazi Rishrash Hadib al-Khaza'ila			
66-Hashim Ahmad Hajazi			
67-Salman Salih 'Aqla Naqrash			
68-Nazzar Ahmad Faris al-Kayid			
69-Yusuf Sa'id Hamid			
70-Muhammad 'Umar al-Mallah			
71-Nazih 'Adil Daruza			
72-Ahmad Muhammad Ahmad 'Ali			

The Text of the Memorandum Sent to the Unions and the PLO Office

In this period, in which the Zionist-Imperialist plots against our Palestinian cause are intensifying and Zionist military preparations for a strike against the Palestinian revolution, the Lebanese national movement and Syria are escalating, while American imperialism tries to impose defeatist solutions on Lebanon and to organize the region in a way that suits American-Zionist aggression, by means of the visit of America's Secretary of State "George Schultz" to the region, not to mention the attempt to impose a defeatist solution on Jordan and signal the implementation of the alternate homeland strategy, this whole plot which is challenged by the struggling alliance of the sons of the Jordanian and Palestinian peoples...in such circumstances as these, the oppressive grip of the Jordanian regime grows stronger. It tosses tens of Jordanian and Palestinian strugglers into the prisons, simply because of their national affiliation and their struggle against imperialism and tyranny, and gives them unfair trials which end with them being given terroristic sentences of great length which can go as far as "to be executed" or "for life." Among them are a number of the sons of the Occupied Territories, who are forbidden to return to their occupied homeland, not to mention mass detention for long periods lasting up to 35 months or more, without any charge being made. These measures are accompanied by a campaign consisting of positions adopted by the Jordanian authorities, such as the denial that there are any political prisoners and the position announced by the prime minister at the last Public Advisory Commission and in a set of practices and organized harassment carried out by the administration of "al-Mahatta prison" against us in order to efface our political identity and smash our national will.

The prison administration has taken to putting a number of politicians in prison cells as a way of harassing them, as well as calling some prisoners before the secret police in order to threaten and terrorize them. In addition, the administration threatens to banish anyone who raises his voice for the sake of improving prison conditions to Ma'an and al-Tafila prisons, not to mention its constant attempt to harass us, with such means as inflammatory and comprehensive searches done in a campaign-like fashion.

In an attempt by the prison administration to harm us, it supported spies and traitors as a means of confronting us. It also dissolved the committees which were run by the prisoners and put the prison under the direct supervision of officers, which led to a decline in all services in the prison infrastructure. The harmful diseases known as consumption and scabies spread as a result of the intense crowding, the low level of sanitation and poor nutrition, as well. Moreover, the prison administration forbade the prisoners to bring in cultural books, even those common in the market, which led to a weakening of the prisoners' cultural level.

We, the sons of the Palestinian revolution and the Jordanian National Movement, confirm that we hold fast to our combative political and nationalist identity. We resolutely reject these repressive measures. We all trust in your resolute and earnest stance with us for the sake of stopping these

measures as a part of our democratic struggle, with the goal of freeing the political prisoners and achieveing a dignified, democratic life in Jordan.

You have our respect and esteem.

The Political Prisoners in al-Mahatta Prison, 'Amman

12224
CSO: 4404/470

PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS

PLO PUBLICATION COMMENTS ON FATAH MUTINY

Nicosia FALASTIN AL-THAWRAH in Arabic No 462, 18 Jun 83 pp 4-5

[Article: "Excuses Are Not Suitable Reasons"]

[Text] Once again [we ask] why is there such hatred and hostility for Fatah? Again [we ask] why is there a continuing conspiracy against Fatah? Yet again [we ask] why are the blatant attempts to interfere in Fatah's affairs so persistent?

Once again questions are being raised. Thousands of questions are being asked: disapproving, critical questions condemning all of Fatah's enemies. These questions are being asked by every child, every boy, every girl and every Palestinian man and woman in every city, village, camp and community of Palestinians either in the occupied land or in those locations to which they have forcibly been banished.

Answers to all these questions may be condensed in one answer: there is an American-Zionist wish to put an end to the PLO and to get rid of this "burdensome Palestinian legacy." In view of the similarity of these two wishes, the process of making interests congruous is being carried out by striking the revolution.

Both public and closet enemies of the Revolution agree that the Palestinian [organization], Fatah, is the backbone of the Palestinian being and the foundation of the PLO. A strike against the PLO cannot be made unless a strike is made against the Palestinian [organization], Fatah. And it would be difficult to make a strike against Fatah as long as this Palestinian movement is united, particularly since Arab regimes that had accepted such a role for themselves in the past, had failed to make such a strike when they used small organizations to strike against a unified and a powerful Palestinian Fatah [organization].

Therefore, they are trying once again to break up Fatah's unity and to weaken the organization so that a strike against it would be easy.

A strike against the PLO and its backbone, Fatah, is still the principal objective of the enemies of the Palestinian people, those who oppose the Palestinian people's ambitions and aspirations for independence and nationhood. The continuing episodes of the conspiracy, which was escalated with the invasion of Lebanon in June 1982, and everything that has happened subsequent to that invasion, either with the Israeli-Lebanese-American agreement or with Israel's military deployments in al-Biqa', constitute hostile efforts and plans to achieve this objective.

The Palestinian people are the first to know the objectives of their enemies, and they are determined to foil these hostile objectives. But it is regrettable that some people are fooled by the tricks played by the enemies of the Palestinian people and are led unwittingly into conduct and positions that serve the objectives of the enemies of the Palestinian people: to deal a blow to the Palestinian Revolution.

It is regrettable that some of these people have had personal experiences with the enemies of the Palestinian Revolution. Nevertheless, they were swayed by the enticements set forth by those who had pledged themselves to intelligence and [other] Arab agencies for purely personal reasons that are based on their own personal failures and shortcomings. These intelligence and Arab agencies used to control a government, using it as a tool not only against the movement of the masses in their country, but they also destroyed the struggle of the Arab peoples in various parts of the Arab homeland.

What is also regrettable is the fact that despite the dissimilarity between conditions on the Palestinian scene and the conditions of Arab regimes, those few people think that tampering with the ambitions that Fatah's members have to develop the reality of their leading movement is a "corrective action" like those Fascist "corrective actions" that are taken by Fascist Arab regimes.

Once again [we say] we are a people's movement. We do not claim to be perfect; nor have we lost sight of the complex and difficult material world that we are personally and objectively experiencing. We cannot claim to have no problems. To say the least, we are taking action amidst a host of afflictions, and it is therefore not unusual for us to be affected by some of them. However, we in Fatah, which is a revolutionary movement, have what it takes to cure ourselves of any affliction that may befall us from the national frustrations brought about by national regimes that have been unsuccessful nationally and regionally.

Although the total picture of the material world around us, amidst this continuous series of conspiracies against our very existence and survival, may have some effects on our own material world, slowing down our victory over our difficult reality, that fact cannot constitute a reason [we would use] to look for curious forms [and bring about] change on our Palestinian scene for the sake of change.

Our Palestinian movement, Fatah, and our Palestinian Revolution and its leader, Abu 'Ammar have firmly established outstanding ideas about the Arab material world on our Palestinian scene, about how dialogue is to be conducted and about how the masses are to participate in the decision-making process: by means of direct dialogue with and within those people who make up the movement.

We in Fatah have become accustomed to shouldering our own burdens as well as those of the entire Palestinian scene. We have also become accustomed to the fact that solving problems on our Palestinian scene is the duty of every revolutionary fighter because it is first of all the duty of the revolution. But in order for such a solution to be a proper and a permanent one, it must follow the proper course and it must come from those who make up the movement and the organization.

It is quite true that our material world is difficult and full of problems, but these problems are not insoluble since solving them is not impossible. The need

for a solution is also the responsibility of every fighter in this movement regardless of his rank within the organization; it is not the responsibility of one member and not the other. However, this need for a solution must be met by those who make up the organization in accordance with the provisions of its bylaws and not according to the mood of this person or the other.

This strong and broad condemnation of the use of an armed military method to overthrow [the movement's leaders] stems from this premise. This method was adopted by some people who are functionaries of regimes that failed in their attack on this movement and its democratic traditions. If we were to give ourselves a little leeway and overlook the facts that were associated with "the armed military coup that was carried out to correct the situation"--and these facts confirm the relationship between that coup and Arab intelligence agencies--we can say that "perpetrators of the coup" forgot the facts about Palestinian democracy that are acknowledged even by the enemies of the Palestinian people themselves. Guided by those formulas that had led those unsuccessful regimes to power, they resorted to "a military coup."

Although a formula [that includes] "a military coup" and "Bulletin Number 1" may have met with factors that caused it to succeed and survive in the countries of those who have been stirring up action against the PLO in order to effect a strike against the Palestinian [organization], Fatah, and break up its unity, this course is nevertheless an ignoble course. It is objectionable to Palestinians. We are not accustomed to it, and we do not accept it for others. How then can we accept it for ourselves?

Furthermore, Fatah is a national liberation movement, and "military coups" have no precedent in any national liberation movement in the world. If the proponents of "the military coup theory" want by this action to change the notion of bringing about change in the world's national liberation movements and introduce a military coup mode into those movements to revolutionize them, we would strongly reject [such an approach]. We would reject this not only because such a coup would be against democracy, but also because we do not accept our movement and our people becoming guinea pigs for the mischievous deeds of ignorant and irresponsible people, most of whom failed to fulfill the least responsibilities for the movement. Some of them failed miserably to take action and to organize in positions of responsibility, and others proved their shortcomings and their bitter political backwardness last summer during the siege of Beirut.

Therefore, if we were to concede for the sake of argument that the "military coup" was prompted only by "a wish to correct the situation;" that it has actually no connections or links with any Arabs around it; and that Arabs neither conducted it, guided it nor benefited from it, [we would then determine that] those who are asking for the correction are not qualified, according to their declared makeup--and that is most certainly the only one--to assume the responsibility of leading the corrective action and proposing the rightful demands. Furthermore, some of them are not even qualified to take part in the movement's general discussion on corrective action that would take place within proper organizational frameworks. This is because these people are being accused of causing the destruction about which they have been clamoring.

The matter goes beyond "demands." Excuses are deeper than objections to

administrative measures. This is because the demands that were being made for every fighter in Fatah and the administrative measures that perpetrators of the coup and proponents of "revolutionary committees" had adopted to justify their action and accomplish "the corrective movement" were being reconsidered by the Central Committee. The resolutions made by the Central Committee confirmed that in the statement that was issued following the committee's meeting.

The demands were also being given due attention. Fatah had agreed to seek the arbitration of the movement's lawful authority and the movement's congress. Abu 'Ammar insisted that an emergency meeting of the Revolutionary Council be held to look into a place and a time for convening the congress.

However, what happened left no room for doubt; it confirmed that what happened was not a protest to an administrative measure, but rather "a military coup" carried out to realize the authoritarian tendencies of "the leaders of the coup," of the "proponents of revolutionary committees" and of "those who favor corrective action" in compliance with Arab wishes to break up the unity of Fatah.

Perpetrators of the coup scuttled the meeting of the Revolutionary Council by occupying the offices of the movement with the assistance of the intelligence [functionaries] of an Arab country. There, they announced they were "joining the rebellion" and "establishing revolutionary committees" in those offices.

How do they want to correct the movement when they think that everything in it has been destroyed and terminated? [How will they correct the movement] when they deny the movement and its members access to the movement's organizations as provided for in the bylaws? Instead of turning to the resolutions of the congress and the organizations that stemmed from it, and instead of calling for a fifth congress for the movement, in their flawed understanding of the organization, they are asking for an emergency committee to be formed. In other words, they are asking that the movement be disbanded and terminated. This would mean the end of the PLO. Regardless of their intentions, this would realize the objective for which the enemies of our people and our revolution have been working and conspiring to achieve.

We do have affection for some people, and we feel sorry for the history of struggle they have had until May 10 when "the coup" began. We affirm that everyone in "the coup" joined it from a different perspective, and we are convinced that there are those among "the perpetrators of the coup" who are genuinely decent and whose nature is such that it would not allow them to pledge themselves to [other] regimes. However, this coup does not only mean an association with regimes, but it also means a strike against the Revolution. Although leaders of the coup may have hidden their association with regimes, preferring them to Fatah and using a number of demands as excuses [for their involvement], they forgot that the masses of our people have a special sensitivity towards regimes because of the historical record these regimes have had in the positions they assumed against the cause. The masses of our people are hoping that if any of those perpetrators have any trace of care left, they will return to their positions and fight with their fellows in accordance with the movement's proper guidelines to effect serious changes in our movement and our revolution. Excuses will always be excuses; they will never become reasons.

PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS

HABASH INTERVIEWED ON CRISIS IN FATAH

Nicosia AL-HURRIYAH in Arabic No 21, 19 Jun 83 pp 9-12

[Interview with Dr George Habash, Secretary General of the PFLP by Zakariya Muhammad: "In a Candid Interview with AL-HURRIYAH George Habash Says, 'We Will not Allow Any Infringements on the Unity and Independence of the PLO' "]

[Text] Any democratic reform that comes in the form of dissension will be counterproductive.

Internal factors are the main reason behind the crisis in Fatah. Leaders have the primary responsibility for that crisis, but the group that is asking for reforms bears a great responsibility for preserving the unity of Fatah.

The relationship between the PFLP and the DFLP is moving in the direction of the full unification of the two fronts.

Soviet support furnished us with the components for victory, but it is up to us to achieve that victory.

We had been trying for a while to interview "the doctor," but the fact that he was busy during the period that followed the [meeting of the] National Council and that he also traveled to Moscow and to other socialist and Arab capitals postponed the interview.

In the meantime, the concerns changed somewhat. The intensity of the questions that were being raised immediately before and after the National Council was reduced. After what happened in Fatah, on the one hand, and the rapprochement between the PFLP and the DFLP, on the other, the subject of greatest concern for Palestinians was the internal situation. Therefore, the questions were basically concentrated on these aspects.

The text of the interview that our colleague Zakariya Muhammad conducted with Dr George Habash, secretary general of the PFLP follows.

The Problem of Fatah Has not Yet Come to an End

[Question] Now that a period of time has elapsed since the recent action in Fatah took place, can it be said that Fatah is making progress in achieving its goals? Or is Fatah coming to a dead end, with an atmosphere of frustration beginning to prevail within the ranks of the insurrection which did not produce change as much as it did produce shaky conditions in the Revolution?

[Answer] This problem has not been resolved yet. The attitudes that will be taken by all parties will play a role in determining the possible outcome of this question. It is our duty to define positions first and then to take the action that is necessary so that the outcome of this action will turn out to be in the interests of the Revolution in general. This requires that one have a point of view about the reasons for this problem, a way for solving this problem and the outcome that we must try to bring about.

Regarding the reasons for the problem, we in the Popular Front believe that the official policies that were pursued, particularly after our departure from Beirut, were the reasons that led to the emergence of this problem in this manner. We hope that Abu 'Ammar and our colleagues in Fatah will take a long, hard look at this matter from a critical, decisive and candid standpoint. Let's take, for example, the military measures that were taken. Who can accept having the troops led by leaders about whom the least that can be said is that they do not have the confidence and the respect of the fighters? I don't want to say any more than that. I don't want to say that this person or the other was responsible for what happened in Sidon or Mount Lebanon, and so on. But I am saying that it is necessary, if one wants to regulate the leadership conditions of the fighters, to take this point into consideration. Questions of conduct are very important and very influential. I know, of course, that we are going through a stage of national liberation and that the bourgeoisie in such a stage is a class and one of the forces of the Revolution. However, there must be limits [to all that] because the revolution needs to have its fighters and the public make major sacrifices. But it is difficult for fighters and for the masses [to do so] when they are under tragic circumstances and they sense that there are modes of conduct and behavior that are as far as they can be from the minimum conduct and behavior that is required for any revolution.

On the other hand, our revolution has been a protracted and a very complex revolution. Accordingly, each organization and the PLO have to appeal to institutions, laws and regulations [for decisions on their disagreements]. It is this that creates a feeling that there is justice in the ranks of the Revolution. But when the revolution is led in an individualistic manner, it is natural that it would face such problems. I am not a member of Fatah, and I do not have detailed information about organizational life within Fatah, but we do have an experience pertaining to the PLO. We complained on more than one occasion, and we lodged a bitter complaint against cases of individualistic behavior and unilateral conduct. No revolutionary and no organization can accept anything but an appeal to principles that are based on collective leadership, on regulations and on institutions.

So much for conduct and organizational aspects. Regarding the political aspect, there is room for independent opinions. Furthermore, I can say that as far as this subject is concerned, there will be different points of view regarding the political course of the Revolution. We are a national liberation movement that comprises numerous classes, and each class has its own political course. Some people may ask you why your point of view is the correct one. I am quite familiar with numerous points of view on the Palestinian scene that find fault with the positions of the Popular Front; they believe the Popular Front does not take tactics into account. That's fine. We do not object to that. However, the point that we are entitled to [make and] demand from all classes and organizations in

the Revolution is that the Revolution stay a revolution. This means that the Revolution is to continue its opposition to imperialism, Zionism and reactionaries, and it is to use all methods, chiefly an armed struggle, in the fight to achieve its goals.

You are well aware of the fact that after Beirut and before the 16th session of the National Council was convened, legitimate questions were being raised about whether or not the Revolution would continue. Questions were being asked about whether some of the leaders had become convinced that after 18 years we had done everything we could and that we now have to look for any settlement we could get. After the departure from Beirut our people did not have a sense that the Revolution's political course was clearly and decisively anti-imperialistic and anti-reactionary. People did not have a clear sense that the Revolution would remain completely outside the framework of imperialist settlements and that it would call publicly for rekindling the Revolution and continuing the armed struggle.

We felt we did make a worthwhile accomplishment during the session of the National Council: we defined a national political course for the Revolution. However, the fact that individualistic approaches and individualistic tactics continued unbeknownst to the collective leadership restored doubts again. The council's resolutions regarding relations with the Egyptian regime, [for example], are unequivocal. However, a member of the Executive Committee, al-Dajani, continued his contacts with that regime. In addition, doubts were created by the Amman talks. I do know, of course, that the Amman talks did not give the Jordanian regime authority to negotiate on our behalf.

The Need for Real Criticism

But we all know that we were very nervous during the period of the talks. These matters must be realized when we set out to solve the problem. We have a pressing need to undergo a truthful, radical and stern critical process so we can restore to our Revolution its vitality and its potency.

There is an important point that I want our colleagues in Fatah to take note of. Some people are saying that these problems did not exist before the battle of Beirut and before we left Beirut and went to Syria. I am saying that the roots of a crisis within any organization are internal. External factors come later. We faced situations in the Popular Front similar to those that Fatah is facing, and we did not allow ourselves to say that foreign factors intervened and led to this matter. I personally looked into a major case of disunity that Fatah experienced in 1978 before we went to Syria and before the battle of Beirut. This case actually almost led to the breakup of the last Fatah conference that was held in 1980. Each of us also knows that he went through a crisis that almost exploded at that time.

Why am I saying all this? I want to tell my colleagues who are involved in this matter, "Let's look for our mistakes, and let's admit those mistakes. Let's go on with the process of democratic reform, and let's do so with diligence and enthusiasm because this will be in the interests of the Revolution." After that it is my duty to point out that any democratic reform that comes in the form of dissension during this period will be counterproductive. Consequently, the process of reforming Fatah must take place on the basis of the principle of Fatah's unity.

Just as I attributed the principal responsibility [for this crisis] to the political and organizational policies and procedures that were followed after Beirut, I am, at the same time, attributing considerable responsibility to the group that is calling for reform if that group does not proclaim alongside the slogan for reform the slogan of Fatah's unity and pursue both with true conviction. After that we would be faced with the following question: how can we combine reform and the unity of Fatah in the wake of the tension that exists between the figures in question? My answer to that question is that it is necessary to initiate a broad, democratic dialogue in Fatah so that the general membership and the cadres of Fatah can speak their minds about this matter. Let us find the formula through which the general membership of Fatah can realize these two watchwords: reform and unity. I am not relieving other Palestinian organizations from their duties at this point, but I do believe that the principal factor is Fatah: its cadres, its general membership and its fighters.

One point remains to be made regarding this matter. We in the Popular Front, and if I may say so in the Democratic Front also, are very careful about giving the Liberation Organization as much protection as possible from the negative effects of this situation. I mean we will try to solve this problem in Fatah according to these rules. However, regardless of when and how this problem will come to an end, every loyal Palestinian must be careful not to infringe upon the unity and independence of the Liberation Organization. This matter is more important than all of us: it is more important than Abu 'Ammar; more important than Abu Salih; more important than Abu Musa; more important than George Habash; and more important than Nayif Hawatimah. The Liberation Organization is for all these people. At the same time it also belongs to Bassam al-Shak'ah, to Ibrahim al-Tawil, Karim Khalaf and the children who are fighting with stones against Israel. We will not allow any infringements on the unity and independence of the Liberation Organization. Let's put everything we have [in the effort] to solve this problem according to those principles.

[Question] But is there some fear that the present movement within Fatah might turn into one that would divide the Liberation Organization among the organizations?

[Answer] Such a fear does exist; we do not want to deceive people. This depends on the following question: will this problem be dealt with in the proper manner and according to proper principles, or will it be dealt with improperly?

[Question] There are those who believe that the present movement within Fatah has been there for a long time, even before the battles of Beirut. Those people think that what made the movement surface was the breakup of the Revolution's security and suppressive agencies after the departure from Beirut!

[Answer] I don't believe so. But I do agree that our departure from Beirut is one of the factors that led to this crisis and to the proportions it has assumed. But it is one of the factors, not all of them.

The Relationship Between the Democratic Front and the Popular Front

[Question] In the past we used to see relations between the Democratic Front and the Popular Front improving and then suffering a setback when a disagreement

would occur over a certain political position. Can it be said now that relations between the two fronts will not be affected by unexpected differences? Can it be said that there are guarantees that these relations will continue and will make progress?

[Answer] The subject of relations with the Democratic Front, as part of the subject of relations between all democratic factions in the Palestinian Revolution in their effort to find a party for the working class, is one that takes up a large part of our attention and the attention of our colleagues in the Democratic Front. The importance of this subject was evident in the political report that was issued by the front's fourth congress which was held in 1981 and in the political report of the Democratic Front's second conference. This is evidence of the fact that this subject is not a new development. It is not a subject that the two fronts faced after our departure from Beirut. Furthermore, our Central Committee held a meeting in May 1982 before the aggression, and this subject was the first item on the agenda for the meeting. Quite frankly there was rage in our hearts and in our minds against the fragmentation of the Left and against the absence of a serious stance to resist this matter. We were enraged by the fact that all of us--we as well as our colleagues in the Democratic Front--were preoccupied with daily tasks and did not stop from time to time to ask ourselves major strategic questions that have to do with the course of the Revolution and the entire course of the Left within that Revolution. Nor did we analyze the course of the Left and how to remedy its crises. We came out of that round with a specific point of view that called for everything mentioned in the report of the fourth national conference to be translated [into action]. We defined the general heading for the mode of new relations that must develop between us and the Democratic Front and between us and any other democratic factions in the Revolution. This heading is this: relations among fronts are to lead to or move in the direction of full unity. I want to say here for the record that we sensed the same level of interest from our colleagues in the command of the Democratic Front.

The events of Lebanon came after that. These events could have caused each organization to become preoccupied with the numerous social, humanitarian and financial problems that each one of them faced after our departure from Beirut. But along with our colleagues in the Democratic Front we reaffirmed by rearranging our priorities that this matter took special priority. While I and my colleague, Nayif were in Aden, it was natural for us to consider with our colleagues in the Yemeni Socialist Party and specifically with President 'Ali Nasir the experience they had had in Yemen. The result of all these bilateral interactions between me and my colleague Nayif, on the one hand, and the trilateral interactions that took place between the two fronts and the Yemeni Socialist Party, [on the other hand], was that we furthered our conviction in the need to make this matter almost foremost on our scale of priorities.

Not a Pivotal Action

We and our colleagues in the Democratic Front are in full agreement that such an action is not and may not be pivotal. We must tackle this matter with this in mind: the unity and firmness of the Liberation Organization, the firm implementation of its political course and the application of its political program. After that we come to the question that I raised: is enthusiasm enough? Is it enough to want to accomplish this? Aren't we also afraid of falling flat on our

faces regarding the future of this course of unity between us and our colleagues in the Democratic Front? Aren't we afraid of facing a political position in which we would disagree and accordingly feel that all wishes and hopes would not withstand such a difference? My answer to that question is that the possibility of having differences in points of view about political positions does exist, and we cannot deny that. It would be a mistake not to tell this fact to ourselves, our staff, our general membership and our people. The possibility does exist. However, the rich experience of the Revolution, first, the experience of our bilateral relations, second, and our earnestness in establishing strategic relations enabled us to reach with our colleagues in the Democratic Front principles by which these differences could be settled.

First, we may avoid these differences by engaging in intense talks. If we cannot settle differences, we can define them, narrow them down and agree on a method for treating them. These are important matters in our previous experience as both of us know. There will be political differences, so let's bring the whole question of relations out in the open. We can now say that these differences are possible, and if they occur there are rules by which these differences would be dealt with. This means that every organization is to express its point of view without hostility. It means that a dialogue on positions that are in dispute is to continue.

In addition, I believe that we must stop and think not only of fundamental questions, but also of program differences and theoretical questions. We must look into those with deliberation, and we must present them to the general membership of the two organizations so they can contribute to the formulation of these matters. This would be the way for making the two fronts cooperate with an eye to unity.

It is useful to remember here previous successful experiences in this regard. The Yemeni Socialist Party consisted of three factions that set up among themselves a variety of relations with an eye to unity. These relations continued for several years. Numerous experiments in Latin America and some experiments in Africa have also indicated the success of this unification effort by leftist forces. Why shouldn't our experience on the Palestinian scene be a successful experience of this kind?

[Question] Some voices which are being heard on the Palestinian scene are saying that the Liberation Organization will have no role to play in the coming confrontation. They are saying that the question is between Syria and Israel and that the PLO would wait [for the outcome]. What do you think about this matter?

[Answer] This is a major mistake. The Palestinian question, particularly after Beirut, has occupied a special place in the hearts and minds of all progressive forces throughout the world. Let me give you a specific example. When I, Nayif and other colleagues met with an ambassador of one of the socialist countries, the ambassador made a moving statement that I still remember. The ambassador said something to the effect that the Palestinian question was "the touchstone of the world's conscience." There can be no solution to the crisis in the Middle East unless the national rights of the Palestinian people are restored. It is true that Israel, being a tool of imperialism, is taking something out of Lebanon, Syria and other parts of the Arab homeland--and that made other factions of the

Arab Liberation Movement face the same danger that the Palestinian people have been facing--but this may not diminish the importance and the central and fundamental nature of the Palestinian question. I believe that any Arab regime or Arab power that has to fight a serious battle against Israel will find that it is in its practical interest to be armed and supported by the Palestinian Revolution so that its opposition to Israel would not take place at the expense of minimizing the importance and the value of the Palestinian scene.

However, we in the Palestinian Revolution must realize, whether we want to or not, that the magnitude of the Palestinian Revolution and the PLO in the question of the Middle East will depend on what the PLO does. Everyone has to feel that the PLO is a power that no one can ignore and no one can overlook the need to be allied with. This requires the PLO to carry out democratic reforms and to undertake a process of reinforcing its structures. It requires the PLO to increase its effectiveness on all political and military fronts.

The PLO must realize the magnitude of the formidable energies of the masses that are available to it to fight Israel. Unfortunately, this is something that the organization has sometimes not recognized forcefully. The PLO must realize the deep commitment that Palestinian citizens have for the Revolution; it must realize the magnitude of the Palestinian question on the official Arab scene, among the people and on the international scene as well. I am saying this because my heart is aching. I am saying this because I sense that the PLO is not aware of these resources that are available to it.

I know that the Palestinian bourgeoisie has an opinion on all these matters. This opinion states that we cannot have a confrontation and that a confrontation would be difficult, so let's accept what is possible and so on. But the general picture of our masses is otherwise.

Soviets Giving Us Strong Support

[Question] Now that you visited the Soviet Union and some socialist countries, can you give us some indication of the views of the new Soviet leaders on the situation in the area?

[Answer] We can say that the Soviet Union and the countries of the Socialist Organization make a clear connection between imperialist policy in the Middle East and global imperialist policy. A person senses clearly that the Soviet Union and the countries of the Socialist Organization are watching closely how far aggressive imperialist policies will go. As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, the matter is not confined to the situation in the Middle East. It has to do with the aggressive policy in Latin America, in Central America, in Africa, Afghanistan and in Europe.

We all know that imperialism in general and U.S. imperialism in particular seem to be determined, particularly as a result of the crisis of the capitalist system, the growing power of the Socialist Organization and the victories realized by nations in the seventies, to use force to put an end to the series of victories, set the movement of history backwards and confront the crisis it is facing with an unrestrained policy of aggression. One of the chief subjects that the Socialist Organization is pondering at this time is that of the aggressive

plans that are being made by NATO, particularly with regard to the deployment of Pershing and Cruise missiles in Europe.

In the context of the efforts it is making for detente and peace, the Soviet Union is determined not to give imperialism any opportunity to realize such a policy. This applies to all regions, including the Middle East region. One of the principal objectives of the 1982 aggression was to keep the influence of the Soviet Union out of the area so as to deal a blow to anti-imperialist forces in the region.

In light of this aggressive imperialist policy in the Middle East and all over the globe one can sense an unequivocal resolve on the part of the Soviet Union to stand in solidarity with nations. By the way, I do not think that the decision to supply SAM-5 missiles to Syria was merely a decision to arm Syria. Actually this decision had more to do with politics than with weapons. As you know the only other country outside the Soviet Union that has SAM-5's is the German Democratic Republic. What does this mean? It means that the Soviets have returned the aggression. The Soviet Union has responded to the American plan to keep the Soviets out of the region by making a political decision to send weapons to Syria. That decision states that the Soviets are joining the nations of the region in solidarity and will not leave them alone to fall victims to aggression.

Now I have to affirm a scientific fact that is in our interests as Palestinians and Arabs to recognize. Soviet support provides us with the objective factor for victory. I do not believe that the Soviet Union can give us more than that, and I do not believe that we can ask the Soviet Union for more. I don't think that we should allow ourselves to think that we want the Soviet Union to win a victory for us. Such thinking would be very wrong and impermissible. The Soviet Union provided us with the components of victory by giving us political, moral and military support. The major question that we are facing is this: What is Syria waiting for? What are the Palestinians waiting for? What are the regimes of steadfastness and opposition waiting for? What are the Arabs waiting for?

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PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS

DIFFERENCES OVER POLICY IN FATAH DISCUSSED

London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic No 174, 11-17 Jun 83 pp 14-15

[Article: "The Wars in al-Biqa': Dissidents in Fatah Resort to Guns; the Palestinian Mutiny: a Race between Dissolution and Settlement"]

[Text] 'Arafat seeks international and Arab mediation to stop support for the rebels.

Since the mutiny was announced amidst fighters' ranks in al-Biqa' Valley and despite assurances made by both parties to the dispute in Fatah that they would not resort to weapons to resolve existing disputes and that dialogue will be the only method each one of them will use, the struggle between both sides broke out in bloody clashes during which scores of people were wounded and killed. The gap between the two sides grew wider, and that was a serious turning point in the history of one of the largest armed Palestinian organizations in one of the most critical periods of the Palestinian question.

This was not the first time for feuding factions within Fatah to resort to weapons. In 1966 a dispute between 2 officers in Fatah, Abu Hishmah and Yusuf 'Azabi, led to armed clashes that ended with Yasir 'Arafat himself, the leader of Fatah, placing restraints on the movement. At that time, however, Fatah was not what it is now. No more than 1 year had gone by since it had carried out its first guerilla operation in the occupied territory. At that time Fatah was still an underground movement with limited influence. Its members included a group of former party members who had decided under those circumstances to become engaged in Palestinian military action. They suspended their party memberships, and they devoted themselves to clandestine organizational activity and the formation of a company that included Palestinians all over the Arab world, but was concentrated specifically in the countries of the Arabian Gulf.

Fatah began to grow after 1967, and it was becoming a significant factor in the Arab equation. Some Arab media agencies began portraying Fatah as the alternative to the armies that were defeated in June 1967. After that Fatah fought several military battles and achieved significant political victories. Soon, however, it ran head-on into Arab disputes. Since the early 70's and during the first part of the past decade Fatah was forced to defend its existence repeatedly, even before Israel officially assumed the task of threatening its existence in 1978 with the first invasion of Lebanon. After that, Fatah had to defend its existence in 1982

when the Palestinian Resistance had to withdraw from its firm, fortified positions in south Lebanon and in Beirut and retreat towards al-Biqa' and the north where its forces are now deployed.

During this period Fatah faced many internal disputes. Sometimes these disputes grew out of the ideological and political diversity which distinguishes Fatah from other armed Palestinian organizations. Sometimes these disputes stemmed from the fact that a group of its foremost leaders would make unilateral decisions and suspend democratic action, as was the case when the movement's fourth conference was delayed for about 10 years. Other times these disputes stemmed from the categorical diversity within the ranks of the movement. Ever since it was founded, Fatah has had an internal crisis every 2 or 3 years that threatened to break it up or undermine it. However, the movement's historical leaders, those who have always been the subject of harsh criticism, always managed to preserve the movement's unity in general, even though their solutions in most cases led to the ouster of a small group of people from the ranks of the movement. As in the case of Sabri al-Banna, [alias] Abu Nidal, sometimes, such a small group would present themselves as an alternative [to existing leaders], or they would become absorbed in the worries of daily life after doing away with their leaders.

Fatah's historical leaders are now facing a new, harsh test. It all began last May 10 when 5 Fatah officers led by Col Muhammad Sa'id Musa, [alias] Abu Musa, announced their mutiny against orders from their command transferring them to Tunisia and appointing 2 Fatah officers, who had been charged with neglect and failure to act when they were charged with opposing the Israeli invasion of Lebanon last year, responsible for the two areas of al-Biqa' and north Lebanon. This was the spark [that started the fire]. However, the mutiny went beyond personal demands to more comprehensive demands that included the indecisive policy that was being pursued by the leaders of Fatah and the PLO in the face of proposed Arab and international solutions and unsatisfactory organizational and administrative practices which the mutineers thought "were responsible for the military and political defeats that befell the Palestinian Resistance Movement."

Neutral Palestinian sources say that the demands that are being made by the mutineers have noticeable support in the ranks of the movement and that they echo continuous complaints that have been made by the membership in general against organizational, administrative and political practices. The sources add that despite the wishes of Fatah's leaders to preserve the unity of their position, the crisis has in fact caused a split among those leaders. There is a group of moderates who think that it is possible to reach a compromise which would restore discipline among the insurgents. And there is a group of extremists who think that there can be no solution without a military confrontation which would rule out once and for all a repeat of such disturbing situations.

Among the moderates was Salah Khalaf, [alias] Abu Iyyad, a member of Fatah's Central Committee. He did not hide his sympathy with the insurgents' demands and his disappointment with the fact that the leaders' response to those demands fell far short of what it should have been. Faruq al-Qadumi, [alias] Abu al-Lutf was also one of the moderates; he is the director of the PLO's Political Department. Informed sources say that al-Qadumi acted as liaison between the rebels and the leaders. These sources say that until the military outbreak of the situation last Saturday al-Qadumi had been the principal troubleshooter both in the Fatah

command and among the rebels. These sources add that al-Qadumi was the one behind the formula which was adopted by the movement's Central Committee. That formula made Abu Hajim, the brother of Abu al-Za'im, who is the director of military intelligence in Fatah, and al-Haj Isma'il--the two men appointed to command positions in al-Biqa' and north Lebanon--accountable to Yasir 'Arafat. Approval of this formula was preceded by a military consultation from which it was understood that making Abu Hajim and al-Haj Isma'il accountable to the commander in chief implied their removal from office. This formula was adopted to avoid embarrassing the command which had issued the order to appoint them.

According to what Palestinian sources told AL-MAJALLAH al-Qadumi and Abu Iyyad were the most enthusiastic [among the moderates] for the Central Committee's decision not to resort to the use of weapons to settle the crisis. In return, al-Qadumi was also able to obtain a similar pledge from Abu Musa and his group that they would not use weapons to settle the dispute.

The Group of Moderates

Abu Iyyad emerged as the spokesman for the moderates, always talking about the crisis in a reproving, non-hostile manner and looking at the subject with deliberation and reason. Khalil al-Wazir, [alias] Abu Jihad, member of the Central Committee and deputy commander in chief emerged [as the spokesman for] the extremists. In speaking about the crisis he relied on two constant statements: first, the number of rebels was small, not exceeding 250 from two battalions in al-Yarmuk Brigade; and second, they were carrying out "a conspiracy" that was prepared with the participation of Arab countries. Abu Jihad had to retract the charge he made against one of the Arab countries. This retraction was attributed to him in an interview with THE TIMES of London, but he did not stop making that same accusation in private gatherings.

In part, personal reasons are behind the position that is adopted by Abu Jihad. In addition to some of 'Arafat's aides, the rebels refer to him in particular when they talk about matters such as "violations" and "favoritism." This is what they reported to Syrian and Palestinian mediation delegations which relayed what they heard to Fatah's leaders along with a recommendation that Abu Jihad be removed and replaced by Abu Musa. These delegations also relayed a suggestion that more members of the Central Committee and the Revolutionary Council be replaced by rebel leaders. This is what Abu Jihad was commenting on in saying this was "a mere joke!"

Rebel leaders showed themselves to be unyielding in the face of the concessions that were offered by Fatah's leaders. They turned down a decision that would have made them accountable to the commander in chief, like Abu Hajim and al-Haj Isma'il. They did not soften their position when they learned that another decision had exempted them and restored them to their positions. They rejected another concession that would have expedited convening a session of the Revolutionary Council in preparation for convening the Fifth Fatah Congress to study all the demands and complaints and approve 22 resolutions made by the Central Committee to reconsider the movement's organizational and administrative situation. In their opinion most of the members of the Revolutionary Council support Fatah's present leaders, and convening the council amidst all these complaints will not help remedy them. They felt the same way about a general conference.

Therefore, 'Arafat changed his mind about a meeting of the Revolutionary Council that he was going to convene and chair last Sunday, May 29, and did not give any reasons for his change of mind. A Palestinian spokesman announced that the meeting had been postponed indefinitely.

Sources loyal to Fatah's leaders compare what is happening to a coup in every sense of that term; that coup is being led by Abu Musa who wants to make changes without working through the system. He wants everyone to yield to his demands in a manner that would set a dangerous precedent.

One day before the Revolutionary Council was to convene, six buildings belonging to Fatah, housing the departments of supply, oil, transportation, the treasury of the Palestine Liberation Army, procurements and a garage fell into the hands of the rebels who had been informed of a Fatah decision to cut off supplies and salaries from the rebels to bring them to heel. Abu Iyyad later denied that there was such a decision. Although Syria was accused of being behind that step since the mentioned buildings are under the protection of the Syrian Guerilla Guards who do not have armed personnel in their midst, a neutral Palestinian source assured AL-MAJALLAH that the buildings were occupied from the inside and from the outside. Some of Abu Musa's supporters had entered the buildings; they joined some of their supporters who were inside the buildings, and they announced they were taking over the buildings. The only thing that officials loyal to the leaders could do was withdraw.

This development worried Fatah's leaders who gave Abu al-Lutf the task of contacting some Syrian officials. Abu al-Lutf met Syria's minister of foreign affairs, 'Abd-al-Halim Khaddam and told him, "If you do not want us in Syria, we will return to you the keys to our offices." Khaddam seemed surprised and appeared not to know about the recent development. He promised that the necessary measures will be taken to restore matters to their normal course. Two days later President Hafiz al-Asad was chairing a meeting of the regional command of the ruling Ba'th Party. During that meeting developments of the crisis in Fatah were considered, and a party committee consisting of two members of the regional command, Mahmud al-Ayyubi and Sa'id Hamadi, and Speaker of the People's Assembly Mahmud al-Za'bi was charged with the task of contacting the rebels. The committee met immediately with Abu al-Lutf; with Muhammad Ratib Ghanim, [alias] Abu Mahir; and with Hayil 'Abd-al-Hamid, [alias] Abu al-Hawl. In the meantime Khaddam met with one of the rebel leaders, Nimr Salih, [alias] Abu Salih. He is a suspended member of the Central Committee.

Syrian Mediation

Fatah appeared satisfied with the step that Damascus had taken, taking it to mean that an honest effort had been made to mediate an end to the crisis. However, rebel sources affirmed that the Syrian delegation had not offered to mediate; the function of the delegation was rather to find out what the situation was. These circles confirmed what AL-MAJALLAH revealed last week: that it was George Habash, the leader of the Popular Front, and Nayif Hawatimah, the leader of the Democratic Front, who were playing the role of mediators.

AL-MAJALLAH has learned that Khaddam and the mediation committee got a pledge from the disputing party that they would stop escalating the crisis and remain

calm as they wait for a formula for a solution to be achieved. The rebels agreed to that. However, they did affirm that any escalation carried out by the other party will be returned and that they still had many hands they could play.

At that time 'Arafat was facing strong pressures from some of Fatah's leaders who were pressing him to make a decision to engage in an armed confrontation with the rebels. Some of those leaders were tempting the commander in chief by telling him that the matter would end in a matter of hours. Otherwise, the dissension would grow, and mending the crack would not be possible because of Arab interventions in the question.

'Arafat, however, preferred to wait. After two ultimatums he had given the rebels to end their mutiny in 48 hours and after the deadline had come and gone without 'Arafat carrying out his threat, he informed fighters in al-Biqa' that another respite had been granted so that a peaceful solution to the crisis can be found. The respite would end in 1 week. Hardly did a week go by before the sounds of weapons in al-Biqa' were drowning out the voices of those who were calling for calm, and there was an outbreak of hostilities.

In return for these pressures from Fatah's leaders, the rebels applied pressure too. The representative of Fatah in London, Musa 'Awad, [alias] Abu Akram, who is a member of the movement's Revolutionary Council, announced that he had joined the rebels since the first day. He announced that he had been charged by a small conference that was held recently and included 24 leaders and members of Fatah in Lebanon to announce that the forementioned conference had joined the mutiny. He said that those who had joined the mutiny recently were 10,000 fighters. This announcement was actually followed by another made in Lebanon by six new officers in Fatah who confirmed that they had joined the rebels. The officers confirmed that they had asked Abu Akram to speak on their behalf. There were doubts, however, about the claim that 10,000 fighters had declared their loyalty to the rebel leaders.

So far, the rebels are still saying that they are adhering to the unity of the movement and the leadership of Yasir 'Arafat. They do not want to split up with Fatah, as their leader, Abu Musa, declared in more than one press conference from his headquarters in al-Hamarah near the Syrian borders. They are not presenting themselves as an alternative to 'Arafat whom they consider a symbol of the Palestinian struggle. At the same time, however, the rebels are asking 'Arafat to make radical decisions and remove some of the people around him from leadership positions. This is not easy for 'Arafat to do. Rebel sources are saying that 'Arafat has nothing to fear from them; they are determined to have him as their leader and commander.

Therefore, 'Arafat did not place himself in the forefront. When he received word of the mutiny, he moved immediately to al-Biqa' and then to the north, making semi-daily visits to these two areas and making enthusiastic statements that in the opinion of observers were written by no one else but the rebels. 'Arafat said, [for example], that war alone would change the present balance of power in the region. 'Arafat then called upon the fighters of al-Biqa' to prepare for war, and he exclaimed [to them] repeatedly, "Dig in! Dig in!" It is to be noted that the rebels are accusing Fatah's leaders of "turning their backs totally on military action and devoting themselves to political action." Hence, Fatah's

leaders "wavered and failed to assume a stern position in the face of peaceful initiatives. They tried to establish a relationship between Jordan and the PLO so that this relationship could be used to lead to negotiations." The rebels believe that the departure from Beirut was part of a major plan to withdraw from military action. They believe that the recent transfers among officers in al-Biqa' and in the north, those transfers that sparked the outbreak of the crisis, paved the way for the withdrawal from these two regions, which would finally rule out all military operations. Abu Akram relates that many Fatah officers opposed the departure from Beirut and some of them threatened to fire on the ships that carried the fighters from the port of the Lebanese capital to Syria, Tunisia and other Arab countries. Abu Akram insists that the Palestinian Resistance movement has to return to Beirut and to south Lebanon to pursue from there its war to liberate all Palestinian soil.

Moscow's Position

What attracted observers' attention is the fact that 'Arafat was in Bucharest when the clashes broke out between the rebels and supporters of Fatah's leaders. 'Arafat's absence may have provided an excuse for the fact that he did not side with either party. There was an agreement that 'Arafat was to visit Moscow last week at the head of a Fatah delegation, but 'Arafat asked Abu Iyyad to go on this mission in his place. Palestinian sources say that Soviet leaders told 'Arafat that the delegation he will head would not meet Soviet leader Yuri Andropov because Andropov will be busy during that period. Therefore, 'Arafat deputized Abu Iyyad for that task. The subject of 'Arafat's visit to Moscow had been discussed in secret and public meetings that were held between the Palestinian leader and Soviet officials. The Palestinian WAFA News Agency had announced news of 'Arafat's meeting with one of those Soviet officials, Yevgeniy Primakov, director of the Soviet Institute of Oriental Studies. The meeting was also attended by the Soviet ambassador to Syria. The agency stated that Primakov had given 'Arafat a letter from Soviet leader Andropov emphasizing "the gravity of the present stage" in the region and stressing "national unity, the alignment of ranks behind the leadership of the PLO and the need for cooperation with Syria."

This Soviet position did not satisfy Fatah's leaders, particularly 'Arafat. Fatah's leaders expected a clearer position from Moscow supporting 'Arafat against the danger of dissension. They wanted something closer to the position that was included in a letter Fatah's leaders had received from the PLO office in Moscow when Abu Iyyad was holding official talks in the Soviet capital. The letter stated that Soviet leaders were "emphasizing their support for the survival of a unified PLO under the leadership of its chairman, 'Arafat." The Soviets said they considered 'Arafat "a symbol of the resistance to planned conspiracies that are targeting not only Syria and the PLO, but also the entire Arab nation."

'Arafat's unexpected departure to Bucharest while the crisis in Fatah was escalating reminds one of his unexpected departure to Bulgaria on the evening of his last meeting with King Husayn, the King of Jordan. 'Arafat was expected then in Tunisia for a meeting with the members of the PLO Executive Committee. In the first case 'Arafat went to a country allied with Moscow to speak [with leaders in] Moscow through that country and ask for Moscow's help in an Arab crisis. In the second case he did the same thing. 'Arafat and a few Fatah leaders are

convinced that the support offered by some Arab countries to the rebels is the reason for their hard-line posture. 'Arafat wants Moscow to take a strong stance on his side to persuade Moscow's Arab allies to stop their support to the rebels to make it easy to bring an end to the crisis.

One question still remains: will the crisis end when Arab support for the rebels ends?

Rebel sources affirm that their movement is not subordinate to any outside sources. These sources express their displeasure with Libya's support for the mutiny. They consider that support harmful to the rebels' image among Fatah's general membership because Fatah's members do not support the policies of Libya's leaders. These sources add that relations with Syria stem from the fact that their points of view on the Lebanese-Israeli agreement and on the idea of the military withdrawal from Lebanon are identical. At the same time, however, they do not rule out that a difference may occur with Syria if that country changes its position.

This is a crisis of major proportions. This fact is suggested by the effort to get from Moscow a position of support and to get Algeria to mediate with Syria. Fatah's leaders may have their own calculations. However, independent Palestinians believe that using outside mediators to solve the current crisis will leave time bombs within Fatah, and this will not help Fatah in the future even claim that it represents an independent Palestinian decision.

8592
CSO: 4404/471

PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS

JERUSALEM AL-QUDS URGES 'ARAFAT TO BE 'REALISTIC'

JN252004 Jerusalem AL-QUDS in Arabic 18 Jul 83 p 1

[Editorial: "Face to Face"]

[Text] As the days go by, and despite all Arab, international and Palestinian attempts to put an end to the differences within the Fatah movement, the situation continues to deteriorate progressively. It seems that the denunciation of this side about what is taking place, the support of that side to it, and the intensification of Arab and international mediation to solve the differences have not brought about the results that will please the sons of this nation.

Yasir 'Arafat and the opposition officers in the Fatah movement are members of the same body. Instead of issuing many statements of condemnation, denunciation and regret over what is taking place, we hope that the Palestinian leader will invite the opposition officers to meet with him face to face and discuss the points of dispute with all frankness and manliness, realizing that the first and foremost aim of the Palestinian movement is to alleviate the suffering of our people.

The demands of the opposition movement are not aimed against Yasir 'Arafat personally but are ideological and organizational differences. We believe that the ideal solution can only be achieved through a face to face dialogue.

There are many Palestinians who are not affiliated to a political side and who have their impact and opinions. Today, these people are calling for such a meeting between the Palestinian leader and the opposition officers because this is the only way to put an end to the Palestinian movement's tragedies.

Whether we like it or not, the opposition officers in the Fatah movement and Yasir 'Arafat are all members of the same movement and have the same aims. Perhaps, 'Arafat should face the new reality because he bears the greatest responsibility in confronting the storms that are sweeping the movement.

CSO: 4400/443

PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS

JERUSALEM DAILY CRITICIZES KING HUSAYN, REAGAN PLAN

JN252056 Jerusalem AL-FAJR in Arabic 18 Jul 83 p 1

[Editorial: "The Sudden Return of the Jordanian Option Overture"]

[Text] The Jordanian media organs hastened to deny, through 'Adnan Abu 'Awdah, the report that the Jordanian monarch made a proposal to Israeli Prime Minister Menahim Begin expressing his willingness to join the so-called Middle East peace negotiations. Whether the report is true or not is immaterial because at any rate the report did not emanate from a vacuum.

Any one observing the developments in the Jordanian position and King Husayn's recent political course has sufficient proof that the Jordanian monarch is almost ready to join the negotiations with Israel on the basis of the Reagan plan at any price.

This sudden return of the overture of the so-called Jordanian option at a time while Menahem Begin is preparing to go to Washington to meet with President Reagan for the first time since the latter announced his recent peace plan in October. The plan stipulated a prominent role for Jordan in the Middle East peace negotiations and ignored the Palestinian role which represents the sole entry point toward any peaceful and comprehensive settlement for the region's crisis.

The Jordanian regime has been trying for a long time to advocate the Reagan plan, beautify it in every possible way, and consider it as the maximum political gain that the Arabs can snatch from the United States. The Jordanian regime exerted great pressures on the PLO by halting the Palestinian-Jordanian talks and through a series of pressures on the citizens of the occupied lands under the pretext of supporting the steadfastness of the kinfolk to wrest the organization's authorization to join the negotiations on the basis of the Reagan plan. However, all these attempts have failed.

The Arabs decided on what should be the minimum for offering any concession to solve the crisis. They rejected the Reagan plan because it did not meet the minimum that could guarantee the national Palestinian rights. Therefore, if any Arab regime adopts a separate political decision that overrules the Fes summit resolutions, then that will be considered a violation of the Arab consensus and an intolerable thwarting of the national Palestinian rights.

The Jordanian monarch is very mistaken if he believes that the current circumstances in the Palestinian arena are appropriate and could enable him to stand on firm feet in the political arena and achieve limited regional gains at the expense of the Palestinian rights. The PLO and the Palestinian people behind it will emerge from its crisis, which is merely a passing cloud, stronger and more determined to continue to preserve the national rights of the Palestinian people and to confront all attempts that aim to wrest these rights and liquidate the Palestinian issue.

CSO: 4400/443

QATAR

BRIEFS

SOMALIA EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT--Doha, 24 Jul (WAKH)--The ratification documents on the agreement to employ Somali laborers in Qatar, which was signed in Somalia in March, were exchanged in Doha today. The agreement is to facilitate the employment procedures of the Somali laborers in Qatar. [Summary] [GF241633 Manama WAKH in Arabic 1150 GMT 24 Jul 83 GF]

CSO: 4400/443

FINAL RESULTS OF WEST BENGAL ELECTIONS REPORTED

Calcutta THE STATESMAN in English 4 Jun 83 pp 1, 7

[Text] The final results of the West Bengal panchayat elections indicate that the Left Front has lost about 4,355 gram panchayat seats to the Congress(I) and other Opposition parties. The CPI(M), the largest party in the Front, has won nearly 53% of the 45,461 gram panchayat seats. It had secured about 61% of these in the 1978 elections. The results of 869 seats are yet to be announced.

The Left Front has, however, received a fresh mandate in favour of the existing panchayat administration in spite of allegations of corruption and discrimination against political rivals.

In West Dinajpur and Murshidabad, the Congress (I) is ahead of its rival, the CPI(M), in the gram panchayat election.

There have been complaints of corruption against a fairly large number of panchayat bodies. The division within the Front has helped the Congress (I). Some of the measures, though well-intentioned, have not been appreciated by all concerned. The Barga operation, for instance, has benefited a large number of sharecroppers, but has antagonised landowners. The Siddhartha Ray Government had enacted legislation fixing the minimum wage of agricultural workers and the Left Front Government had enforced it. This has benefited a section of the people, but has caused hardship to another section.

The final elections results do not, however, indicate which parties will control how many gram panchayats, panchayat samities and zilla parishads. It will take some time for a clear picture to emerge.

Politburo's Reaction

The CPI(M) Politburo thinks that the Left Front was not united enough to meet the Congress (I) offensive. The party's general secretary, Mr E. M. S. Namboodiripad, briefed the Press after the two-day Politburo meeting in Calcutta on Friday.

Although Mr Namboodiripad said that the meeting did not make an analysis of the results, the communique blamed some of the Front constituents.

RESULTS AT A GLANCE

GRAM PANCHAYAT	1978	1983
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Total Number of seats		
contested	...	46,700
Results declared		
(till 1.00 a.m.)	...	46,700
CPI(M)	...	28,105
Congress(I)	...	4,536
RSP	...	1,674
Forward Bloc	...	1,539
CPI	...	825
Janata	...	5
BJP	...	—
Congress (R)	...	580
Independents	...	9,436
		3,265

PANCHAYAT SAMITY	1978	1983
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Total number of seats		
contested	...	8,454
Results declared		
(till 1.00 a.m.)	...	8,454
CPI(M)	...	5,596
Congress(I)	...	623
RSP	...	353
Forward Bloc	...	326
CPI	...	132
Janata	...	2
BJP	...	—
Congress (R)	...	105
Independents	...	1,323
		346

ZILLA PARISHAD	1978	1983
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Total number of seats		
contested	...	647
Results declared		
(till 1.00 a.m.)	...	647
CPI(M)	...	488
Congress (I)	...	22
RSP	...	31
Forward Bloc	...	44
CPI	...	5
Congress (R)	...	4
Independents	...	53
		16

Gram Panchayat Election: Final Results

District	Total No. of seats	Results declared	CPI(M)	Congress(I)	RSP	Forward Bloc	CPI	Janata	BJP	Independents
Bankura	2,554	2,545	1,658	564	74	72	15	—	—	162
Birbhum	2,216	2,179	1,128	636	20	107	25	—	1	212
Burdwan	4,182	4,151	3,078	811	32	58	50	5	—	117
Hooghly	2,912	2,890	1,629	1,003	2	43	33	—	1	119
Midnapore	6,709	6,677	3,947	1,832	26	15	315	13	3	526
Purulia	2,052	2,032	1,193	569	—	117	24	—	—	191
Howrah	2,256	2,247	1,243	821	—	108	17	2	7	49
Murshidabad	3,773	3,614	1,427	1,471	400	33	27	—	10	246
Nadia	2,530	2,332	1,265	904	25	1	60	3	4	70
24 Parganas	7,910	7,871	4,122	2,739	226	61	67	—	—	596
Cooch Behar	1,744	1,735	735	632	3	340	3	—	—	22
Darjeeling	1,214	1,192	297	175	9	3	23	—	—	635
Jalpaiguri	1,603	1,603	770	595	158	20	5	7	—	48
Malda	2,042	2,038	981	918	8	2	15	14	8	92
West Dinajpur	2,456	2,402	767	969	257	104	32	—	—	273
TOTAL,	46,153	45,670	34,405	14,733	1,241	1,084	716	44	34	3,413

Results of 483 seats have not been declared as the elections have either been countermanded, adjourned, boycotted or held up because of court order.

The CPI(M) workers, the communique said, did their utmost to preserve the unity and cohesion of the Left Front, but their efforts failed because of the unrealistic claims made by some of the constituent parties. It hoped that everybody concerned would be wiser by experience.

The communique added that the election results confirmed the fact that the Left Front administration had the support of the people of the State.

The Politburo agreed with the statement made on Thursday by the State party secretary, Mr Saroj Mukherjee, that the big monopoly Press had tried to run down the Left Front Government.

The West Bengal Congress (I) president, Mr Ananda Gopal Mukherjee, said that though the results did not reflect the "immense support" his party enjoyed in the villages, it was clear that the Congress (I) was "well-entrenched" in the rural areas. The party would now be able to strengthen its organization in the villages.

The RSP leader, Mr Makhan Paul, said that it was regrettable that the Left Front, including its major partner the CPI(M), could not retain the seats it had won in the last panchayat election. The lack of unity and cohesion among the constituents of the Front had helped the Congress (I).

CSO: 4600/1298

TRIPURA LEADER'S STATEMENT ON DHAKA INVOLVEMENT 'BELATED'

Calcutta THE STATESMAN in English 4 Jun 83 p 9

[Text] SHILLONG, June 7--The Tripura Chief Minister's statement about Dhaka's involvement with the Tripura tribal extremists is a belated recognition of authentic reports about the earlier involvement. According to paramilitary sources, 45 tribal extremists under Chuni Koloi, who was arrested by the Central Reserve Police in April this year, reached Thangnang in the Chittagong Hill Tracts in February-March 1979 to be trained apparently by the Mizo National Front. These Tripura Sena insurgents were trained in three sections with arms which were either smuggled into the area or supplied indirectly by the Bangladesh authorities.

In December 1980, about 100 Tripura extremists were concentrated at the Thangnang hideout having arrived there in groups by different routes. The MNF hostiles had evidently vacated the camp in circumstances which are not clear. Interrogation reports suggested that about 250 Tripura Sena volunteers had been trained in the use of weapons, including LMGS, either by the MNF or the Bangladesh Rifles between February 1979 and October 1980.

In November 1980 about 80 Mizo insurgents guided by a Tripuri extremist attacked a security post at Anandbazar in North Tripura near the trijunction of Tripura, Bangladesh and Mizoram. The hostiles came from the Zopui side of Bangladesh and went back. The Jampui hills sector is under Army surveillance, a sore point with the Tripura Chief Minister who would prefer an additional Border Security Force battalion deployed there. Till he was arrested at Machli village towards Kumarghat, the leader of the Tripura National Volunteer Force, Chuni Koloi, was a feared insurgent having established an early rapport with the Mizo underground.

Following the raid on Manu police station late last year and the ambush of a CRP escort vehicle he was believed to be loaded with arms. Over confidence led to his capture. After looting some shops at Karamcherra, about eight km from Manu, he was surprised by a CRP platoon and overpowered. The three others captured were J. J. Koloi, Utname Mohan Tripura and Prafulla Deb Barma.

Among the items seized were a revolver belonging to the sub-inspector of the Tripura police who was killed in the earlier ambush, fuses of the kind used by the CRP, nine mm ammunition with wire round the rim enabling it to be fixed by

a revolver of a certain calibre, including one round, with Pakistan ordnance factory marking a telephone set and a diary with nine photographs. The arrest of Koloi deprives B.K. Hrangkhal, who appears to have strengthened his links with Dhaka and the MNF after his disappearance, of a reliable associate.

Hrangkhal was on a mission to unite Chuni Koloi's TNV with Binanda Jamatia's All Tripura People's Liberation Organization. Observers recall that the alliance of the Tripura Upajati Juba Samity, Militants with the Sengkak extremists, largely Reangs, and the MNF conditioned the birth of the Tripura Sena which openly proclaimed its objectives in 1970 at Durga Choudhury, under Jiranda police station. In October that year eight volunteers were arrested on suspicion while going to former East Pakistan via Santibazar. A month later, the BSF intercepted a group returning from training at a MNF camp near Keshub Mahajanpara in the Chittagong Hill Tracts. They admitted having left Udaipur in a group of 22 under Hrangkhal.

The Tripura Sena was reconstituted in 1975 with a sub-committee which included a former havildar of the Tripura Rifles, Bishuraj Deb Barma and Binanda Jamatia himself. In the years to come, the sena had its "ups and downs" reflecting the fortunes of Hrangkhal who staged a comeback in 1978 over the introduction of the autonomous district council under the seventh schedule.

CSO: 4600/1298

SOURCES REPORT HOPES TO INCREASE IMPORTS FROM USSR

Calcutta THE STATESMAN in English 4 Jun 83 p 7

[Text] NEW DELHI, June 3--The Government hopes to increase imports from the Soviet Union and other East European countries to tackle the problem of trade imbalances with rupee payment countries instead of cutting down exports to them, according to Commerce Ministry sources.

But there is no indication yet how the crisis in Indo-Russian trade, arising out of heavy "technical credits" made necessary by India's large surplus balance over the past few years is to be dealt with. The credits are thought to be worth about Rs 1,400 crores by now.

To work these off and also arrange for balanced trade in future to prevent the problem arising again, India will have to make heavy imports. The problem lies in finding Russian goods that are acceptable.

In the recent Indo-Soviet talks, it was decided that India would import 250,000 tons of crude in addition to the 2.5 million tons already contracted for in the 1983 trade plan. The crisis in bilateral commercial relations is underscored by the fact that the main item chosen for further imports was crude oil, which now accounts for nearly 80% of Soviet exports to this country.

Crude is now available in plenty in world markets because of a glut and imports from West Asian sources would be cheaper because of lower transport costs.

During the talks, 23 other items were also identified for import from Russia. These are thought to include helicopters, cement and some machinery: but in limited quantities since these items cannot be imported on a permanent basis or in large amounts.

The main problem is that Russian technology is obsolete and India is now in a position to either indigenously manufacture the kind of capital goods the Soviet Union can supply or prefers Japanese or Western substitutes, both because these are modern and cheaper.

The large technical credits in Indo-Soviet trade are due to the fact that the two countries have reversed roles: India is in a position to export manufactured and processed goods while Russia can supply what are basically raw materials or industrial inputs, like crude. This problem is likely to persist while crude, refined goods and fertilizers remain the main imports from Russia.

CSO: 4600/1298

INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION FOR 1982-83 DISAPPOINTING

Calcutta THE STATESMAN in English 6 Jun 83 p 1

[Text] NEW DELHI, June 5--Even the Government's modest expectations that industrial production in 1982-83 would show a rise of 4.5% have been belied by the actual performance of the major sectors, and trends for the year suggest that overall growth will be no more than a negligible 2%. Since agricultural production has fallen sharply because of drought, the economy will show no growth at all during the year.

The major contribution to industrial production in 1982-83 was by the oil industry. Largely due to heavy investments in Bombay High, crude production increased by as much as 30.1%, but that this proved too much for the country's refineries is shown by the fact that their performance was better by just 10%; and part of the Bombay High crude production had to be exported.

Official figures of the performance of eight key industries in 1982-83 show that they improved over the previous year but obviously not sufficiently to make a dent in the overall picture.

Saleable steel production increased by a modest 1% to 7.28 million tons largely because the steel industry, which showed a falling trend until September 1982, picked up until March thereafter.

Production of cement at 23.1 million tons registered a rise of 10.8% during the year while nitrogenous and phosphatic fertilizers increased by 8.9% and 3.3% respectively.

Figures for the first 11 months of 1982-83 show that the performance of industries in the capital goods sector was poor and this reflects the overall picture of industrial growth since these are the basic industries.

Only four out of 10 items increased production by modest amounts: car output increased by 2.1%, jeeps by 6%, machine tools by 7.4% and boilers by 18.1%.

The remaining six items registered a decline in production ranging between 3% in the case of power-driven pumps to 26.2% in the case of agricultural tractors.

A mixed trend was witnessed in the performance of industries in the consumer goods group. Eight out of 12 in the group increased by varying degrees. Sugar went up by 39.5%, tea by 1.1%, vanasoat1 by 2.5%, scooters by 32%, motorcycles by 15.2%, auto rickshaws by 24.7%, mopeds by 8.6% and penicillin by 2%.

Four others in the group--cotton cloth, paper and paper board, streptomycin and chloramphenical--showed a decline in production.

All seven industries in the intermediate group showed an increase in production. Jute manufactures went up by 6.9%, petroleum products by 9.7%, newsprint by 91.9%, 'giant" tyres by 6.9%, cycle tyres by 5%, nylon filament yarn by 14% and vat dyes by 23.8%.

All the industries mentioned collectively account for 54.32% of all industrial production and are officially monitored as an index of overall industrial performance.

CSO: 4600/1302

TAX REVISION PLANNED, EXPENDITURES MOUNT

Madras THE HINDU in English 6 Jun 83 p 1

[Article by G. K. Reddy]

[Text] NEW DELHI, June 5--The Government is considering a series of steps to encourage self-employed, salaried and professional classes, which constitute the bulk of income-tax payers to file their returns, pay up outstanding taxes and regularise their incomes and assets without any penalty or fear of prosecution for past evasion.

The intention is to levy only interest on arrears of taxes on the basis of self-assessment with no further questions asked in most cases.

It will involve a further liberalisation of the present procedures for summary assessment of incomes of less than Rs. 1 lakh of individual assessees, while the Government will continue to retain the right to scrutinise the details of the returns filed by businessmen.

This will mean that the great majority of income-tax payers would not be summoned to appear before Income-Tax Officers, nor come in contact with the Department if they file their returns properly without any reasonable grounds for suspecting evasion.

Settlement of cases: While intensifying the searches and seizures to catch the big fish indulging in tax evasion and black money generation, the Government will encourage settlement of cases without getting involved in protracted litigation.

Though it has not been able to tackle the problem of black money in a permissive society in which the political system itself depends heavily on such tainted sources for its sustenance, the proposed revision of tax laws will give enough flexibility to those who want to regularise their ill-gotten wealth by shelling out some of it.

The Government is also taking parallel steps to clear the heavy backlog of pending assessments which has now acquired alarming dimensions. According to the Comptroller and Auditor General's report on the subject, there were as many as 26,60,689 assessments pending out of an estimated 40 lakh returns filed in 1981-82. The result is that the arrears of tax collections have been piling up reaching an all time high of Rs. 1,239 crores.

Arrears piling up: The total income-tax and corporation tax collections in the same year amounted to Rs. 1,475 crores and Rs. 1,900 crores, altogether Rs. 3,375 crores. Despite the introduction of the summary assessment scheme and other steps to clear up the pending cases, the tax arrears keep on piling up, partly because of the Government's reluctance to write off the unrecoverable amounts and bring down the figure of effective arrears which are estimated to be Rs. 900 crores.

But the main area of governmental failure has not been in income-tax collections but in its inability to deal with Central excise evasion. The Indian excise laws are the most archaic in the world with too many loopholes. If the annual collection of income-tax and corporation tax is in the range of Rs. 3,300 crores to rs. 3,500 crores the Central excise accounts for roughly Rs. 10,000 crores while the customs duties yield another Rs. 4,000 crores.

Excise duty evasion: The estimated evasion of Central excise is Rs. 9,000 crores a year according to official sources. When excise duties are evaded, it means that sales tax and income-tax are also avoided leading to a further loss of revenue. One of the excuses given by business houses for evasion of Central excise duties is that since the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act does not allow expansion without going through the most exasperating procedures any increases in production must necessarily be concealed to escape prosecution.

It means that many business houses continue to expand production but avoid disclosure and evade payment of excise in the name of escaping the tyrannies of the MRTP Act. This is the single largest source of black money generation that goes into the commodity markets, leading in turn to more profiteering and corruption.

At one stage the Government thought of having what was called an appropriate institutional arrangement for advising it in important areas of economic administration including rationalisation of taxation, use of non-tax devices to raise the level of savings and avoid wastage in public expenditure.

It was in pursuance of this desire that the Jha Commission was appointed in 1981, but the Government has not bothered to implement the recommendations made in the 20-odd reports submitted by it.

Public expenditure: The present Government has not only wound up abruptly the expenditure commission set up by the Janata regime, but has done precious little to curb the alarming increases in public expenditure which has gone up from 10 per cent of the national income in 1950-51, to 34 per cent at present.

The non-Plan expenditure on the administrative establishment, which accounts for 12.2 per cent out of this 34 per cent, has reached the staggering limit of Rs. 12,700 crores.

The Government does not know what to do and how to tackle this problem. The mere intensification of tax collections and plugging of the loopholes in the income-tax or excise laws cannot make much difference, if the administrative expenses keep on increasing so sharply well beyond the capacity of this poor country.

JANATA MP TELLS OF TALKS WITH PRC OFFICIALS

Madras THE HINDU in English 6 Jun 83 p 9

[Article by K. V. Narain]

[Text]

TOKYO, June 5.

Mr. Era Sezhiyan, leader of the Janata party in the Rajya Sabha, has come back from China after a week's visit with the distinct impression that there is a growing awareness there that China and India should come together. According to him, 'there is growing respect for India and they want more contacts between us'.

Mr. Era Sezhiyan described his 45-minute talk with the State Councillor and former Foreign Minister, Mr. Ji Pengfei, on May 30 as 'good'. He said Mr. Ji urged the need for closer understanding and growing friendship between India and China, quoting from the late Prime Ministers Jawaharlal Nehru and Zhou En Lai's call for 'panch shila' (the five principles).

The Janata leader arrived in Hong Kong yesterday after visiting Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou (Canton). He told this correspondent in a telephone interview from Hong Kong today he had made it clear to Mr. Ji Pengfei that both on the border problem and improving Sino-Indian relations, 'we, in the Opposition, also are one with the Government'.

He quoted Mr. Ji as stressing the importance of finding a solution to the problems facing the two countries. Mr. Ji conceded that the border problem was an important one, left behind by history and, therefore, took time to solve it. "Let us find solutions to the other problems facing the two countries".

Mr. Sezhiyan said, in reply, 'while we welcome the growing contacts between our two countries and also want more cooperation in many fields of common interest, it is desirable to find a solution to the border question without delay. A problem made by man can be unmade by man, but if it is left unsolved for a long time, it will become more complicated. At the same time, we should not stop improving relations in other fields'.

CSO: 4600/1303

SAUDIS ACCUSED OF CREATING DIFFICULTIES FOR PILGRIMS

Khatami Elaborates on Problems

Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 26 Jun 83 p 2

[Text] Hojjat ol-Eslam Dr Seyyed Mohammad Khatami, minister of Islamic Guidance, in an interview with the Centenial news unit, talked in detail about the pilgrimage affairs in the current year, the action of the Islamic Republic of Iran in this regard, and contacts with the responsible authorities of Saudi Arabia for preparing the visit of the pilgrims to the house of God and also about the obstruction in this matter caused by some of the responsible authorities of the above-mentioned country. The details of this interview are as follows:

[Question] "Your Excellency Hojjat ol-Eslam Khatami, will you please explain questions regarding future pilgrimages for those who are interested?"

The minister of Islamic guidance: "In the name of God the compassionate, the merciful, based on the experiences of the responsible authorities of pilgrimage affairs in previous years, and also on the basis of the suggestions of the people themselves, we have tried this year to follow these matters with careful planning. Thank God from our point of view, improvements have been comparatively satisfactory and we hope to solve those problems pertaining to us as far as possible and to provide more facilities for the respectable pilgrims both from the financial and spiritual point of view. However, only part of the question of the pilgrimage pertains to us. The other part depends on the government of Saudi Arabia.

"Since Mecca and Medinah, the two great Islamic centers, are located in Saudi Arabia, unfortunately, we were faced with some problems which might cause us difficulties. Although based on our plans and with regard to the number of Iranian pilgrims, which makes Iran among the one or two countries with the most pilgrims, we had planned to take action early this year to provide housing facilities in Saudi Arabia and the necessary steps were taken in this regard. Unfortunately, Saudi Arabia's restraint and delays to the trip of the Iranian mission to their country for preparation of the facilities, has caused problems. If we stop being optimistic we will realize that Saudi Arabia is obstructing the affairs of the trip of

the respectable Iranian pilgrims to Mecca and this is really surprising to us. First, Mecca and Medinah are the two great Islamic centers and all the Muslims must enjoy equal opportunities in order to be able to practice their religious rites. The most important privilege that the Saudis claim is serving the two sacred sanctuaries of Mecca and Medinah. The greatest proof of this privilege is to serve the respectable pilgrims to the house of God and holy tomb of God's prophet (greeting to him and his descendants) and not to hinder the affairs of the pilgrims.

"Secondly, we never expected brotherly acts from the government of Saudi Arabia for various reasons and origins, which time does not permit mentioning here. But we expect them to look at matters objectively and to establish and follow a policy based on reality. What greater fact could there be besides that there has been an Islamic revolution in Iran and that this revolution has been based on the strength of faith and will of these people. The fact is that the Islamic government of Iran is serving the desires and interests of these people and is the servant of the people. It does not have anything to discuss with others except the people's wishes. On the basis of these facts, it is better that they build their policies and that all the countries of the region, among them Saudi Arabia, try to realize the fact that the brave Muslim nation of the Islamic Republic of Iran has emerged from the bloody revolt of this nation and is everlasting in this region. These are lasting affairs and they must form their policies according to these facts and realize that to create difficulties for the trip of the Iranian pilgrims to the house of God is a direct confrontation with the people themselves. Naturally, our nation will never be able to forgive this unkind treatment easily, especially when they realize that these difficulties are caused by the fact that their Islamic revolution has the reputation of being anti-imperialistic, anti-American and anti-Zionist. We hope that these difficulties will be solved as soon as possible and that these mistakes will be compensated for. We can even hope that these mistakes and inconsideration and these encounters have resulted from the mistakes, carelessness and ignorance of lower ranking officials of Saudi Arabia. We hope that an order be issued to solve these problems. It must be realized that most of the countries that have one-half or one-third of the Iranian pilgrims have made the preparation and have provided housing for their pilgrims. With regard to the high number of Iranian pilgrims and with attention to all the obstruction, there is a delay of a month and a half to 2 months compared to the previous year and they have not yet permitted our responsible authorities to act fully. With regard to the little time left and the right of the martyr-nourished and Muslim nation of Iran and with regard to the time lost in the past and delay, God willing, preparation can be made in order to enable us to compensate the preparation of the facilities and work rapidly in the future. We will take measures in this regard and since we do not have any secrets to hide from our people, we do not discuss matters behind closed doors. Naturally, the people have the right to be informed moment by moment about the pilgrimage, in which they are very interested. We will also discuss these matters with the people when it is appropriate. We hope to give our people better news in the future.

"There is nothing else to say and peace and God's blessing be upon you."

Number of Pilgrims

Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 27 Jun 83 p 2

[Text] In the current year about 95,000 pilgrims will be privileged to visit the house of God (Mecca).

Abolfazle Tavakoli Bina, deputy minister of Islamic guidance and the director of the pilgrimage organization, who is in Mashhad participating in the ceremonies of dusting the holy tomb of Imam Reza, greetings to him, said yesterday in an interview discussing this matter: "In the current year, around 95,000 of our nation's Muslims will be privileged to visit the house of God. Ten thousand of the pilgrims are from families of honor-providing martyrs and self-sacrificers of the Islamic revolution."

He said: "In the current year the pilgrim quota for Khorasan Province will be around 18,000 persons, and after Tehran, this is the largest number of pilgrims."

The director of the pilgrimage organization in regard to the amount of foreign exchange per pilgrim said: "Last year, the foreign exchange quota per pilgrim was 2,500 Saudi rials. With the approval of the supreme council of pilgrimage, this amount will be increased to 3,000 Saudi rials and possibly a little more."

The director of pilgrimage organization in regard to the increase in the number of pilgrims per caravan, from 100 to 200 persons, said: "This increase will be considered in regard to the possibilities and proper accommodation of each caravan and the administrative capacity of the caravan director."

In regard to the increase of the number of special tents for pilgrims in Mana and 'Arafat, he said: "The increase of tents is directly related to the cooperation and resources of Saudi Arabia. In the event that the Saudis give us more tents, naturally our pilgrims will have more space."

The director of the pilgrimage organization in regard to medical services for the Iranian pilgrims to the house of God, said: "We have discussed the matter with the Ministry of Health and the necessary plans have been prepared so that the pilgrims can be examined and treated before and during the pilgrimage ceremonies in the best manner."

At the conclusion he announced that presently 20,000 pilgrims have gone to Syria. He expressed hope that the pilgrims to the house of God in the current year make use of the training programs of the mass media and the directors of the caravans in order to enjoy the great world pilgrimage congress in the best manner.

9815
CSO: 4640/271

EMIGRE WEEKLY REPORTS ON SHAH'S PARIS MEETINGS

NC141144 Westgate-on-Sea E'DAM in Persian 8 Jul 83 p 1

[Text] We have been informed that Reza Shah II visited Paris for a few days in order to meet with political figures.

During this visit Reza Shah II held a 3-hour meeting with Dr Shahpur Bakhtiar, leader of the national resistance movement of Iran.

As reported by an E'DAM correspondent from Paris, during this meeting discussions were held and views were exchanged on the conditions of solidarity and on the mode of struggles until the downfall of the clerical regime. In addition, the situation of the Iranian refugees was discussed, and important agreements were reached between Reza Pahlavi and Shahpur Bakhtiar. Informed circles have described these agreements as very useful and have attached great importance to this meeting.

We hope that with the unity, solidarity and agreement between Dr Shahpur Bakhtiar and Reza Shah II, both of whom are respected and praised by patriots and strugglers for Iran's liberation, our dear and everlasting homeland, Iran, will be freed from the clutches of a bunch of pseudo-clerical lackeys as soon as possible, and that the hands of the satans ruling our country's destiny will be cut short.

Meanwhile, during the young shah's recent trip to Paris, in addition to his meeting with Dr Bakhtiar he held other important meetings with some political and military leaders and personalities, the most important of which were his meetings with Dr Amini and General Oveysi.

CSO: 4640/280

NATIVE JOURNALIST REVIEWS CONDITIONS PREVAILING IN HOMELAND

Paris LE QUOTIDIEN DE PARIS in French 5 Jul 83 p 20

/Text/ Article by Safa Haeri/

/Text/ Zealous servants of the Islamic regime since the revolution of 1979, the Iranian communists are, in their turn, the victims of a purge carried out by their allies of yesterday. This wave of arrests has hardly improved relations between Tehran and Moscow, but the rupture is not for tomorrow. There now remain over a thousand foreign advisers in Iran, largely Soviet.

Some two to three thousand Tudehs (members of the pro-Soviet Iranian Communist Party, Tudeh), having clandestinely fled Iran, recently arrived in several western capitals, notably Paris, London, Madrid, and especially West Berlin. Among the socialist countries, only Czechoslovakia took in some of them.

It is the former capital of the Reich that received the majority of them (over 1,500), who plan to establish there an association to defend the lives of their "comrades" still in the Islamic Republic, while organizing abroad "to continue the fight."

According to informed sources in Tehran, 200,000 persons suspected of belonging to Tudeh or of sympathizing with this party have been sifted out. At least 20,000 of them are imprisoned in Tehran and in all the big cities. Some have apparently been executed, but this has been learned only indirectly, through obituaries or through messages of condolence published in the newspapers by the families of the victims. This was the case, notably, for Hassan Hosseinpou, a well-known union leader.

The Tudehs who recently left the country affirm that the arrests in the ranks of the party had begun "well before the condemnation to death by Khomeyni," but neither the party nor the mullahs nor Moscow had breathed a word about them. During a press conference held in Tehran a few weeks after the announcement of the new interdiction against Tudeh, Mohsen Rezai, commander-in-chief of the Guardians of the Revolution, admitted that "for more than 2 years, the Pasdars had been systematically spying on Tudeh."

Collaborators Denounced

"It was after the arrest last February of Nureddin Kianuri, along with the entire leadership of the party, that we realized that practically all of us were being tailed by the counterespionage services of the mullahs, and had been since the revolution," specified a communist. Most of the militants who succeeded in leaving the Islamic Republic are directors or provincials, easy to identify and thus to denounce.

The Tudehs were so zealous in assisting the regime in its fight against its opponents that today everybody is helping the authorities to arrest them--the monarchists and the Mujahidin and Marxist nationalists. Moreover, as the deadline that the communists were given to come before the Islamic committees has expired, those who are now hiding out risk being "executed on the spot," the Pasdars and other "agents of security" having been given the order to shoot any Tudeh on sight.

Over a Thousand Foreign Advisors

Since the witch hunt opened, many communist officers have managed to flee Iran aboard ships, helicopters, or army planes. The last group, composed of 11 navy officers and homafars (the aviation technicians who spearheaded the revolution), was able to reach the sultanate of Oman and obtain asylum.

Most of the Tudehs pass through Turkey and the German Democratic Republic, but the attitude of the military authorities of Ankara visibly troubles them. "The Turks make a clear distinction between communist and noncommunist Iranians. While the noncommunists receive aid and protection, the communists, once identified, are almost systematically stopped and handed back to the Iranians," declared an exile.

For their part, the East Germans simply facilitate the passage of the Iranian communists to the West, by directing them toward West Berlin, a city which, in the twenties, served as a cradle of Iranian communism.

The pursuit of the Tudehs, the confessions of their leaders concerning espionage activities on behalf of the USSR, and the dismantlement of Tudeh have of course rather seriously affected Irano-Soviet relations but have not really shattered them; and, despite the electronic countermeasures that oppose Tehran and Moscow, the Soviet influence in the Islamic Republic remains strong.

Abbas Soleimani, an F 14 pilot, who escaped Iran last 6 April by landing his plane in Saudi Arabia, declared on 9 June, during a press conference, that it is not by fighting Tudeh that communism will be beaten in Iran.

"This struggle is like a puppet show," he said. "Having been the first military attache of the usurping regime in North Korea, I know for a fact, and on the basis of very precise information, that over a thousand advisers from this country and other communist nations, beginning with the Soviet Union, are now in Iran. Many Soviet military advisers have Bulgarian or North Korean passports, said Soleimani.

He also revealed that many Iranian communists have infiltrated the administrative and military machinery under false names. According to him, last May, 35 pilots, 20 technicians, and 75 homafars were shot in the Evine prison in Tehran.

Divided Army

While adopting a low profile with regard to the fate of Tudeh, the Kremlin is encouraging all its allies who have privileged relations with the ayatollahs to plead in favor of the communists. And so it is that, one after the other, the Cubans, the Libyans, the Palestinians, the South Yemenis, the Syrians, and even the Algerians have intervened.

According to the Libyan information agency Jama, Colonel Qadhdhafi addressed a warning to the Tehran authorities regarding "internal developments in the Islamic Republic that will only serve the interests of imperialism." Though the turbulent colonel refrained from elaborating, observers in Tehran easily understood that he was alluding to the arrest of the communists.

The desertion of officers, the discovery of Tudeh elements within the army, and the flight abroad of many leftist military men have, once again, raised the problem of the fidelity of the army and led the mullahs to rely once more on the Pasdars (Guardians of the Revolution). This is why, it is believed in Tehran, Ayatollah Khomeyni has just renewed the functions of his representative within the Pasdars, Hojjat ol-Eslam Hassan Taheri Khorram-Abadi, and the commander-in-chief of the Guardians of the Revolution, Mr Mohsen Reza'i. "Obedience to the orders of Mr Reza'i, whom I like, is a duty (religious) for everyone, including the minister of the Pasdars," declared the Iman, thus making Reza'i the veritable commander-in-chief of all the armed forces of the Islamic Republic.

In the eyes of observers, this confirms the existence of a growing unease within the Guardians of the Revolution, many of whom have been arrested. It seems that, in appointing his protege, Ayatollah Khomeyni wanted to settle matters once and for all by putting order into this revolutionary army, which he considers as the guardian of Islam.

12368
CSO: 4619/76

EMIGRE PAPER DISCUSSES RELATIONS OF TUDEH PARTY, KHOMEYNI REGIME

Paris NEHZAT in Persian 2 Jun 83 pp 1, 3, 4, 5

[Paris NEHZAT in Persian; bimonthly organ of the Iran National Resistance Movement]

[Text] The arrest of the leaders of the Tudeh Party and its members by Khomeyni's agents, like all the mullas' oppressive, illegal, and inhuman arrests, is severely condemned and protested in our eyes. We remember that in Paris immediately after the execution of a number of senior military officers and the former Prime Minister Amir 'Abbas Hoveyda (who had also been severely tortured), the Committee for the Defense and Advancement of Human Rights met and declared that these executions without trial, with no reason given, without the presence of an impartial body, and with no defense counsel granted to the defendant were unacceptable and contemptible. An attending audience of about 500 Iranians was told that "This savage act is the pattern of what is to come from these rebellious usurpers. It is a certainty that a blood bath in this kingdom without a king will follow in the wake of these merciless butcherings by this prescribed government, and these intimidating tactics will be followed by more of the same. While this is still in its early stages, the voice of protest must be raised and the executioner's hand must be cut off. They must not be allowed to carry out a general slaughter, calling their victims servers of the former regime, SAVAK torturers, and the lackeys of foreigners, planting the seeds of fear in the people's hearts and bringing terror to the royal throne. This is a very cunning and fiendish act on the part of the clergy. They have excited the people by killing Nasiri and others; they will channel dissatisfaction with the oppression of the past into a religion of killing people and fondling bloody corpses. They are destroying the law. The people who are rejoicing today at the killing of these people will be looking at the corpses of their own children tomorrow." The speaker added, "Why shouldn't these people, who held high positions and were in charge of the country's affairs for many long years, each one of them with a volume of secrets about the country in his mind, be tried according to law? Why shouldn't their trials be public, to make the people aware of their crimes? Why shouldn't verdicts be issued concerning them and the proceedings and results of the trials be recorded on historical documents and kept at document centers, so that, in the event that they have committed crimes and treason, the people of the world will then know of their criminal acts? Because of the methods the clergy have used in what they have done, it will not be seen as the punishment and execution of criminals. This is murder, vengeance killing, and deliberate slaughter."

Unfortunately, this voice went unheard, and no other person or group protested this illegal affair. On the contrary, there were people who said that these traitors got what they deserved. We saw the kind of results that came out of this heavy silence and the rhetoric of the opportunistic Iranian press, as it praised and glorified the just acts of the savior Imam and emissary of God. That instinctive killer Khalkhali acquired so much license that he killed a 16-year-old child on a whim, and his shameless answer to the child's plea that he was innocent was "If you are innocent you will go to heaven, and if you have sinned you will go to the pits of hell." We even saw how this very Ayatollah, the sign of vengeful God, killed Dr Reshvand before the eyes of the people for the crime of showing mercy to a wounded Kurd, and what a lot of killing of innocent people who were accused drug addicts, smugglers, or enemies of God he brought on. The stoning of women accused of adultery, the killing of pregnant women accused of having relations with men other than their husbands, the shooting of patriotic officers, provincial and tribal chiefs, the massacring of Kurds, flogging young girls for not wearing veils, packing prisons with innocent people, plundering the people's property and the public treasure, the killing of a woman nurse who had the courage to report their crimes to a reporter from L'EXPRESS, forcing the people to flee from their homes, cottages, and country, the brainwashing of adolescent children, starting the war with Iraq, killing 7- and 8-year-old children on various pretexts, and thousands of other disasters that were the products of Khomeyni's Islam, all of which have been mentioned and written of thousands of times, and are perhaps not in need of individual mention, at least in this article, have all taken place. We know that they killed for the crime of seeking freedom, they killed for the crime of loving truth, they killed for the crime of fighting for God, they killed for the crime of loyalty to a minority, and they killed and they killed, and they will kill as long as they exist. Their sustenance is the flesh of these murdered ones, their water is the blood of the youths which they have sucked.

We were discussing the Tudeh Party and the Islamic Republic of Khomeyni. What has this party of the new equilibrium, this messenger of justice and equality, done and said in four years?

1. Unconditional cooperation and unity with the regime of mullas.
2. Combining the Marxist doctrine of godlessness and secular knowledge with the religion of the 7th century, blind religion, class-bound, ignorant and born of the age of ignorance, the Islam of Khomeyni.
3. Praising and applauding all this oppression, perversion, and mercilessness.
4. Endorsement of all the injustice and murder.
5. Voluntarily identifying military and civilian opponents of the Islamic Republic.
6. Calling freedom-fighters counterrevolutionaries because of being liberals and lackeys of imperialism.

7. Nominating Khalkhali, who is known to all, for President of Iran.
8. Saying and repeating "Ayatollah Sadeq Khalkhali is the greatest man of the Iranian revolution."
9. Giving the clergy guidance in the making of committees, the art of consultation, the making of rationing systems, and demonstrating.
10. Launching the Iman's line and the taking of the hostages (and what a lot of material and spiritual damage that did to Iran).
11. Praising the luminous savior Imam and the Islamic Republican Party.
12. Eavesdropping and telling tales.
13. Raising the banner of opposition against every patriotic, mortally threatened group.
14. Pretending that every nonsensical comment was true and commenting favorably on the Iman's absurdities.
15. Pronouncing all killings to be revolutionary and supporting them.

They didn't think it would be their turn one day and that the seeds of their actions would bear fruit, but it was clear to every knowledgeable person that the last killing ground for the clergy would be the Tudeh Party. Unfortunately, the leaders of the party were so sure of themselves and so busy pursuing their goals that they thought they had acquired power, and considered themselves the only successors to this desolating, oppressive, bloodthirsty regime, or in other words, they thought they were the relief to come after hardship. They submitted to every form of shame and disgrace, thinking that their futile hopes for Iran were an undeniable reality. They let the nation fall prey to its enemies with this idea, and today, alone, unprotected, and with no supporters, they find themselves living in the tombs of the prisons of these dastardly thieves facing an unknown fate.

Their last futile, unbelievable act was the shameful confessions of the party's first secretary, the party's writer and a long-time member of this great party. The most important point in these messages was the advice these old, seasoned students of the ideology of scientific socialism gave to the young people of Iran, to distance themselves from their faith and belief of 40 years.

Is the purchase of a probable life worth such a heavy price?

Concerning this we will address a few remarks to the Communists Party of France. The people of Iran say with the utmost pain and sadness that they have been afflicted for over four years by something the likes of which has been remembered in our history as an invasion. There was the invasion of Genghis Khan, the invasion of Tamerlane; even the Arab invasion, during which many of the people unwittingly sided with the invaders because they were unhappy with the Zoroastrians and religious interference in the government, was an invasion rather

than a revolution. The French Communist Party has called the Khomeyni invasion a revolution, and many others have deliberately or inadvertently held the same idea, and continue to do so, and we do not dispute this. It has even spoken favorably of the power of religion, which it views as a progressive force in practice, and of the Islamic Republic. Again, we do not dispute this, but why have these relentless killings, which the mullas have told us are part of a fight against the counterrevolution, been carried out? Most painful of all, throughout all this period the French Communist Party has not spoken out even once in defense of our murdered and bloodied youths; it has ignored what has taken place in our disaster-ridden land. It speaks only of revolution, the salvation of the people of Iran, boundless oppression, and achieving the blessings of brotherhood, equality, and the happiness of revolution. Now suddenly the arrest of the leaders of the Tudeh Party has caused it to raise its voice and change its tune. For the first time, its newspaper HUMANITE is echoing the words of the leader of the Mojahedin, Mas'ud Rajavi, saying that there are 100,000 prisoners in Iran and calling upon all the people to protest the illegal arrests of the Tudeh Party leaders and to save the lives of these democrats. One must ask whether, among the thousands of human beings the mullas have killed on Khomeyni's orders, there wasn't one democrat, and even one captive in that country who was deserving of defense before their friends were arrested, so that a party that considers itself the foremost representative of the humanitarians, and considers its mission to be the establishment of justice and love for humanity, could defend those tortured, humiliated captives? Is the responsibility of such a party only and solely to defend those whose hearts beat with the name of Stalin and who believe in and submit to the communism of big brother? On the basis of what we have seen, one must be a communist with protection, for otherwise, a non-communist will not be considered a human being, and until he comes around it is too bad! We hope that these captives will be saved and will stay alive, because no one has the right to take someone else's life because of ideological disagreement, and we know that there are no small number of worthwhile and knowledgeable people among these men, and that there are a great many believing youths among them. The same can be said of the other groups and individuals who are caught in the clutches of these vicious animals, except that the Tudeh Party was unconditionally united with these hardened killers in order to become their successor, while others had given up their citizenship in their fight to rid the country of the mullas. The newspaper LONDON TIMES wrote an article on this very subject on the 6th of May under the title "The Wages of Opportunism," the mention of which would not be inappropriate here: "In his confessions, Kianuri said, 'I believe that for the mistakes we have committed, spying, sedition, and treason, we deserve whatever sentence the Islamic Republic may hand down against us.'" Concerning the comments of the first secretary of the Tudeh Party, the newspaper said the following: "In this expression of opinion, it is highly likely that Kianuri has issued a death sentence for the Tudeh Party, a party in which this man has been a leader for 42 years and has served as its first secretary since 1978. Last Wednesday a proclamation dissolving this treasonous party aligned with the Soviet Union was officially issued, and an order was given that all members and supporters of the party turn themselves in within a week. The Iranian Foreign Ministry also ordered the deportation of 18 Soviet politicians. Kianuri's interviewer, in an interrogation that went with this message, said to the younger members in conclusion 'It is my belief that young people must not follow these methods in any way, or to be under the line of leftist influence in Iran, because the meaning of such methods is servility to foreigners.'"

The newspaper correspondent writes: "Here it is difficult to imagine how damaging such a humiliating denial of all the issues is for a man who is an old-time communist leader who has worked all through his political career to strengthen and broaden the influence of socialist internationalism in Iran. A man who put all the genuine national principles of Iran behind him in order to become a proponent of the line of international socialism in his country, with this humiliating confession, has denied and rejected all that he stood for in a single stroke."

"It is obvious that the methods that were used to obtain such confessions are unimaginable, yet one is tempted for two reasons to say that he got what he deserved, first because Kianuri was a representative of a movement and a power that learned and perfected its despicable techniques in famous Moscow trials and second because he and his party unhesitatingly sought to perpetuate the Khomeyni government by supporting it, on Moscow's orders, with such zeal. He and his party, with all severity and complete heedlessness to their own beliefs, omitted nothing in the protection and praise of this government, and throughout all this period, one observing all the torture and contempt that was brought down on the other various leftist groups would have to ask, 'Why did they do this?' The clear answer that comes to mind is that the Tudeh Party hoped, using this method, to make its own path free of pressure and oppression, and to get itself into a position from which it would be able later on to stage a power revolution when its own membership expanded. Kianuri and his colleagues underestimated the dangers that faced them, otherwise they would not have been caught so easily. They stand on historical issues and have good historians among them; they should have made an assessment of their own successes and failures."

In April of 1980 a LONDON TIMES reporter asked Kianuri whether he thought the same misfortune that befell the communist party of Iraq, which, like them, had unconditionally aligned itself with the Ba'th party of Iraq and become a victim of that party, would befall him.

Kianuri answered, "We are aware that the national bourgeoisie will not accept our ideas and that there is a possibility that they will become reactionary, but as long as they fight imperialism it is our duty to cooperate with them.'

The reporter writes, "As we interpret the first secretary of the communist party of Iran's answer, he is saying 'We will defend any anti-communist regime as long as its foreign policy is in the interest of the Soviet Union, even though we know that we will end up sacrificing ourselves as defenseless victims of suffering, torture, and execution.'"

"A selfless and wonderful spirit such as the one that emerges from our analysis would be worthy of praise and admiration, were it not given in the cause of such a worthless and mean-spirited goal."

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POLITICAL FUTURE: NEGOTIATIONS WITH POLITICIANS SUGGESTED

Karachi DAWN in English 5 Jul 83 p 7

[Text]

SIX YEARS ago on this day, the Armed Forces assumed power in a country that was close to a national split in the aftermath of the March 1977 general election. On this anniversary one naturally recalls the purpose of the Army takeover — the separation of the combatants and restoration of peace followed by a general election — and wonders whether the original inspiration for the move is at all going to guide our steps in the seventh year. Some very hopeful words were spoken by the Chief of Army Staff on that fateful July 5, 1977. But here we are, six years later, with the same Martial Law and the restoration of representative rule not yet in sight. Six years is a long time for a constitutional deviation. It is also too long to be encapsulated in this comment. Still, July 5 excites memory and thoughts. What have we achieved and lost during this period? Most assessments of the Martial Law record are bound to be subjective. People will use their own yardsticks in drawing up a balance-sheet. Explanations of why an intervention, initially intended to last ninety days, has been so prolonged will vary according to individual or group perceptions of the objective reality. But some observations can be made with a considerable degree of confidence. Economic

management in the past six years has on the whole been good, yielding beneficial results. Despite international aberrations and internal infrastructural deficiencies, growth has remained higher than the expectations of most of Martial Law's detractors. The cherished dream of food autarky has been realised, aided in considerable measure by favourable weather. In the domain of foreign policy, the Martial Law Government has handled a difficult geostrategic situation adroitly and with a judicious combination of firmness and flexibility.

But the dominant verdict on the performance of the Martial Law Government must flow from its handling of the domestic political situation. Though here also assessments may vary quite considerably, a broad agreement of opinion exists on the basic features of the existing situation. The political process remains suspended and the business of governing the country is being handled for the most part by a bureaucracy, civil and military, which does not have to answer for its acts and omissions. Some of the known features of bureaucracy are red-tapism, the tendency towards expansion, abuse of discretionary powers and centralisation. The last-named feature is impinging adversely

on the federal character of the State in an atmosphere in which political inter-actions between and among provinces have already ceased. The functions and powers the judiciary enjoyed under the 1973 Constitution have been circumscribed. The public platform is quiescent. The Press functions in an environment which discourages it from gathering and disseminating news without fear or favour and from airing a variety of opinions. We do not know what has been happening under the surface. The Majlis-i-Shoora has served merely as a debating forum. What is crucial here is not the quality of people nominated to the Shoora. The limitations of such nominated bodies are universally recognised and even though the Government has treated it with courtesy, the Shoora has not been deciding policy. It could not be otherwise. Similarly, the hope that elected local bodies would provide an alternative leadership has been belied. True, the denial of local democracy in Pakistan's feudal politics has greatly contributed to our national woes. The election to the local bodies has been a healthy development, but the elimination of political parties has impaired their serviceability.

Apart from offering government by consent, the democratic system ensures painless renewal of the Executive through smoothness of succession. Irrespective of its performance, Martial Law is necessarily an extraordinary and interim arrangement which should yield place sooner or later to a more normal and durable pattern of political rulership. Even if the present Government were an elected one, it would still be under an obligation to seek a renewal of the popular mandate after being in office for four or five years. It is but natural that the question of succession should arise after six years of

Martial Law. The air is laden with suspense and expectation with the approach of the deadline for a new political framework that the President has promised by August 14. On the same day, an alliance of defunct political parties has threatened to launch a civil disobedience movement to bring about the restoration of democracy. How, then, is an orderly succession to be achieved? The tragedy is that though we have had spells of good or bad democratic rule, the country has for a greater part of the time been under authoritarian government. Political parties have been in a state of suspended animation. And the institutions which protect the citizens' freedom, spread knowledge, information and enlightenment and raise the level of awareness and sense of responsibility of the people have been in a process of enfeeblement. Thus, there has been a very grave impairment of the processes of opinion formation and of evolution of leadership. The foremost truth the Government must face at this crucial stage is that there is no alternative for this nation but to return to a representative system of government. There may be more than one opinion on how and under what particular conditions such a transition back to democratic rule can be achieved. But what is not debatable to the slightest degree is the desirability that the transition be smooth and orderly and that democratic restoration be genuine and durable. We emphasise this because, in spite of the distance of time and events, one can hardly be forgetful of the bitter lessons of the two previous popular upheavals: the one from November 1958 to March 1959 against Ayub Khan's regime and the other against Bhutto's rule, from March to July 1977. Although in each case the mass agitation was for the sake of democracy, the ultimate outcome turned out

to be bitterly disillusioning for the people and their leaders. Even without suggesting a pattern in these instances, one might caution both the Government and the political leaders on this account — the former against allowing a situation to develop where long-suppressed democratic aspirations seek an outlet in violence and disorder; the latter against adopting mass agitation as a strategy for democratic restoration. The only other option, thus, is for the Government and the politicians to take the path of dialogue in a spirit of mutual accommodation and understanding, keeping in view the supreme national interest which both claim to hold above everything else. Even at this late stage, this remains the only sane option if the mistakes of the past are to be avoided and if the country is to be spared the consequences of a more menacing spell of uncertainty and drift.

The Government needs to break its isolation from the politicians and open serious negotiations with them on the country's future because the incontrovertible truth is that the

quasi-political ideas and concepts — Majlis-i-Shoora, nominated Provincial Councils, non-party local bodies and so on — that have been tried during the present interim period have failed to produce a viable alternative which could do without the services and involvement of politicians and political parties. By the same token, politicians must be willing to talk to the Government and consider its point of view on the future pattern of government if they see the wisdom of working for an orderly democratic return free from the treacherous traps and pitfalls of an agitational process. A hopeful factor, insofar as political parties of different leanings and persuasions are concerned, is that there is a clear consensus on the 1973 Constitution as providing an agreed framework for the country's governance. The Government, too, appears to be basically in agreement with this position. In fact, except for minor modifications relating to broadly agreed matters or those that may be necessary for effecting an orderly transition, the nation's

Basic Law must be left substantially intact--for it to hold the popular commitment and allegiance that it still embodies. There must be a clear realisation all around that the prospects for the future can be made extraordinarily grim if any attempt is made to introduce changes impinging upon the Constitution's schemes for power sharing between the Centre and the federating units and the form of government. Once these vital principles are accepted on both sides, the Government and the political parties should not find it too difficult to sort out their differences on the peripheral issues, or on the modalities of transfer of power through elections. In any case, given the continuing gulf dividing the two sides, even informal contacts and soundings can produce constructive results--by thawing the icepack of mutual distrust and misunderstanding and by involving both sides in a process of 'some sort for exploring common ground. The responsibility for initiating such moves rests primarily on the Government, because as wielders of power through the long political vacuum, it must decide what to do next: whether to bring the continuing political pause to an end or to carry on with the burden of national responsibility for an indefinite period, with all the risks and hazards it entails for the nation's future.

BENAZIR BHUTTO'S TESTIMONY IN JAM SAQI CASE: MORE DETAILS REPORTED

Cochin THE WEEK in English 3-9 Jul 83 pp 23-27

[Article by K Gopalakrishnan]

[Text]

BENAZIR Bhutto is the prize prisoner of the Pakistan jail system under General Zia-ul-Haq. The Oxford-educated Benazir is the acting chairman of the Pakistan People's Party, founded by her father, the late Zulfikar Ali Bhutto.

Her house in Clifton, Karachi, has been declared a sub-jail by the military regime. The 29-year-old Benazir is guarded by over 40 armed personnel equipped even with machine guns. Her telephone is cut off. The road leading to her house is closed to traffic. Even her own sister is denied entry to the house. None can contact her. An enterprising foreign correspondent tried to enter the house recently but was bashed up by the armed guards.

After becoming the acting chairman following the departure of her mother Nuzrat Bhutto, chairman of the PPP, to Europe for medical treatment, little has been heard of Benazir's thinking on national and international affairs. No wonder, because the Pakistani censors see to it that nothing of that sort gets through the country's controlled press.

In the last week of March, Benazir however spoke on various subjects while giving evidence in what is known as Jam Saqi case in Karachi. Jam Saqi, Jamal Naqvi, Amar Lal, Kamal Warsi, Suhail Sanghi, Shabbir Sher and Badar Abro are charged with publishing, printing circulating and possessing literature of a type aimed at promoting hatred between different classes. They have also been charged with spreading disaffection against the armed forces and propagating views prejudicial to the established ideology of Pakistan.

The case shot into fame when Jam Saqi, who is widely believed to be belonging to one of the communist parties of Pakistan, called in his defence about 300 witnesses including leaders of all important political parties.

In her testimony Benazir has shown that her politics is left of centre with a strong dose of populism. Being young and with the halo of martyrdom around her as a result of the hanging of Bhutto and her own incarceration for over two years, Benazir is sure to be a major factor in Pakistan politics for quite some time.

Benazir's 14-hour deposition before the military court no. 5 in the last week of March this year was covered all too briefly by the tightly censored Pakistani press. Reporters who went to cover the event were confronted by roadblocks and police guards at every entry point of the sports complex in Karachi, where the military court is functioning.

The explosive story told by her in defence of Jam Saqi has not been revealed to the world till now and was gathering dust in the shelves of the military court. The exclusive report given below was obtained by THE WEEK Correspondent K Gopalakrishnan, who was in Pakistan recently. With the spirit and gumption of her famous father, Benazir Bhutto fearlessly answers questions put by the military court and talks of Zia's martial law, revolution, the ideology of Pakistan, and the differences between martial law and the armed forces...

Q: What is your opinion about military courts?

A: In international law and in internal law there are two words which give a meaning to existing situations. These two words are *de facto* and *de jure*. *De jure* refers to a legal order. It refers to actions and rules which flow from a legitimate document or authority. These may derive, as in the case of England which does not have a written constitution, from the monarch on the advice of the legislature. Or these may arise, as they do in most countries of the world, from a constitution.

Today, in Pakistan, we do not have a *de jure* situation. We have a rule by Martial Law. Martial Law is a short term for military regiment, that is, a rule based on the whim of the commander of the military regiment and enforced, not by consensus, but by the threat of force which the commander commands. So we have, in fact, a *de facto* situation.

While answering your question, I am also reminded of the words of Regis Debray who is presently adviser to the President of France on the Third World. When he was being tried in the past, he said, "who are the judges and who are the judges? You speak of certain crimes, I speak of others." Today's victims will not necessarily be the victims of tomorrow.

Since military courts do not flow from the Constitution of 1973 which is the accepted, representative and legitimate document governing the relationship between citizen and society, they are, therefore illegal. However, the *de facto* position is that this court is to announce the verdict and although a man is not *de jure* guilty when pronounced so by a *de facto* court, nonetheless he may be imprisoned and sentenced by the *de facto* court but he is still innocent by *de jure* standards.

Q: What do you think of the Iranian Revolution?

A: Let us first define the word 'revolution'. Revolution is not something which is a monopoly or has been a monopoly of Iran. Revolution is a historical concept and revolutions have occurred throughout history. Should we talk about the French Revolution or the

American Revolution, should we talk about the Russian Revolution or the Iranian Revolution, should we talk about the eastern concept of revolution, of which China is the leading example, or should we talk about the western concept? Let us instead ask why revolutions occur.

Revolutions occur when a situation within a given territorial unit disintegrates to such an extent that all organs of the state are identified with the maintenance of a status quo which is repugnant to such a wide spectrum of people that they believe the time has come when they have nothing to lose, and everything to gain, if they show courage and take what is rightfully theirs. They bring down the corrupt or degenerate organs of the state and replace it with those of their choice.

A revolution means a total change. It does not retain any of the old and that is why it is followed by a period of anarchy before a new system evolves itself. Because this new system has the consent of the widest possible spectrum of the population it is accepted while the old was not. People do not face death or bullets unless they have a cause to fight for. When a revolution takes place, irrespective of where it takes place, it is contingent upon causes.

Q: We (the accused) have been accused of working against the ideology of Pakistan. Is there an ideology of Pakistan?

A: Generally speaking there are two kinds of states—historical and ideological. Some people maintain there is a third kind of state, that carved out by the retreating colonial powers. This third kind usually refers to continents where there was tribal predominance and does not concern us at the moment.

Historical states emerged as a process of history. Most of the European and Asian states we may refer to as historical. Pakistan falls into the category of an ideological state. What is an ideological state? Let us begin by defining ideology.

Ideology is a co-ordinated body of ideas about human life and culture. Ideology is either used to maintain a status quo, to bring change in a reformist manner or to bring about revolutionary

change. Although these three things are so different, ideology is used in all three because ideas justify action. Ideas give impulse and act as a stimulus. A body of coherent ideas forms ideology.

Pakistan is an ideological state. In determining the ideology of Pakistan, we need to cast an eye on the movement for Pakistan. My view of the freedom movement is that the ideology of Pakistan was based on the fear of the Muslims of undivided India that they would not receive their political and economic rights and they would be discriminated against on the basis of being Muslims.

As British rule continued, the sense of insecurity amongst the Muslims of India grew. They felt they were being discriminated against, treated as second class citizens and, therefore, they would not get their rightful share of the nation's resources or their just political and economic rights under the present scheme of things.

The Indian Muslims did their best to find ways and means by which they could live in India without fear of persecution with guarantees to enjoy political and economic equality with the non-Muslims. That is why the demand for Pakistan was not made until March 23, 1940. The Muslim struggle was always for political and economic rights.

The Quaid-e-Azam was well known as the ambassador of Hindu-Muslim unity. This title indicates the willingness of the Muslims to work out a solution whereby they could live in undivided India so long as their rights were respected. The subsequent moves for separate electorates and such topics were the effort to find some guarantee that would not deny Muslims equal status with non-Muslims merely because they were Muslims.

The turning point came with the India Act 1935 under which elections were held for provincial assemblies. The short-sighted policies of the Congress provincial governments were the deciding factor in the Muslims' conclusion that they would never get a fair deal in undivided India.

In determining the ideology of Pakistan, we must see what the manifesto of Pakistan was, and if we look at the speeches of the Muslim League leaders and in particular the Quaid-e-Azam, we will see that Pakistan was to be a democratic state with sovereignty resting in the people, with an independent judiciary as these were seen as pillars to ensure political and economic equality.

Since Pakistan is an ideological state, its ideology is integrated and defined in the Constitution of 1973. The preamble of the Constitution states that sovereig-

nity belongs to Almighty Allah and is to be exercised by the people of Pakistan through their representatives. Along with the preamble there are five clear articles which contain the ideology of Pakistan which are from Article 1 to Article 5. The first Article relates to the territorial boundaries of Pakistan.

The second relates to the state religion and it declares that Islam is the state religion. This has been interpreted by some jurists to mean that the head of Pakistan, as a symbol of Pakistan, should be a Muslim. However, another interpretation of this Article, buttressed, I believe, by a subsequent explanation, is that any law which is repugnant to the Quran and the Sunnah will be struck down (Article 227.1). Therefore anybody who supercedes this provision, by declaring another law superior to the Quran and Sunnah, and thereby not challengeable in the relevant courts dealing in the matter, he would be working against the ideology of Pakistan and the law of God.

Ideology means the relationship between man and state. Islam gives us the relationship between man and God and between man and man.

Q: Pakistan has had only two elected leaders, Quaid-e-Azam (Jinnah) and Quaid-e-Awam (Bhutto). Both stood for parliamentary democracy, Islamic socialism and provincial autonomy, did they not?

A: The Quaid-e-Azam said in his speech in Chittagong in 1948 before the Chamber of Commerce that he supported Islamic socialism, and wanted to give due importance to the public sector. He said that the economy of Pakistan would be based on the concept of Islamic socialism. Subsequently, the Pakistan People's Party which declares that Islam is our faith, fought for socialism as its economic platform and received a mandate for its implementation. These same ideals are also incorporated in the Constitution of 1973. To talk of provincial autonomy, parliamentary democracy or Islamic socialism is not an offence under the Constitution of 1973 or the founding principles of Pakistan.

Q: In both the elections held, those opposing Islamic socialism were defeated.

A: The political parties which say that there is a contradiction between Islam and socialism have never won a mandate from the people of Pakistan or from the Muslims of undivided India. This is because the Muslim masses know that the real struggle in Pakistan is not between Islam and Kaffir (non-believers). It cannot be as 90 per cent of the people of

Pakistan are not only Muslims but Muslims who withstood two hundred years of British rule and lived side by side with non-Muslims from 712 A.D. without ever shaking in their faith. In fact, the Muslims grew in number because the egalitarian message of Islam attracted those from a rigid system where man's place in society was determined by his birth and not by his talents, efforts and contributions.

In view of the Quaid's Chittagong speech and in view of the PPP manifesto endorsement that the real struggle in Pakistan is between the capitalist class supported by their representatives and the oppressed forces supported by their representatives. It is a struggle between the exploited and the exploiter, it is a struggle between the rich and the poor. There is no question of Islam being in danger. The danger is facing the oppressor class.

Q: Is there any question of martial law in Islam?

A: In determining with clarity whether martial law has a place in Islam or not, we need to understand the concept of martial law and the concept of Islam. Islam, as I have already said, is submission before the will of Allah whereas martial law is submission before the army commander. A Muslim submits only before the will of Allah.

The term martial law, if I remember clearly, is a term derived from the days of Bismarck and the Prussian empire. To integrate the territories he conquered, Bismarck superceded the law prevailing in those territories with his own law based on his whim and enforced at the point of a gun. Martial law, before the Second World War, also referred to the rule of an occupying army. The word of the commander of the occupying army superceded the existing law.

Under colonialism, the indigenous people were treated as second class citizens, denied a government of their choice, denied the right to shape their own destiny according to their hopes and desires and according to what would be economically beneficial for them. In the wake of World War II, and the withdrawal of the colonial powers from most of the colonies, the people of the newly independent countries enjoyed freedom and liberty for a little while. This was the period when nationalist leaders such as Nasser, Nkrumah, Nehru and Soekarno insisted on bringing social equality and justice to their people. But the former colonial powers, now restructured in shape, intended to keep their own people happy and, whether they consciously decided this or not, they ended up sup-

porting a military mullah complex. This mullah-military complex denied the people charge of their own destiny and the fruits that would avail from guiding this destiny. The situation was further complicated by the rivalry between the Soviet Union and the United States of America.

Many of the newly independent states are now ruled by some form of military administration. However, an administration which is based on force and not consensus cannot be congruent with the central principles of Islam which lay emphasis on consensus. Secondly, military regimes always come into power at the point of a gun or the threat of the use of force, whereas in Islam there is no concept of the usurpation of power. Therefore, we can see that there is no question of martial law in Islam.

Q: We (Jam Saqi and others) have been accused of hindering the purposes of martial law. Could you tell us the purpose of martial law?

A: Since different purposes are given all the time it is difficult to determine the purpose of martial law. The first reason for martial law was stated by the chief martial law administrator in his address to the nation on July 5, 1977. He said, "I saw no prospects of compromise between the PPP and PNA because of their mutual distrust and lack of faith. The army had therefore to act." However, the PPP and some PNA leaders have come on record to state that they had agreed on the night of July 4, 1977 to sign an agreement the following day. Therefore, to prevent an agreement being signed between the PPP and the PNA for fresh elections, the only time left to act was the night of July 4, 1977.

The second explanation given by the chief martial law administrator was that martial law had been imposed because the elections had been rigged. The factual position is that the charge of rigging was refuted in detail by the chairman of the Pakistan Peoples Party in his rejoinder filed before the Supreme Court. This rejoinder was banned so that people may not come to know the truth. Subsequently, in more than five and a half years of martial law only one man was prosecuted on charges of alleged rigging. That person is Yahya Bakhtiar, the former attorney general of Pakistan who, by coincidence, was also the senior defence counsel in the case of the former prime minister. Yahya Bakhtiar was subsequently cleared and therefore not a single person has been convicted on the charges of rigging an election.

The third reason for the imposition of martial law was the so called spectre of

civil war looming on the horizon. Riots take place in all countries, whether developed or undeveloped, and they are not called "civil wars". Recently, about a year or two ago, severe riots took place in England but they were not termed civil war.

The fourth explanation for martial law was that the Pakistan People's Party wanted to create strife and chaos to perpetuate itself in power. The Peoples Party was in power because it had been elected to govern by the people of Pakistan. It only wished to continue because the people had mandated it so. Secondly, no government or administration wishes to create strife or chaos because such a situation makes it appear weak and incapable of governing or administrating.

The fifth explanation for martial law was that the PPP had harmed the Constitution and martial law was necessary to restore the Constitution and in particular the independence of the judiciary. If I remember correctly, the 4th and 5th constitutional amendments were withdrawn by a martial law regulation. But an extra-constitutional activity cannot protect the Constitution as those which are the products of the Constitution. The truth is there for all to see. Let the people judge who has harmed the Constitution and who has protected it.

The sixth explanation for martial law given after the promised elections of October 1977 were postponed, was accountability. And this accountability was to be taken by those who were non-accountable. Whether the purpose was to take accountability or to indulge in a witch-hunt was made clear when about six members, disqualified under the principle of accountability, were subsequently dry-cleaned snow-white when they agreed to become members of the federal council. The federal council we are told, is composed of the most honest men. It took two years finding them.

The seventh explanation was that the prime minister was going to remove him as chief of army staff. Although the prime minister is constitutionally competent to take certain actions, there is no truth that he was to be removed since he had as late as July 2 and July 3 sworn to support the legal prime minister.

The eighth explanation given is that we must salvage the economy by giving big business a renewed lease to plunder the country. Therefore, most of the public sector projects have been abandoned or delayed and hardly any new projects have been undertaken in it. It is an irony that while there is unhappiness in the eyes of all those suffering from hunger and unemployment, at the same time big business is itself reluctant to reciprocate the

strenuous wooing by the military regime.

The ninth reason for the imposition of martial law, which was given after the second promised elections, those of November 1979, were postponed is the Afghan situation. We have been told that the Afghan situation necessitates martial law. I cannot understand why we should be punished and denied our rights simply because the martial law regime is so concerned about Babrak Karmal not giving the rights the martial law regime thinks fit for the Afghans but not for us. The question of questions is whether these declared intentions of martial law are the real reasons for its perpetuation or a cloak for the aggrandizement of power.

Q: How does the Provisional Constitutional Order (PCO) issued by the Zia regime affect the people?

A: Different people have different yardsticks to judge allegations. We should have one yardstick and the yardstick in this matter is the Constitution of 1973 which was approved by a mandated and representative Assembly on a unanimous basis.

The PCO issued by the present regime is illegal by the objective standard of the Constitution of 1973. Fundamental rights are an integral part of the Constitution of 1973. The 1962 Constitution did not recognise fundamental rights and nor does the PCO. The Constitution of 1973 empowered the superior courts to look into the violation of fundamental rights and the superior courts alone could judge questions relating to liberty and to life because the protection of liberty and life is an integral part of all civilized societies.

According to the PCO, when the liberty and life of an individual is threatened by an arbitrary organisation, which owe their existence to orders passed by an individual, one cannot appeal to the superior judiciary to see or review the orders which affect his life, liberty, property and his pursuit of happiness. This is one aspect amongst many others as to why the PCO is in contradiction of the Constitution of 1973 and therefore illegal. This reason should be sufficient to make the point. (Note: The military court continuously interrupts asking to shorten the arguments since they have understood the point.)

Q: How will you characterise the legal or political validity or sanction of martial law?

A: This regime has no legal or constitutional validity. It came into being as a result of a coup d'état carried out on the sole instructions of the chief of army staff against the constitutional government which the chairman, joint chiefs of staff of the navy, air force and army had

sworn to uphold on 28th April, 1977. Since martial law is an anti-people machinery and since the term politics refers to that which concerns itself with the affairs of the public, martial law is against the public and political trends in society.

The present martial law regime has not received any legal sanction from any court which received its powers from the Constitution of 1973. It will be recalled that when chief justice Yaqub admitted the Begum Nusrat Bhutto constitutional petition, he was summarily sacked. Anwarul Haq was chosen to be the chief justice and all the judges of the Supreme Court were required to swear a fresh oath which, if I remember correctly, either omitted allegiance to the Constitution or introduced allegiance to martial law.

This Supreme Court, now a creature of martial law regulations, heard the petition and gave a limited endorsement to martial law for a period of nine months. It was hesitant to lay down a time-framework but upon the insistence of the petitioner, the law enforcing officer, Sharifudin Pirzada, gave an undertaking to the court that the period would be nine months. This limited endorsement, which is not regarded as constitutional by some, also made it clear that all actions of martial law would be reviewable before the superior judiciary.

The second blow to the tenuous myth of legality came in August or September 1978 when the President, Chaudhry Fazal Ellahi, resigned and General Zia made himself President on his own advice. There is no *gunaish* (scope) in the Constitution for such an action and nor the doctrine of necessity allow it.

The third blow which shattered the fragile myth of supposed legality came with the introduction of the PCO which amounted to the formal and ceremonious burial of not only the Constitution of 1973 but also the judgement containing the doctrine of necessity. Subsequently some weak claims were made by the regime that it had not buried the Constitution of 1973. Because not only legal matters are involved but also political considerations, let us leave the matter here. Suffice it to say that when the PCO was passed, it amounted to a new legal order. So, by the yardstick of the Constitution of 1973 it is illegal.

Q: Politically what sort of regime is this?

A: The word usurper traditionally means, (whether referring to Pakistan or to all countries, the past or to the present), one who takes that which he is not legally entitled to by coercion or a

threat of force. According to the Constitution of 1973, sovereignty belongs to the people of Pakistan as agents of Allah and the representatives of the people are the trustees of the country. Since General Zia seized power at the point of a bayonet in the middle of the night, deposing the elected prime minister of the country who was the trustee of the people's sovereignty, he took what was not his. And since one who takes that which is not his is a usurper, the factual position is that he is a usurper who has usurped the rights of the people. Also he has himself said repeatedly that 'I am not an elected leader. I am a military man'.

Q: Is criticising martial law the same as criticising the armed forces?

A: Martial law and the armed forces are two completely different things, different in character, different in nature and different in duration. Martial law means the supremacy of force over law. Martial law is a self defeating exercise. It comes to restore law and order but ends up giving both to violence and desolation. Being an enemy of the people it is ultimately its own enemy. It sows the seeds of its own destruction.

Martial law is against the sovereignty of the people and therefore it is injurious to people's interests. The armed forces are not injurious to people because the armed forces are from the people. Martial law is a system which seeks to promote itself in power on the basis of force. The armed forces are an institution which seeks to defend the country's territorial integrity and comes to the aid of civil power upon the direction of the Government. Martial law topples the government. Martial law destroys unity and corrodes the foundations of the State. The armed forces protect national unity and safeguard the interest of the nation. Martial law enslaves the masses. The armed forces are a creature of the masses.

Practically every country of the world, in the past or in the present, have armed forces. These are considered a natural part of a country and have a specific role to play. Martial law on the contrary, is an unnatural development and is resisted everywhere. The armed forces are a permanent part of a country's structure. Martial law is an aberration and transitional. The armed forces derive their legitimacy and flow from the will of the people. Martial law is illegitimate and goes against the will of the people.

In short, martial law is *haram* where as the armed forces are *halal*.

Q: Is opposing martial law illegal?

A: When martial law itself is illegal, how can opposition to it be taken as illegal?

Q: The attitude of the present regime is different with different parties?

A: As far back as 1978, when the former prime minister filed his application against his illegal detention, he noted that despite the junta's claim that it would be fair and impartial, the martial law regime was playing favourites. It was assiduously courting certain parties the way Romeo courted Juliet. But whereas Romeo was faithful to Juliet, the regime was sometimes courting one party and sometimes another. It encourages those parties which support it at a given time and persecutes those parties which want power to be restored to the people.

Even further back in August 1977, when a certain maulana lost his pug when he got caught up in a mammoth reception for the former prime minister, the chief martial law administrator rang him up to apologise. However, when the police brutally attacked the former first lady at Gaddafi Stadium he was in a big hurry to praise this uncivilised and barbaric action. They have always played favourites and not acted according to the established norms or rules of conduct.

Q: We have been charged with spreading class hatred. What is class hatred?

A: Class hatred, as the *Shaheed* has said, is an expression which is used loosely without appreciating the historical march of man. We need to differentiate between creating class hatred and supporting the just rights of oppressed man. Pakistan is not only a poor country but its people are amongst the poorest in the world while the rich are amongst the richest of the world. This is not the law of God nor the ideology of Pakistan. This unjust disparity is man-made. The power and privilege of the exploiting classes is enhanced to the direct detriment of the exploited classes.

The brotherhood of classes emerges from egalitarian policies. There is no reason why a person who speaks for the depressed and downtrodden should be accused of creating class hatred. That person creates class hatred who invites the rich to become richer, provides all sorts of incentives, gives away public

property in the name of devaluation, feels that the 22 families should be further strengthened and cares not for the burden of the poor eking out a miserable existence in slums.

Q: (Reads para 14 of Comrade Magazine on terror not being able to finish rights).

A: It is true that no amount of terror can extinguish the legitimate desire of the people for the exercise of their social, political, economic rights. If the established leadership is eliminated, the articulation of causes will be made by others and the banner will be passed along.

The need is to devise a manner in which power is transferred to the people with as little further damage to the country. This is contingent upon the plans of the de facto rulers. They have to demonstrate that they will genuinely transfer power after fair, free and impartial elections. When there is a talk of indirect election, registration of political parties, proportional representation, electoral colleges, selection of candidates and so on, the impression is created that the objective is not to transfer power with a civilian facade.

To restore confidence about its intentions, some measures are necessary for the rulers to undertake. These include (a) unconditional release of all political prisoners, (b) transfer of all cases from military to civil courts, (c) withdrawal of disqualification tribunals, (d) restoration of power of superior judiciary under 1973 Constitution, (e) removal of the ban on Musawaat and compensation to employees with similar action for all media which is banned, (f) withdrawal of all false cases instituted by regime, (g) restoration of political activities, (h) definite frame-work or time-table for transfer of power on the basis of fair, free and impartial elections.

Q: Has the United Nations Charter, with its articles on fundamental rights, not been violated?

A: I agree that although Pakistan is a signatory to the United Nations' Charter, its articles are being violated.

MRD LEADERS DEMAND RELEASE OF POLITICIANS

Karachi DAWN in English 8 Jul 83 p 18

[Text]

The Secretary-General of the Movement for Restoration of Democracy (MRD), Khwaja Khairuddin, has criticised the alleged maltreatment of MRD leaders and workers by the Police on the 'Protest Day' on Tuesday last.

In a statement, he demanded action against the concerned police officials and the immediate release of Rao Abdul Rashid, Malik Hamid Sarfraz, Mr Arshad Choudhuri, Sheikh Rafiq, Sheikh Bashir and others rounded up the same day.

He praised people's response to the MRD call and reiterated that the MRD was determined to continue the struggle according to the programme already announced.

The Secretary-General of the defunct Qoumi Mahaz-i-Azadi, Mr Iqbal Hyder, has also endorsed Khwaja Khairuddin's demand for

action against the police official who manhandled MRD workers and leaders.

Addressing at a Iftar Party at the Labour Square on Wednesday, he appealed to the democratic forces to join the MRD, says a Press release.

A leader of the defunct Tehrik-i-Istaqlal, Mr Mehfooz Yar Khan, also demanded release of detained political leaders at an Iftar Party in Gulshan area on Wednesday, says a Press release.

In a similar statement, another Tehrik leader, Mr Hasmat Habib, demanded release of detained political leaders.

Meanwhile, a number of political leaders and workers called on Mr Mairaj Mohammad Khan who sustained injuries during the Protest Day on Tuesday last.

CSO: 4600/765

ZIA RENEWS PROMISE OF POLITICAL STRUCTURE

Karachi DAWN in English 7 Jul 83 p 1

[Text]

ISLAMABAD, July 6: President Gen. Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq said today that Islamic political system for the country would be announced by Aug. 14, as promised. This was his "commitment", he added, apparently meaning that it would be honoured.

Talking to local newsmen at an Iftar party, hosted by Brig T.H. Siddiqui, Director, Inter-Services Public Relations, the President said he was awaiting reports of various agencies working on the system.

Asked if he intended to appoint another committee to evolve a single report out of the reports prepared by three different agencies, the President said he could not answer the question until he had seen all the reports. According to newspaper reports, he added, the Shoora Committee would submit its report to the Shoora Chairman who would take another three or four days to send it to him. However, he smilingly said, appointment of new committees was interpreted as meaning that the matter was being put in cold storage.

The President told a newsmen that the students of Rawalpindi's Politechnic College had been shifted to three other colleges. The college had been closed down because its "history was not good." It was located on the Grand Trunk Road and its students "made a show" of their presence there.

The President replied in the affirmative when asked if he felt fit enough to undertake his official visit to Japan, beginning on July 17. However, he added, he was sorry that he was missing his trip to holy places in Saudi Arabia on Ramzan 27.

Agencies add: The Iftar was attended by the Defence Minister, Mir Ali Ahmad Khan Talpur; the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee Gen. Mohammad Iqbal Khan; the Vice-Chief of Army Staff, Gen. Sawar Khan; Vice-Admiral Tariq Kamal Khan, Chief of the Naval Staff; The Chief of the Air Staff, Air Chief Marshal Mohammad Anwar Shamim; and high ranking civil and military officials, besides the journalists.

Later, President Zia offered Maghrib prayer along with a large number of guests. After the prayer, he shook hands with Imam Sahib and other people around him.

CSO: 4600/765

'ZIA SUPPORT MOVEMENT' CONSIDERED UNHEALTHY FOR PRESIDENT

Karachi JANG in Urdu 24 Jun 83 pp 2, 22

[Article by Irshad Ahmad Haqani: "These Ignorant Friends of the President"]

[Text] According to reports, Mohammad Yusuf Qurensi, "chairman" of "Zia Support Movement," has demanded the suspension of municipal elections and the appointment of municipal council members along the lines of Majlis-e Shoora. Addressing a press conference in Karachi, he said that the democratic system is anti-Islamic and was forced on the Indian subcontinent by the British. He added that the Movement is against the democratic system and demanded the suspension of municipal elections and official appointments instead. Asked if the Zia Support Movement would take part in the elections should municipal elections take place, he said, "Yes, we will take part in elections and run for a seat wherever possible." As for factionalism in the Movement, he said there was none but that nevertheless some irresponsible members of the Movement had been expelled. Mr Qureshi added that in order to promote support for the present government, the Zia Support Movement would organize several subgroups, such as the Zia Student Movement, and the Zia Services Association. To counter the activities of "Al Zulfiqar," an "Al Zia" group was also being established. Subgroups under the "Al Zia" movement would be the "Green Squad" and "Muhafiz-e Khijri" ["Protection of the Leader"]. Regarding popular elections in the country, Mr Qureshi said that the Movement was against popular elections as these are dangerous for Islam. Mohammad Irshad Javid, who was present at this press conference, announced the establishment of the "Zia Labor Movement" to promote support for the present government among workers.

We would not have taken any notice of this news about the Zia Support Movement, since it is based on lies and does not deserve any serious consideration, but as this news item was published prominently in several national newspapers with reference to a respectable news agency and as no government agency bothered to check or verify if the organizers of this movement were using the name of the president with his consent and blessing, this report cannot be totally ignored.

It is understandable that some people support President Zia, acknowledge his services to the nation and desire his retention as president. It is also valid that these people should propagate the guidelines that President Zia wants the country to follow. But pushing ideas and making demands with which the president has not associated himself by words or actions indicates that these people are foolish friends of the president. Not only did President Zia help hold the recent municipal elections and take open credit for them but his government is also working on holding these elections again. These self-proclaimed supporters of the president oppose municipal elections and demand the appointment of municipal commissioners along the same lines as shoora appointments.

Zia has never opposed elections on principle even though his government has failed to hold any elections for the last 6 years. He is even ready to present a scheme for popular elections in the near future. His so-called followers, however, oppose popular elections on principle and call democracy something left by British rulers in the subcontinent. To top it all, they are doing all this under the banner of a movement called "Support Zia Movement." Obviously, some people might mistakenly think that this movement is being supported by the government and that the antidemocratic views propogated by this group have behind-the-scenes support of the government. Such an impression would not be fair to President Zia and his government, since he has never implied support for such views.

In each society there are people who are desirous of "being more faithful to the king than the king himself." Unfortunately, we have more than our share of such people. Thus, it is understandable that some fortune hunters would try to pull this trick in order to get in his good books, but they should do that without hurting the position of their leader. People who support President Zia and want to be with him in his political battles should support the views and philosophies for which Zia stands. Making demands against which the president and his government are working is not the way to help him. If the members of the Support Zia Movement are sincere about helping Zia and are not merely interested in publicity, then they should refrain from issuing misleading statements.

They should be especially careful about giving an erroneous image of the president to students, laborers and government employees. It would be appropriate for the government to announce that there is no connection between this so-called "Support Zia Movement" and the president of the country, and that he does not support these demands. Whenever an organization is given importance by the mass media there is a danger that misunderstanding may be spread among the masses and it is necessary to make the truth known. Simply saying that the government is not able to check every news item and activity does not suffice.

7997
CSO: 4656/206

SUCCESS OF MRD'S PROPOSED CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE MOVEMENT DOUBTED

Lahore NAWI-I-WAQT in Urdu 21 May 83 pp 10, 11

[Article by Ilyas Shakir: "Can the MRD's Active Movement Succeed"]

[Text] A full 2 years and 2 months after it was established, the MRD has finally announced the beginning of its active struggle, but disputes have arisen concerning this announcement. Simultaneous with this announcement came speculation and opinions about whether this active civil disobedience movement could be successful. This simple question has engaged not only political workers. Since this announcement, the MRD leaders themselves have become anxious about the advantages and disadvantages of this movement, because this is their last attempt at survival. If they fail to launch their full-fledged movement on 14 August 1983, the MRD itself will be the first victim of the resulting disappointment, because it will not be able to escape the confusion and anxiety that will result from this disappointment.

It is the opinion of political circles in Karachi that the MRD's active movement beginning on 14 August has little chance of success. In their opinion, the MRD has not done sufficient preparation to back up such an important announcement. They feel that announcing an active struggle without doing the political "homework" for it is like signing a blank check. They also say that the MRD has not even been successful in stopping the internal struggle among its own workers yet and here they have started to journey whose end even they can't predict.

Although political circles feel that two parties included in the MRD are capable of providing an ample supply of workers for some action, they say that when one of those parties could do nothing to save its own leader, what will it be able to do for democracy? And the leaders of the other large party, which claims to represent two provinces despite its separation from many of its supporters, wonder what will be the benefit of taking part in such a movement whose "fruits" will be eaten by someone else. But now it seems that this party, too, is ready to make sacrifices for the sake of others, and recently an important leader of this party, Khan Abdul Wali Khan, said in an interview that it was not the purpose of the defunct Pakistan National Unity Movement to remove former Prime Minister Bhutto.

However, it was this same Wali Khan who said in a recorded interview with the BBC after the fall of the previous government that "Bhutto and Pakistan cannot go together." The BBC broadcast this interview in Wali Khan's own voice a second time, along with the news of the hanging of the former Prime Minister on 4 April 1979. On the other hand, it is also a matter of record that Khan Abdul Wali Khan had challenged former Minister Abdul Hafiz Pirzadah in the Assembly, saying, "I will bring an end to you and your leader." Now this party has changed its character. What could be the reasons? Nothing can be said in this regard for the moment, except that now perhaps they have seen some signs of possible gain!

As far as the remaining parties in the MRD are concerned, the common impression in political circles is that their support will be of no particular benefit to the active movement other than to give the impression of an increase in the number of political parties taking part. On the other hand, the question has again arisen in MRD circles as to whether the MRD will begin this active movement in the absence of its permanent leader. If this question should again gain strength, it could ruin things at the last moment, and some sympathizers feel that first all positions for officers should be filled so that every party has complete representation in the MRD, and then something can be done. After all, they should "enjoy" the 94-day grace period so that the public, too, can feel that the MRD is doing something. But the problem is that all of the important leaders of one party are taking it easy outside the country, and it has been decided not to listen to the defunct Istiqlal Party, which objects to the presidency of Khan Abdul Wali Khan. In this situation, it is possible that supporters of Wali Khan may again begin their demands for the presidency.

Political circles are also asking why the MRD has so suddenly and hastily announced that it will start a movement on 14 August 1983. The MRD's "informed sources" say in this regard that when the MRD decided that it would meet quarterly rather than monthly, some friends taunted its leaders by asking if they had accepted the present government for another 2 years. When the MRD leaders asked what they meant by this it was said that, "A quarterly meeting of eight parties means each will have a turn over 2 years. Your plan seems to be a 2-year plan."

Another reason for the announcement of the beginning of a movement is said to be President Ziaul Haq's recent visit to Sindh as a result of which two matters have been brought to the forefront. First of all, Sindhi political parties were to be reassured that something was about to happen so that they would be happy where they were rather than prepare to pack their bags to depart. The second matter is that of the Shoora League, which is thought to be about to come into public view. The announcement of its founding will also be the announcement of the shortcomings of the leaders of several political parties. So the announcement of an active movement was in fact an awkward attempt to create confusion because it is the common view that if the country's political landlords learn today that such and such a political party cannot come to power, then most

of them will increase their business activities, resign themselves to the present situation and escape without even bothering to arrange for the burial of their ideal party. In this situation, the MRD has a right to be in a hurry, but they also incur a greater possibility of being hurt. It seems that Mr Khwaja is walking on the thin edge of a sword, and there is no telling what the result of his journey will be.

But one thing is perfectly clear and that is that the days when the MRD advances its active movement, according to its newspaper announcements, are the very days during which most political and social workers will be busy in provincial elections where they will have a greater opportunity to use their personal leadership and become councilors, mayors, deputy mayors and chairmen. In this situation, who will fight to make the MRD leaders who live in houses like palaces into members of the national assembly? Who will come out in the streets? This is the question hanging over the heads of the MRD leaders, because they themselves know that one political party is taking part in the provincial elections as a protest and one for practical reasons. One will come forward in disguise and one is preparing to come forward with the label of a friend of the people, so who will pay any attention to the MRD?

9914
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PURGE OF JAMAAT-E ISLAMI MEMBERSHIP IN BALUCHISTAN EXPLAINED

Lahore NAWA-I-WAQT in Urdu 21 May 83 pp 10, 11

[Article by Aziz Bhatti: "Disputes Within the Jamaat-e Islami"]

[Text] The news of disputes within the Jamaat-e Islami has astonished political circles, perhaps because the Jamaat-e Islami is the only party in the nation's political history that has not split into two and from two into four groups. The reason for this may be this party's organizational structure, under which those gaining party membership must first undergo a long trial of political loyalty. It is appropriate to briefly mention the organizational structure of this party before discussing the incidents and details of the alleged disputes within the Jamaat-e Islami.

The first stage of a connection with this party is membership in "the circle of the influence," and the second stage is "the circle of those in agreement." These stages must be completed not in months but in years, and those who are accepted as "reliable" after their satisfactory performance in 'the circle of those in agreement' are made "members" of the party after great consideration.

The selection of officers and the provincial Majlis-e Shoora and the central Majlis-e Shoora is from among these "members." The method of selection for each stage is not for someone to name himself or someone else as a candidate, for such a method would disqualify the person. The "circle of selection" selects the officers by secret ballot and the selected individuals must be acceptable to all. So up to the last stage, it is not known who will be selected for a particular post.

To get an idea of how many testing stages a candidate for membership in the Jamaat-e Islami must go through, consider that there are only 21 members for the entire city of Quetta, and all of them have been either suspended or expelled from the party. This is the first time in the history of the party that the entire organization of a provincial capital or a large city has been suspended or separated. Even more amazing than this step is the fact that such an important action was kept so secret that no one had any inkling of it for a period of more than 2 weeks, and it might still be a secret if a confidant had not made this writer aware of this "explosive news." This confidant, whose name I have obviously promised not to divulge, said that, "No one will confirm or refute this news."

This was correct to some extent, as most leaders of the party were unavailable or refused to speak when they were contacted. With great difficulty, a meeting was arranged with the young, intelligent and enthusiastic general secretary of the Jamaat-e Islami in Baluchistan, Imamullah Baluch. During the discussion in his office, it became evident that something was amiss. Imamullah Baluch claimed that the action against the Jamaat organization in Quetta was an ordinary action, and he wanted it to be "off the record," but I could not remain silent about such important news. So a circumspect report was prepared on the basis of this conversation with Imamullah Baluch, the publication of which astonished political circles. Dr Muhammad Ibrahim of the Quetta Jamaat-e Islami (who is one of those expelled from the party) broke down and disclosed that the members of the Quetta organization had not been merely suspended but were expelled from the party, and this step was taken not by the provincial but by the central organization. The Jamaat's district official, Sayyid Taj Muhammad Agha, gave the same reply to this that Imamullah Baluch had given and which had already been published in NAWA-I-WAQT. Taj Muhammad Agha had been made the supervisor for the area in the absence of the Quetta organization. The organization that had been broken up had been established just 1-1/2 to 2 months before. The 21 members who had been expelled from the party had all been considered representatives of the Jamaat-e Islami in Baluchistan. Among them was the former provincial officer Abdul Majid Khan, who is the supervisor of the "service" institution of the Jamaat-e Islami. This institution does work to aid the Afghan refugees.

A representative of the defunct NDP, Salah Muhammad Mandukhail, has said that 20 million repuees of foreign aid for the Afghan refugees has been embezzled, which is why there has been action taken against the Quetta Jamaat-e Islami, but Jamaat-e Islami circles have strongly denied this.

9914
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PUBLICATION OF REPORT OF COMMISSION ON BANGLADESH WAR URGED

Karachi DAWN in English 11 Jul 83 p 9

[Text]

WHILE the fall of Dacca was unquestionably the most tragic moment in the brief history of Pakistan, the news of it was conveyed to the nation in a single, cryptic sentence of thirty-one words. Almost twelve years have passed and no serious attempt has been made on the national plane to analyse and understand the circumstances in which the country was rent in two. However, there have appeared some reports in the past few days which have revived interest in the role of some of the leading players in the great military and political debacle. These disputations, like earlier exercises in self-justification, do not take in the whole gamut of issues involved in the loss of East Pakistan. In fact, selectivity and distortions are to be considered inherent in the manner in which the controversy has been rekindled. Almost out of nowhere, a national Urdu daily leaked some passages from the Hamoodur Rahman Commission's report pertaining to the conduct of a few key persons on the eve of the nerve-shattering denouement. Following the leak, a number of statements and interviews have thrown light on some aspects of the debacle. But these have not added up to any clarification and the fundamental need to take a close look at a very delicate

phase in our history and to draw the right conclusions from it is yet to be fulfilled. Admittedly, the Hamoodur Rahman Commission report would be one of the basic documents that a historian would need to consult for an objective study of the circumstances that eventuated in the East Pakistan debacle. The Commission had painstakingly gone into the military, political, moral and international factors that were involved in that traumatic event. There have been repeated demands that the report be made public and action taken against those who were judged to have compromised and betrayed the national interests through their follies and lapses. It is obvious that until the report is officially released, any selective disclosures and comments thereon could lead to positive misrepresentation.

The Commission to inquire into the circumstances leading to the surrender of our forces in East Pakistan was set up on December 26, 1971. It consisted of the then Chief Justice of the Supreme Court Mr. Hamoodur Rahman as Chairman and Mr. Justice S. Anwarul Haq and Mr. Justice Tufail Ali Abdur Rahman as members. After examining 213 persons, it presented its 1,000-page tentative report on July 8, 1972. It was

tentative because the Commission recommended a further inquiry to be held when the Commander of the Eastern Command and other senior officers, then prisoners of war in India, were available for testimony. Thus, the Commission was reactivated after the POWs had returned by May 1974. The supplementary report was submitted to the then Prime Minister on November 25, 1974, after the Commission had examined 73 more witnesses, including the senior army commanders. This report consisted of 438 pages. Among those examined by the Commission were political leaders, civil servants and members of the public. We refer to these details only to highlight the labour, time and expense that went into the inquiry. All this cannot be justified if the report remains classified and the nation is not taken into confidence about the sequence of events and the conduct of a section of its top functionaries who were holding crucial responsibilities at the time. The crisis developed during a Martial Law regime, marked as it was by extra-legal restrictions on the gathering and dissemination of information. Newspapers were under restrictions and the nation was kept wholly in the dark about what was happening in East Pakistan. A major lesson we should learn from the Dacca tragedy is that suppression of intelligent debate and denial of information in the midst of a national crisis create a situation in which the rulers cannot be prevented from leading the nation into a blind alley. It is significant that the Commission itself was of the view that the report should be made public and appropriate action taken on its recommendations. Mr. Justice Hamoodur Rahman himself told newsmen that the Commission had not confined itself to the military aspects alone because it was found that the surrender was brought

about as a cumulative result of political, international, moral and military factors. This would make the report a document of prime historical value and a vital key to the understanding of the break-up of the country. Even if the document is held to be flawed in respect of evidence recorded or procedure followed, it will still remain relevant.

We feel that the time has come when new thinking is necessary on whether the Hamoodur Rahman Commission report should be made public. When it was submitted to the previous Government, two sub-committees were formed to study the report and in early 1975 it was made known that its publication was not in the national interest "at this stage". The then Prime Minister said that it contained sensitive material impinging on questions of national security and foreign relations. It was hinted that the publication could affect Pakistan's relations with the superpowers and the Muslim countries. On one occasion, the then Prime Minister gave two more reasons for not making the report public: it could harm the image of the armed forces and stand in the way of improved relations with Bangladesh which "wants to forget the past". But the past is a resource not worthy of being forgotten. It is mainly to get one's history right that such inquiries are deemed necessary. Arguments about national security and foreign relations are apparently valid and to take them into account a high-level committee should be formed to see if some portions of the report are to be classified. The report is the nation's property, and the bulk of it, if not the whole of it, should be made public after such a scrutiny. Worried that out-of-context leaks might compromise their character, some of the leading participants in the events of 1971, too, are now advocating

the publication of the report. Of course, the Hamoodur Rahman Commission report is not the only report which has been consigned to the sealed lockers of our bureaucracy. This ill-advised practice was started in the Ayub era. By now, we have a long list of inquiries made at public expense and meant to be in the public interest which have been wilfully concealed. The practice is synonymous with our curious obsession with secrecy in public affairs and contravenes accepted norms of democratic rulership. In any case, the Hamoodur Rahman Commission report is rather unique in its importance and continued relevance. Although it was recommendatory in nature and it was not obligatory on the Government to implement its recommendations, justice would demand that those it found guilty be publicly indicted. Nations are more important than individuals or even institutions. Sweeping historical facts under the rug is not going to help meet difficulties and crises that we may encounter in the future. On the other hand, a full knowledge of what happened in the past and an opportunity to learn from the mistakes of yesteryears are sure to equip us better to deal successfully with the challenges of the future.

CSO: 4600/776

OPPOSITION LEADERS TALK AGAINST MARTIAL LAW

Cochin THE WEEK in English 3-9 Jul 83 pp 21-22

[Text]

THE WEEK met a few political leaders of Pakistan in Karachi, which is the unofficial political and economic capital of Pakistan. Unlike Islamabad, people here are more free and fearless. The people talk openly against the Zia regime. Here are the views of some political leaders on the situation in Pakistan.

Sardar Sher Baz Mazari, president of National Democratic Party:

On the overthrow of Bhutto and his execution: When Zia took over power, the feeling was that the country was fast becoming a battle ground for a civil war. When he stepped in there was a sense of relief. He had made a commitment that he would hold elections within 90 days and we believed him. At first, when I met him I thought that he was a modest man, a good listener and humble unlike Bhutto. I really believed him. After that, unfortunately, he has somersaulted and gone back on his words so many times that his credibility is disastrous. No one believes or trusts his words any more in this country.

In spite of our differences with Bhutto, I think it has set up a very bad precedent by having a politician hanged. It might be the beginning of a very dark, grim future. I think he was tried in a court of law, unlike our friends put in the Hyderabad tribunal, mind you. But the fact that the verdict was I think three against two is significant and the general feeling was that magnanimity could have been shown. By and large, the majority people of Pakistan did not approve of this hanging. We would have liked to meet him politically.

In fact, by hanging him, Zia-ul-Haq has created a symbol of martyrdom. It is being reaped by his daughter and his wife. And it is a fact of life which you cannot deny.

On Benazir's popularity: I would not say she is becoming popular. Maybe their (Zia administration) power is eroding. Even I was opposed to Bhutto. I did not approve of the vicious manner in which he was ruling the country. But I was fighting for democracy, rule of law, for the fundamental rights of the people of Pakistan. And there is no doubt that after his hanging a sympathy was created. The day he was hanged, believe me, I couldn't eat, even though I was opposed to him politically and we had suffered considerably under his regime.

The role of political parties under martial law: Our stand has been consistent. We are fighting for the same rights and same cause as we fought during Bhutto's days. Bhutto dismissed the majority provincial government of Baluchistan. The NWFP government had to resign. Hundreds and thousands of people lost their lives.

The People's Party government under Bhutto curtailed the powers of the judiciary, which curtailed fundamental rights of the people. A man like Tikka Khan who is responsible, whose hands are besmeared with blood of the people of Bangladesh and Baluchistan, was made the commander-in-chief by Bhutto. And now Tikka Khan is the additional secretary general of the PPP.

But we are with the PPP in the movement for restoration of democracy in Pakistan. We are demanding lifting of martial law and holding of elections according to the 1973 constitution, and the PPP is also demanding the same today. At least when we talk about it there is some justice. I am not trying to malign the People's Party. But believe me, I am talking about launching a movement. Our people have not forgotten, particularly those of Baluchistan and NWFP. Our people have suffered so much under Bhutto. They were tortured,

they were beaten up. How can you collaborate with the people who were responsible for the atrocities committed in Baluchistan? Yet we are together for the restoration of democracy on a broad platform.

The feelings of the bureaucracy under martial law: I think the bureaucracy is also unhappy right now. The reason is during the martial law of the fifties, Ayub Khan used the military for two months or so and then removed them to the barracks. And then the country was run by the bureaucrats. I don't think the bureaucrats were ever so powerful as during those days. Later Bhutto, in spite of his commitment to the people, did not implement or honour it. Slowly he fell into the hands of the bureaucrats. That was why in the 1977 elections, when the movement was launched, the ordinary worker had been alienated. Then even the people to whom tickets had been given by PPP were all feudal lords from Sind, Punjab, NWFP and Baluchistan.

Now about bureaucracy today, barring Ghulam Ishak (finance minister), who is a very powerful bureaucrat, by and large they are dissatisfied. The reason being that they are now subordinated to the army at all levels and it is the army that is ruling the roost for the last six years. The bureaucrats have become secondary to the armed forces and they resent it.

About military officers taking civilian positions: Already, it has affected the morale of the army. Army should be a fighting force. They are indulging in administration for the last six years. They are in no way superior to us. Their credibility was at its peak. Right up to the time Yahya Khan took over. After that I think the credibility of the army fell. And today it is very low. Because martial law today stands for injustice and corruption which has spread to every walk of life. There is a total isolation of the army. Wars are not fought by armies alone, there has to be a total involvement of the people of that country and that is the problem here.

On the Afghan problem: Truthfully speaking we are told that there are a million refugees. It could be a hundred thousand more or less. It is creating the usual economic problem. We welcome them. They are our brothers, and we are not preventing their entry into the country. But what we object to and what we consider wrong is their interference in the internal affairs of our country.

Since they have come, they are hand in glove with the Jamat-i-Islami and they are the only party that has direct access to the *muhajari*. And they are very well armed, and we feel that they are being

treated as a voluntary force to crush any democratic movement in the country.

Possibility of war with India: War with India? No, you can write that off. Because you see, Zia's is not a representative government and he knows that the people of Pakistan do not love him. He is in a very weak position. It is only a person who feels in a strong position with an efficient army who'll fight a war unless he wants to commit suicide. If Zia studies the past, each time there has been a conflict with India it has eventually resulted in the removal of the president. It is a matter of history. I don't think Zia will make the stupid mistake.

On Indo-Pak relations: Our party has always sought for and wanted very close, friendly relations with India. Though we are two separate sovereign countries, we have a common past, a common history. We have worked together, lived together and rather than seek help from Russia and other superpowers and let them interfere in our affairs, I think it is far better for us to improve our relations with our neighbours, first of all with India.

Mairaj Mohammad Khan, president of Qaumi-Muhaz-e-Azadi:

On the present situation in Pakistan: Martial law is not for the first time, and it is not likely to be there the last time. Whenever the feudal and the capitalist forces could not face the challenges of development and could not sustain the foreign interests in Pakistan, there was martial law. This was one of the reasons for dethronement of Bhutto.

The problems we face are not sudden. These have roots in history. After independence we moved from colonialism to neo-colonialism. There was no change in the state of affairs and conditions of the people. The rulers did not want industrialisation. We will not remove *jagirdari*. We will not have self-sufficiency as long as there is martial law.

On Islamisation: In Quran there is an injunction that *sharab* is *haram*. It is to prevent people from drinking. But not to be used as a basis for penalising people for what they may have done in the past. This injunction cannot be used to whip people for having violated the *Quaranic* injunction. However, it only being used here to penalise the people for their past action. And it has become a weapon of fear and terror.

Zia has no right to punish people for their past errors. In Islam it is not a sin to speak the truth. There is corruption. There is bribery. Why should these questions which are in public interest be used to punish people? What kind of

Islam is that when it is used to suppress the truth?

Take another point. Zia has been in service for all his life. He has been indulging in many un-Islamic activities throughout. During British rule, if the British had ordered Zia to arrest both *Quaid-e-Azam* and Gandhi he would have carried out those orders. And now he is concerned with Islam.

Yet another point. Palestinians are fighting in Jordan. You do not support this. What kind of Islam is this? If I were a real Muslim, I would have said that I am not interested in a service of this type. What is this Islam which is used to crush the will of the people? The land belongs to the tiller and you deny him these rights and still you say it is in defence of Islam. The *Quaid-e-Azam* believed in secularism. He said there will be no theocracy.

Our minorities are today feeling insecure. There is lawlessness. Is this Islam?

On the MRD movement: If we have a broadbased alliance we can bring about a force to face this crisis and fight imperialism. Because it is the imperialism which protects the structure. Even the weakest agitations have affected our rulers. Our democratic fight is also anti-imperialist. It cannot be democratic if it is not anti-imperialist. No political party wants feudalism. No party wants capitalism. A broad democratic alliance is needed. But democratic forces organisationally are not strong.

Aslam Gichki, a revolutionary leader on whose head Bhutto had announced a reward of Rs 10 lakh.

On problems of Baluchistan: Baluchis are not happy with the Pakistan authorities. People from Baluchistan who have passed double MAs have not been able to get jobs. Everyone is imported from Punjab, right from a peon to the top man. How can the Baluchis be happy with such a ruling clique?

When people of Baluchistan agitated during Bhutto's regime, the army was despatched to suppress the agitation and the army and air force even resorted to bombing. Even today people of the state are suffering. Will not regionalism grow under such circumstances?

CONDITIONS INSIDE PAKISTAN REPORTED

Cochin THE WEEK in English 3-9 Jul 83 pp 16-18

[Article by K Gopalakrishnan]

[Text]

A Delhiwallah may not feel out of place in Islamabad. There is frequent power cut, water supply is irregular, telephones do not work, and there is talk of corruption wherever people get together. Punjabi is heard everywhere; it is the language of authority though Urdu is the official language. And, like what has happened to our father of the nation, Quaid-e-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah has been reduced to a picture hung on office walls. As we quote Gandhi, they quote Jinriah and ignore him.

So similar, yet vastly different. All said and done, Delhi is the seat of a secular and democratic government. Islamabad is the nerve centre of a martial law administration, controlled press and a virtually theocratic state. While commoners and civil servants of the middle and lower rungs wear the Awami dress—a loose pajama and kurta in the Pathan style—the generals manning civilian positions try to cover their muscle in achkans and churidars.

President Zia-ul-Haq leans heavily on Finance Minister Ghulam Ishaq Khan, the most powerful civilian. One hears many stories about this alliance in Islamabad. One is that Ghulam Ishaq is the Americans' man. Another story is that in 1977, when Bhutto learnt of Zia's plans to oust him he issued an order sacking Zia. Ghulam Ishaq, who was then one of the top bureaucrats in the defence ministry, who was immediately informed. But Ghulam instead of implementing the order promptly told Zia about it. The General acted swiftly. Whatever the truth, Ghulam is a key man in Zia's regime today.

Most of the political parties are opposed to the martial law. The two parties supporting it are Jamat-i-Islami headed by Mia Tufail Ahmed and the Mulsim League (Pir Pagaro group). Buying the support of these religio-political parties explains the Islamisation programme of President Zia, though in a way it is only an extension of the moves initiated by Bhutto during his last days in power.

In fact, many of the authoritarian laws now in force were initiated by Bhutto. He overcentralised the administration at Islamabad, reducing the states to municipalities. He imported machinery for interrogation of political adversaries, which is being put to good use by the Zia administration.

It was Bhutto who introduced prohibition, declared Ahmadias as non-Muslims and made Friday a public holiday. All to win the support of conservative elements.

Zia went one step further. He began appeasement of fundamentalists like Mia Tufail. Tufail's views mentioned in the

Munir report (Mohammad Munir, former chief justice of Pakistan) are revealing. On Jinnah's announcement that in Pakistan every religious group will have equal status, Tufail said that those who supported Jinnah's government were sinners.

One reason why Zia appears bent on encouraging the fundamentalists is that he has found no support among the political parties. Further, the Punjabi-dominated military clique, which has been ruling Pakistan after the death of Liaquat Ali Khan, feels that the lurid canvas of Indian bogey is no more a hot-selling item in North West Frontier Province, Baluchistan and Sind. So Islamisation with the support of conservative elements has been adopted as one of the strategies to keep the military in power. Whipping up religious fervour helps to curb opposition to the regime.

The result is Islamisation of a sort. Zia has issued ordinances on civil code and taxation on the basis of sacred Islamic books. Public lashing, cutting of hands and stoning to death, prescribed in the *shariat*, are part of the administration of justice in Pakistan today, although all this is against the United Nations charter on human rights to which Pakistan is a signatory.

A victim of Islamisation is the Pakistani woman. Zia has passed laws on a dress code for women. The Evidence Act passed by the highest policy-making body in the country, Shura, which is a nominated body, states that evidence in courts by one man is equal to that of two women. The act is, however, yet to be signed by Zia. And it remains to be seen whether he will sign it.

Women's organisations all over Pakistan have objected to this law. And in the case of dress, women have not heeded the president's wishes. One could see women in jeans and pedal-pushers in Islamabad and Karachi. Only a few were in the decreed burqa.

The literacy rate of women shows the true state of affairs. At the national level it is just 13.7 per cent. This, despite the fact that there is a women's division in the Pakistan government directly under Zia. Mrs S Ahmed, secretary of the division, said that her department is taking up a number of programmes to improve the plight of women in the country. When asked about Islamisation of Pakistan and the curbing of women's rights, Mrs Ahmed, who is the target of attack by ulema and mullahs, said that in the past the *shariat* gave more freedom to women than any other religion. She was also planning to set up separate stadia and playgrounds for girls so that they could continue to take part in sports without violating the laws of the land.

The curbing of women's rights has had at least one beneficial effect, Mrs Ahmed said. Educated women have started reading the *shariat*. They are trying to understand the meaning of the laws, instead of leaving it to the mullahs.

Dr Hamida Ahmed, professor of history at the Sind University, however, said that under Islam there cannot be any official interpretation of *shariat*. "There is all round confusion on what exactly is being done with regard to women's rights and Islamisation.

The fact is that Zia himself is not clear on Islamisation. But he has to please the fundamentalist elements. Whether it is just a slogan or a deliberate state policy is also not clear. What is obvious is that if Zia leans heavily on the fundamentalists, he will have no option but to press on with the Islamisation programme.

Islamisation is also viewed with suspicion by the minorities. Not that they had much rights before this. For the minorities to get land allotted for building churches or temples is practically an impossible task. Christian missionaries

are allowed to convert only Hindus, who have some numerical strength in Sind. According to Ft John Williams in Islamabad, preaching and conversion are not possible in Pakistan.

Christians are given time on radio and television only during Christmas. Most of their educational institutions have been taken over by the government. In the case of Hindus, even their temples are in a sad state; one can see intelligence personnel in front of temples, watching the worshippers. So much for the minorities.

Sikh gurudwaras, however, are now getting special attention. Still their maintenance is not up to the mark. The Sikh emblem on the Panja Sahib Gurudwara

is broken. When we entered the building and went around, some intelligence men asked angrily: "How did you enter? Hindus from India cannot enter here without prior permission". Sikh pilgrims have been getting special treatment in Pakistan these days. Zia finds time to receive and advise them.

There is little evidence to show that Pakistan is interfering in Punjab. But when Ganga Singh Dhillon, the Canada-based Sikh separatist leader, visited Pakistan three times in the past three years, he called on Zia. What transpired between them is not known.

A word about rural Pakistan where

zamindari is still in operation. Auyb Khan was the first to introduce land reforms and impose a ceiling of 500 acres, which Bhutto brought down to 150. But each time loopholes in the law were exploited and land holdings were divided among family members. At present, 90 per cent of the farmers own less than 12.5 acres while two-thirds of the land is owned by five per cent of the people.

The Zia administration has no plans for introducing land reforms. The reason, according to Planning Minister Mahbub ul-Haq is that feudal power structure cannot be changed through legislation. In the sixth plan, Dr Haq hopes to restructure the feudal set up by giving incentives to Gulf Pakistanis! According to Dr Haq, though much of the remittances from abroad is now spent on conspicuous consumption, it can be channelised into productive investment. He was also confident that the remittances would continue at the three-billion rupee level.

In Pakistan's sixth plan period, Haq has allowed 91 per cent of the new investment for the private sector. He says the plan is based on realistic policies and the experience of the public sector under Bhutto's regime. He prefers to introduce a "Suzuki culture", which means opening the country to the multinationals.

But despite the optimism of the minister, the economy of Pakistan subsists on borrowed money and goods. A slight drop in the international aid or reduction in remittances can push the economy into the doldrums. Since self-reliance has been totally ignored in the past—there is hardly any industrial infrastructure—Pakistan will have to be at the mercy of the western powers for a long time to come.

It is not the state of the economy alone which is making Zia lean towards the west. The other factors are the million Afghan refugees in Pakistan and the Russian presence on the border. Many believe that Zia may not try to solve the refugee problem so that the aid may keep flowing. But the hypothesis is difficult to accept. The refugees are slowly spreading out and settling down in different parts of Pakistan. According to unofficial estimates, there are nearly one lakh refugees in Karachi alone. About 50,000 have reached Punjab. They are also in NWFP and Baluchistan. Here again is a factor in favour of the fundamentalists. The Jamat-i-Islami is getting billions of rupees for relief work. The Afghans with their arms have created law and order problems and it is believed that they took part on the side of Sunnis in the recent Shia-Sunni riots in Karachi. It is also

ing speculated whether the Jamatis are trying to create vote banks among the refugees of whose return there is little hope.

For Zia, the situation in the provinces is also not very comfortable. A strong regional feeling is growing in Sind, NWFP and Baluchistan, though it is yet to take the shape of a political movement. The leaders in these provinces feel that the Punjabi-dominated ruling clique is ignoring the development of these areas. Over-centralisation of power in Islamabad is resented and the ruthless army operation in Baluchistan during 1973-75 has only reinforced the regional feelings of the people in these areas.

Opposition to army rule is growing. The Sindu Desh movement under J M Sayeed is gaining strength. Due to press censorship, the real strength of these movements has not been revealed, but the people supporting them are quite vocal and committed.

The so-called Indian threat is taken with a pinch of salt by most people in Pakistan. Throughout Pakistan, the common man shows a lot of interest in India and its development efforts. They hope for better relations between the two countries, though in Islamabad the officials are ever suspicious of any marked interest in India.

Attitude towards India is different in Islamabad and Karachi. A medical student in Islamabad said that his impression of India was that Muslims were treated very badly, while a Karachi student looked at India as a democracy with free press, following the path of development and self-reliance. In no place including Lahore is there any animosity towards India among the common people.

Matters are very different at the official level. And it is difficult to take Zia's offer of a no-war pact or his utterances on normalisation of relations with India at face value. For, the military clique over which he presides is relevant only if Indo-Pak relations continued to be what they are. It must also be said that certain utterances of Indian leaders on the eve of the Indo-Pak joint commission meeting did not help improve matters.

Among opposition leaders, there is a strong feeling that any talks held by a foreign government with Zia will only add respectability to his "illegal" martial law administration. In fact, before the first meeting of the joint commission, the eight-party MRD issued a statement that an agreement with Zia would not be binding on the people of Pakistan.

Talking about the normalisation of relations with India, What was often asked was: "Can you trust Zia?" It was Bhutto who made him the chief of staff over the head of eight generals. Zia made Bhutto the colonel commandant of the armoured corps, the first and only civilian to be so honoured. Yet it was Zia who insisted on Bhutto's execution.

What one sees in Pakistan is a ruthless military regime and a population wanting but unable to be freed from its grip. Both sides are aware of the lack of ideology. The military regime is trying to make Islamisation the ideology but the progressive sections of the people are strongly resisting this. The junta is not sure how far it can push the issue.

The division of Pakistan and the formation of Bangladesh have made many Pakistanis feel that religion cannot be the basis of forming a nation. In the case of Bangladesh, regional feelings and language defied the theory of a state holding together on the basis of religion. Now again the separatist elements, being moved by regional considerations and language sentiments, are raising its head, albeit slowly, in NWFP, Sind and Baluchistan like the ones in erstwhile East Pakistan. Added to it, those Muslims who opted for Pakistan from the southern states have not been able to merge with the national mainstream. Same is

the case with those who have migrated from Uttar Pradesh. The Punjabi character of the regime has further aggravated matters.

What has happened is that even after 34 years of independence, Pakistan is still in search of an ideology. Mohammad Ali Jinnah did formulate it at the time of formation of the state. In 1947, addressing the Constituent Assembly, Jinnah said: "We are starting the days when there is no discrimination, no distinction between one community and another, no discrimination between one caste or creed or another. We are starting with the fundamental principle that we are all citizens and equal citizens of one state".

Jinnah also gave similar assurances of equality to women. But in Pakistan today things are far different. Soon after Jinnah's death began the attempts to make Pakistan a theocratic state. Interestingly, in the Ayub Khan set-up there was no mention of Islam preceding the republic of Pakistan. Later, even men like Bhutto had to go by the Islamic state theory.

Today, Zia is working for something more. He is trying to Islamise the whole state. In this process, even Muslim minorities like Quadianis, Shias and other Muslim sects are apprehensive.

Poor Quaid-e-Azam must be turning in his grave. For, Pakistan today is not what he had envisioned.

CSO: 4600/776

MISTREATMENT OF JOURNALISTS BY POLICE ALLEGED

Karachi DAWN in English 11 Jul 83 p 9

[Text]

July 5

July 5 is gone with the entire media reporting that it was a total flop. But those who read all these reports to the end — and their number was very large — appear to be convinced that it was not exactly a flop. They had special words of praise for Urdu newspapers which seem to have learnt perhaps out of necessity, to present meaningful reports, expressive cartoons and bold articles.

By the way, two more retired Generals, Sarfraz Khan and A.A.K. Niazi have joined the on-going battle to fix responsibility for the fall of Dhaka. A third retired General, Tikka Khan, who was lucky to have come away from Dhaka before its fall in 1971, was this week interned in his house for two months.

But it was for his political activities against the present Government and not for any responsibility in the fall of Dhaka. When Gen (Rtd) Tikka Khan was being taken to local jail on Juma-tul-Wida (he was brought back for house arrest after a few hours), members of Imamia students organisation were playing hide-and-seek with the police at Committee Chowk, the centre of Rawalpindi city. They were observing Yom al-Quds and had burnt effigies of heads of Government of Israel and two big supporters of it. The observance coincided with the latest killings of Muslims at Masjid al Aqsa on Juma-tul-Wida.

Last week some small groups of newsmen had to face some incidents which were unspeakably, shocking. In the first incident, three senior newsmen, including the Chief Editor of a local Urdu daily, while returning late in evening from a reception at a diplomatic

mission, were chased by a car and stopped in the middle of the road. The inmates of the car rushed out, demanding of the newsmen to establish their identity. On protest against this crude method, the newsmen were dragged out of their car and made to surrender the car key. After some unpleasant exchanges, the newsmen were released by their captors who suddenly found themselves in the glare of lights of a large number of cars coming from different directions. The ruffians then sped away in their car.

The second incident was on July 5, when local authorities were out in a big way to ensure that "un-patriotic" elements were not allowed to disturb the law and order. They were successful in ensuring that there was no mentionable show of black flags or black bands anywhere in the city. Even small strips of black cloth which are widely used as a symbol to ward off the evil eye by trucks and vans in northern areas were taken off. Three newsmen were picked up along with Chaudhry Arshad, a former Federal Minister in the Martial Law Government till the middle of 1979, who had invited newsmen to an Iftar party in a local hotel, on July 5, despite having been ordered against it. In fact, the newsmen had declined to leave the scene of action, and this enraged the concerned authorities. The newsmen were released after an hour or so.

Civilian agencies working in the field of security seem to have acquired a role and methods which are incompatible with civilised norms and values. Getting tough with newsmen on the slightest pretext has become almost a standard practice.

LIBERALIZED IMPORT POLICY COMMENDED

Karachi DAWN in English 1 Jul 83 p 20

[Text]

Private entrepreneurs of Karachi on Thursday commended the 1983-84 import policy for the incentives given to the private sector to enable it to enhance the productive capacity of the industrial sector as well as to make new investment with the availability of industrial raw materials and machinery.

Of particular interest to the business community is the introduction, for the first time, of the negative/restrictive list system whereby, it is hoped, complications in the import trade would be removed.

Syed Nazar Hasan Shah, Acting President of the Federation of Pakistan Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FPCCI), in a statement on Thursday said that the new import policy has been further liberalised to stimulate new investment and help industrial expansion.

He particularly appreciated the fact that the import of items like cement, caustic soda, ash and public transport vehicles, which had been confined to the public sector, has now been opened to the private sector.

So also, he said, the shifting of 15 items of tools and machines from the 'tied' list to worldwide source was welcome. This would greatly help the cottage and medium-size

machinery.

Haji Razzak Janoo, President, Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Karachi, said that the new import policy had not only retained its liberal tone to ensure the regular supply of industrial raw material and consumer goods at reasonable prices, but had also strengthened the role of private enterprise. In this connection, he particularly welcomed the permission given to private sector to import sugar, non-nitrogenous fertilizers and transport equipment.

Mr Janoo said that the introduction of negative/restrictive list system was, indeed, a "significant change" in the format of import policy and hoped that this would help remove the existing complications in the import trade through a "rationalized and simplified procedure."

The Chamber President emphasised that the removal of quantitative restriction from 17 consumer items including tea, coffee, stationary, dates, vegetables, betel leaves and betel nuts etc. and placing their import under "Free List" would encourage healthy competition among the importers and eliminate the monopolistic trend.

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RETURNING WORKERS: CONSEQUENCES EXAMINED

Karachi DAWN in English 5 Jul 83 pp 7, 10

[Text]

With the 'advent of the 1980s emigration from Pakistan to the Middle East had already started to decline in the face of stiff competition from better disciplined Koreans and lesser paid Indians and Bangladeshis and with the commissioning of projects commenced a decade ago. Further, in countries like Kuwait where the local population has been reduced to 45 per cent of the total, in Bahrain where it is only one-third and in the U.A.E. where it is a mere 24 per cent, Governments actively pursue policies of localisation and as more and more qualified local technocrats, skilled workmen and labour trained by local institutions becomes available, the number of immigrants declines.

To anyone who looked upon remittances as a permanent, ever-increasing feature of the country's economy and thought that the Middle East bonanza was for ever, events of the last year should be a sobering reminder of the ephemeral nature of economic stability. International recession, chaos in OPEC, the downward slide in oil prices and the dwindling oil revenues have all made a review of national plans and priorities inevitable. The OPEC balance of payments surplus which stood at \$115 billion in 1980 has already evaporated and its weaker members suffered a trade deficit of \$30 billion in 1982. Kuwait, Libya and Nigeria have already slashed development outlays and many major projects, in the Middle East, which were at the drawing board stage, have been abandoned.

Fluctuating fortunes have forced even petro-giants like Saudi Arabia to revise their development plans.

These obfuscating adversities of the oil market have resurfaced in other spheres. Crash of foreign exchange companies leaving a flotsam of bank drafts in the market resulted in a loss of Rs.120 million to the Pakistani workers alone. Kuwaitis, who had not witnessed a single bankruptcy in their country for decades, were stunned by the collapse some time ago of their stock exchange, which left post-dated cheques worth millions of Kuwaiti dinars drifting unhonoured on the market.

Plans being revised

In this bleak economic situation it is obvious that the Pakistanis in Middle East will be returning home sooner than expected and the already decreased rate of increase in home remittance is an early indicator of what lies ahead. Coupled with this certainty is also the possibility that faced with unemployment and xenophobic reassertion by the locals, a sizable proportion of the Pakistani workers in Europe and North America may also have to start looking homewards. In spite of these foreseeable prospects, the Government has done little advance planning and preparation to meet the contingency of waves of job-seeking expatriates returning home. In the absence of specific plans prepared with care and imagination, as emigration from Pakistan slows down and then reverses in the coming years, the economy will not be able to withstand the dual pressure of rising unemployment and diminishing foreign exchange earnings.

Being a developing country, it is incongruous for Pakistan to think

of development in the absence of the required expertise and skilled manpower. The mass exodus of skilled workers and technocrats has inevitably weakened the foundations upon which an industrial infrastructure could be raised and is a major cause of decline in home production. The country is caught in a vicious circle. The negative trade balance, the huge deficit current account balance, unemployment and the pressure on the balance of payments — all dictate that emigration from Pakistan be allowed to earn additional foreign exchange, to keep this remittance economy afloat and to check mass discontent.

This export prevents development, reduces home production, augments unemployment, widens the trade gap, increases the current account deficit and puts even more pressure on the balance of payments, to which answer is found through an even larger export of manpower. The solution perhaps lies in an extensive programme to vocationally train the local workers in sufficient numbers to fill the gap at home. The resulting expansion in the industrial sector will help ease the economic situation and provide much needed jobs to the returnees. The fourteen training centres opened by the Overseas Pakistanis Foundation for this purpose by the end of 1982, though a step in the right direction, falls a long way short of the actual need.

Investment

But manpower alone is not sufficient; economic development without capital formation and investment remains an elusive goal. It is here that remittances can be prodded and cajoled into service. At present, though ostensibly a huge amount of foreign exchange is flowing into the country it has done little to change the domestic situation. Nearly 62 to 63 per cent of it is meretriciously wasted on consumer goods while hardly 12 to 14 per cent finds its way into productive channels. Price hike and inflation have been the natural results. While long queues of returning Pakistanis at the customs' counters, overloaded with hi-fi sets, VCRs and so forth and the overstocked local radio-electronic shops provide telling examples of this new brand of consumerism, thousands of vacant flats in the steel and concrete monstrosities

erected all over Karachi are a testament to wasteful property speculation.

On the societal level, an unhealthy competition has been created because the possession of modern gadgets and other goodies of life has become the yardstick of social standing. Effective government action to channel this great source, which will soon dry up, for the long-term benefits of the emigrant in particular and the nation in general can supply much needed capital while at the same time reducing the socio-economic problems and tensions.

The bulk of the remittances, though huge in sum-total, reach home in small fractions and are disbursed over a large number of families, and as such they are not an easy source to capture or redirect. To secure these, well publicised voluntary investment programmes are needed. Another alternative may be to compulsorily deduct and invest a fixed percentage of the remittances. Either way the Government will be helping the emigrant create capital which he will be able to productively utilise on his return and which till such time can be used to augment the country's resources and in the process yield good dividend incomes for the remitter or his dependents back home.

Overseas Pakistanis ought to be encouraged to buy stock to buoy local industry which, if in a healthy state, can absorb a large number of the returnees. The Small Industries Corporations ought to be asked to chalk out plans for setting up profit-sharing business schemes and development projects in which the emigrant's money is utilised as that of a small entrepreneur. Such projects, if spread all over the country, will reduce economic disparities, create employment and ensure a decent living for those returning home. Investment of the emigrant's money in projects on the pattern and style of Fauji Foundation can also prove to be of great advantage.

Major obstacle

Yet another mode may be the establishment of private investment companies in regions from where Pakistani workers have gone abroad in large numbers. The successful collection of Rs.3 million in one month by a team of the Na-

tional Savings Centre on a visit to the Middle East last year shows that a major obstacle to such investment is the lack of knowledge about the avenues available for the purpose. The emigrant, however, will not be in a position to make a precise assessment of the stock available on the market or the productivity of different investment schemes floated by the Government. An investment advisory agency, rendering free advice through correspondence and periodic visits to the Middle East and other centres of Pakistani concentrations may go a long way in bolstering the confidence of the expatriate workers and can be instrumental in bringing about a healthy change in the spending pattern.

One can conveniently brand the spending pattern of the overseas Pakistani as sheer prodigality, but a study of the problem reveals that he is not a compulsive buyer of consumer goods. Part of the explanation lies, of course, in the deprivation one has suffered in the past and the way one's position in the social echelon of this country is directly related to the possession of worldly goods. But what cannot be ignored is the official apathy towards launching any meaningful programme for the economic education of this important group. Planned action and not inertia is

the need of the day if this valuable source of foreign exchange is to be harnessed into productive undertakings.

In 1982, a survey conducted in collaboration with the United Nations showed that 40 per cent of the Pakistanis returning home are unemployed. At present the total number of returnees is a mere drop compared to the trickle which will soon follow and the tide which is not too far away. If we are not in a position to accommodate 40 per cent of this drop, what, then, would be the situation like when the tide is upon us? Unless a variety of investment and industrial schemes are put into operation well in time and these are able to ingest the returning millions, the great deluge of home-bound emigrants will definitely submerge us.

As it is, adjustment to a drastically trimmed down spending pattern, a sudden change in life style, the decrease in wages, the prospect of a lower standard of living — all these will cause enough frustrations among the returnees, without unemployment being added to the cauldron. But non-planning at the moment will definitely result in mass unemployment in the near future which, coupled with dwindled foreign exchange earnings, is bound to cause widespread economic distress, social unrest and disorder.

CSO: 4600/764

MRD WRITES TO ASGHAR KHAN

Karachi DAWN in English 5 Jul 83 p 9

[Text]

FAILSALABAD, July 4: Tehrik-i-Istiqlal will participate in the observance of Black Day on July 5 but will not be a party to the civil disobedience movement initiated by the M.R.D. commencing Aug 14, this was stated by Malik Hamid Sarfaraz, President, of the defunct Tehrik-e-Istiqlal Punjab.

He reiterated that although the Tehrik was keen to take active part in all movements aiming at restoration of democracy, the decision about taking part in the civil disobedience movement would be arrived at after a meeting of the General Working Committee after the Eid.

He contended that since no representative of the Tehrik was present in the MRD meeting which decided about the disobedience movement, it was not committed to participate in it.

He further stated that Khawaja Khairuddin had delivered him a letter addressed to Air Marshal

(Retd) Asghar Khan through Punjab MRD Secretary Rao Rashid which would be delivered to Mr. Asghar Khan within the next couple of days.

Similar letters, he said, have been addressed to Miss Benazir Bhutto and Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan inviting them to join the movement.

He further stated that the Tehrik would observe July 5 as Black Day on the appeal of MRD.

He said the national problems of Pakistan could not be solved through "a so-called LFO and that in the face of the 1973 constitution no such framework was needed.

The need of the hour is immediate withdrawal of the martial law, holding of general elections, restoration of the 1973 Constitution and release of political detainees failing which condition would deteriorate further, he added.

CSO: 4600/764

BALUCHISTAN'S AGRICULTURAL POTENTIAL DISCUSSED

Karachi DAWN in English 7 Jul 83 p 10

[Article by Laila A. Ali]

[Text] STRETCHING across a vast expanse of western Pakistan and eastern Iran, strategically located province of Baluchistan, commands a total cultivable land of about 16.79 million acres and more than 900 miles of the Arabian Sea coastline, inclusive of the northern shores of the Straits of Hormuz only less than 350 miles away from the Soviet controlled Afghanistan.

Ninety per cent of Japan's oil supplies and 80 pc of Europe's have to pass through the Straits of Hormuz on their way out of the Gulf. In terms of Asia, the Middle East and southern Europe, Pakistan's biggest province of Baluchistan is a very important flank — an impatient giant, wanting to be developed to play its destined role for the country's security, sovereignty, prosperity and stability.

The government has chalked out a strategy for Baluchistan's speedy development, with main emphasis on agriculture. At present, 85 pc of the population lives on agriculture; 65 pc of the total labour force derives its livelihood from agriculture and 56 pc of the Gross Domestic Product is contributed directly by the agriculture sector in Baluchistan.

Cultivable land

Out of total cultivable land of 16.79 million acres only about 3.4 million acres (20 pc) is under cultivation. Of this, 1.3 million acres are irrigated and 2.1 million acres non-irrigated. Details of the area under each year are as follows:

Crops 968,000 acres; Orchards 83,000 acres; Vegetables 43,900 acres (Total 1,094,900 acres).

During the 6th Five-Year Plan period, the area under various crops would be increased from 1.094 million acres to 1.344 million acres under provincial development strategy. It will ensure an increase of 0.250 million acres (23 pc) through extensive and intensive cultivation.

Similarly, the area under the orchards would be increased from the present 83,000 acres to 97,000 acres. The production of fruit would be raised from 3 lakh tons to 3.66 lakh tons during the 6th Plan period. A fruit development project is already under execution with UNDP/FAO assistance at a cost of Rs.35.27 million. Research on production of high density plants of apple, cherries, plums, peas and peaches suitable for climatic conditions in the uplands of Baluchistan is also in progress.

Under FAO programme, several model nurseries have been set up to serve as the sources of improved plant materials, such as rootstocks of apple, pear, peach, plum and other fruit for the commercial fruit growers.

As a result of government's efforts, the average income of a fruit-grower now ranges between Rs 40,000 to Rs 50,000 per acre,

which is perhaps the highest in the country. Steps are also under way to increase the per acre production and quality of the deciduous fruits.

Similarly, the area under vegetables will be increased from the present 44,000 acres to 61,000 acres during the coming Plan period. During the same period, vegetable production would go up from the present 1,64,000 tonnes to 2,74,000 tonnes.

The following two-point development strategy has been worked out to achieve the objectives:

1. Increase the sources of irrigation water through installation of new tubewells in the selected valleys where underground water survey has already been completed; construction of flood dams; widening of Pat feeder canal and implementation of other small irrigation projects would also be undertaken.

2. The inputs, i.e. improved seed, fertiliser and plant protection coverage, will be made available on a large scale.

Japan has already completed the feasibility study on the widening of the Pat feeder canal to take a designed discharge of 67,000 cusecs. Costing about Rs.754 million, including foreign exchange component of Rs.65 million, the project will provide drinking water for a population of 0.275 million persons, besides irrigation facilities for an additional area of 0.25 million hectares in the Pat feeder area. The project will be executed by a Japanese firm.

Similarly, Mirani dam across Dasht River, about 48 kms from Furbat in Mekran Division is designed to irrigate nearly 12,545 hectares through a lined main canal and two branch canals. Costing over Rs.542 million including foreign exchange component of Rs.34 million, the project would increase agricultural productivity from 2,725 tonnes to 23,850 tonnes in the coastal areas of Pakistan. For want of a dam, crops are now harvested only once in two to three

years. Besides augmenting agriculture, assured water supplies for drinking and commercial purposes, the project would provide a firm base for future development of the Mekran coast.

Special plan

Under special development plan for Baluchistan financed by the Federal Government with credits and assistance from the Kuwait Fund, IDA loan, co-financing of West Germany and the Netherlands aid, 68 minor irrigation and agricultural development projects are under execution at a cost of Rs.522 million to bring under plough an additional area of 2,79,000 acres of land in Baluchistan.

In the agriculture sector, other schemes to be executed during the 6th Plan period include increase in yields and cropping intensities, distribution of good seed and fertilisers, display of better farm management techniques and construction of roads from farms to markets. Rural development shall be the keynote in the Sixth Five-Year Plan in Baluchistan.

Measures would also be adopted to make cooperative movement more effective. The existing extension services, mechanised cultivation, marketing research and training institutions would be strengthened to make Baluchistan self-sufficient in its foodgrains requirements. At present, the food deficit is met by the Federal Government through wheat and sugar quotas from food surplus provinces of the Punjab, Sind and the NWFP.

In the past, vested interests did not let the agriculture go beyond its primitive stage. Ploughing with donkeys, camels, horses and bullocks with old implements was a common sight in the past. Now bulldozers, tractors and graders are visible on the farms and fields. The peasantry is now rising as a progressive society to turn this land of naked hills into Pakistan's fruit and food basket of the future.

BRIEFS

MUSLIM LEAGUE AZAN CALLS--MULTAN, June 30--In pursuance of the fresh instructions issued by Pir Pagaro, the leader of defunct Pakistan Muslim League, all the branches of the party have reportedly decided to intensity the campaign of reciting Azan. In a circular issued by the defunct Punjab Muslim League to party workers, they have been advised to recite Azan on the nights between Thursdays and Fridays in mosques and important places including buildings and crossings of roads and streets "in order to get rid of the evils in the country" during the night hours. Azans should also be recited at all public places and thoroughfares three times forenoon hours before the Juma congregations on every Friday and prayers offered to get rid of all problems faced by the people. [Karachi DAWN in English 1 Jul 83 p 7]

JUP OPPOSES PROPOSED FRAMEWORK--Maulana Shah Ahmad Noorani, President of the defunct Jamiat Ulema-i-Pakistan (JUP), has said Pakistan came into being on the basis of one-man-one-vote, and this democratic principle alone would guarantee the national security and integrity. Speaking at an Iftar party held in the Lines Area under the auspices of Tehrik-i-Nizam-i-Mustafa, he said if Nizam-i-Mustafa was in force, the bureaucrats would have been moving in the countryside solving the problems of people on the spot and dealing with anti-social elements. Maulana Noorani said it did not behove the powers-that-be to give to the nation a new political framework. But, if at all it was so necessary, the better course for them would be to face the bar of public opinion as a politician and public representative. Shah Faridul Haq, the defunct party's Deputy Secretary-General, in his speech wondered why the persons whom the Hamoodur Rehman Commission had held responsible for the East Pakistan debacle were not being exposed. [Karachi DAWN in English 2 Jul 83 p 6]

JUI SPLIT: REPORT DENIED--Qari Sher Afzal, Information Secretary, defunct JUI, Sind Thursday denied press reports that Maulana Siraj Ahmed Dinpuri Chief of the Party and Maulana Mohammad Shah Amroti, additional secretary general, JUI and Amir of Sind, were forming a new group in the party, and leaving the MRD. In a statement, he also denied that the group led by Maulana Fazlur Rehman was leaving JUI. Qari Sher Afzal said, "we have full confidence in Maulana Fazlur Rehman. We shall abide by the decision of the conciliatory committee of JUI to suspend all activities of the party in MRD till August one". The JUI leader said "we have full confidence in the committee and we hope that Maulana Obaidullah Anwar and others will extend full cooperation in the conciliatory efforts. If both the groups in JUI unite it will be a source

of additional strength for the MRD", he added. Qari Sher Afzal said his party had a long background of taking active part in movements for restoration of democracy, civil liberties and enforcement of Islamic system. In future, the JUI will always remain in the forefront, he said. [Karachi DAWN in English 2 Jul 83 p 6]

PER CAPITA INCOME UP--The per capita income has increased, over the years, from 2.4 per cent in 1980-81 to 3.6 per cent in 1982-83, it was officially stated in Karachi. According to officials, the per capita income has been calculated after correcting for the erosion of purchasing power of the rupee because of increased prices over the years. The per capita income of Pakistan, according to official estimates, amounted Rs. 4, 176 in 1982-83. [Karachi DAWN in English 2 Jul 83 p 6]

GHAFOOR ON UNCERTAINTY, INSECURITY--Prof. Ghafoor Ahmad, Naib Amir of the defunct Jamaat-i-Islami, called on Friday for "immediate remedial measures," to end, what he said, the state of uncertainty and insecurity in the country. Speaking at an Iftar party in city's Yusuf Plaza he regretted that bureaucracy had not taken lesson from the "excesses" of the previous regime. He said that law and order situation had "deteriorated progressively," while the common man was groaning under the "dead weight of price spiral." In addition, he pointed out, the void in the country's body-politic was continuing unfilled. In absence of democratic process, the accountability of bureaucracy and other related agencies was conspicuous by its absence, with the result that the people's day-to-day problems kept on going by default. Prof. Ghafoor maintained that such a state of affairs should not go unchecked. And, the only solution was the creation of conditions conducive to transfer of power to the people's elected representatives, he emphasised. [Karachi DAWN in English 2 Jul 83 p 10]

PIG IRON, FERTILIZER EXPORTS--BEIJING, July 7--Pakistan is entering vast Chinese market of increasing potentialities with another two items, pig iron and chemical fertilisers. So far, its only substantial export to China has been raw cotton. China Chemicals Import Corporation contracted last week to purchase 50,000 tonnes of urea fertiliser manufactured in Pakistan. The deal approximated US dollar seven million. Negotiations are believed to be proceeding for purchase of another 35,000 tonnes of urea from the same source. Suppliers, an American company, undertook to ship urea fertiliser manufactured at Fauji Fertiliser Company plant at Sadiqabad. Similarly, China recently contracted to import 100,000 tonnes of pig iron from Pakistan. Both purchases were to be made on cash payment through "middlemen" in the private sector. Pakistan's export earnings from the People's Republic of China on account of raw cotton last year were of about US dollars 120 million. [Karachi DAWN in English 8 Jul 83 p 18]

MOVE FOR NEW PARTY--MULTAN, July 6--Former Member of National Assembly, Mr Ahmad Raza Kasuri, has said majority of people in Pakistan are totally against the idea of creating disturbances in the country which is already facing various types of problems. Talking to newsmen here, he said the people have no interest in the MRD. Replying to a question, he said he was reviewing the prevailing situation and has started a meet-the-people campaign from Multan.

He added that after completing this campaign in other towns of country he will have consultations with his friends to call a convention in August or September to decide the political future and to form a political party of his own or to make a alliance with any of the existing parties. [Karachi DAWN in English 7 Jul 83 p 9]

JI LEADERSHIP CRITICIZED--LAHORE, July 6--Mr Haider Farooq Maudoodi has said his differences with the present leadership of Jamaat-i-Islami are "based on the fact that they (JI leaders) have deviated from the thoughts of Maulana Syed Abul A'la Maudoodi". In a statement here today, he said he had no differences of personal nature either with the leaders or any workers of the defunct Jamaat. He said that to improve the relations between him and the Jamaat leaders he made three demands: In view of the present political cirsis and in the wider interest of the country the Jamaat should revise its policies so as to restore its dignity. The Jamaat should present the details of its assets and sources of income before and after the inclusion of Chaudhry Rehmat Elahi, Prof. Khurshid Ahmad and Maulana Khalil Hamdi in the Jamaat leadership, and--the report of committee headed by Khurram Jah Murad should be published. Besides, complete accounts of funds collected in the name of Afghan Mujahideen and claimed to have been spent should be made public for scrutiny. [Karachi DAWN in English 7 Jul 83 p 10]

HAMOOD REPORT: PUBLICATION URGED--Mr A. Razique Khan, President, National Repatriation Committee, has urged the President to publish Hamoodur Rahman Commission report and punish the persons responsible for breaking up Pakistan and killing of half a million non-Bengali Pakistanis and destruction of their properties worth millions. He said in a Press statement that Bangladesh came into being due to foreign intervention and internal conspiracy. He recalled that when Army action was started on March 25, 1971, except for Shaikh Mujib none was arrested and the other Awami League leaders took shelter in India which exploited them against Pakistan. "People of Pakistan are desirous to know the secret hands who broke our country," he said. Mr Razique Khan also asked the Government to repatriate the 300,000 stranded Pakistanis in Bangladesh. "It is their legal and religious right and their citizenship cannot be ceased by any canon of International law," he maintained. [Karachi DAWN in English 8 Jul 83 p 18]

PROPOSED POLITICAL ORDER BACKED--The Chief Organiser of the defunct Pakistan Muslim League (Qayyum Group), Syed Baqir Ali Shah Gilani, has said that his party would support the 'political framework' provided it further strengthened the 1973 Constitution and promised complete enforcement of Nizam-i-Mustafa in the country. In a press statement, he advised the political parties to refrain from criticising the proposed political framework in advance. He also said his party was opposed to the policy of confrontation and advised politicians to enter into a dialogue with the Government for the settlement of all the controversial issues. He said his party was in favour of a constitutional role for the armed forces which, in the form of a 'Supreme Council', could save the country from the frequency imposition of Martial Law, the Press release added. [Karachi DAWN in English 8 Jul 83 p 18]

MKP ON LOCAL ELECTIONS--The defconct Mazdoor Kissan Party (MKP) has decided not to participate in the scheduled local bodies elections later this year. This was announced by Mr. Fatehyab Ali Khan, President of the defunct MKP, while talking informally with the newsmen at his residence on Thursday. He claimed that MRD's 'Protest Day' in NWFP was successful and the Provincial administration did not allow passenger buses from other parts of the province to reach Peshawar. [Karachi DAWN in English 8 Jul 83 p 18]

LABOR POLICY AFTER 14 AUGUST--ISLAMABAD, July 10--The Federal Labour Minister Ghulam Dastgir Khan today said labour policy will be made public shortly after the announcement of proposed political system in the country. Labour policy, he said, will be designed in consultation with the contents of the political system promised to be announced on August 14 next. The Minister told 'Dawn' he had contacted all prominent labour leaders and employers separately to include their standpoint in future labour policy. The labour policy, he said, was delayed because of some sensitive points which, he said, require time and concentration. The proposals and various conflicting views he received from all over the country will be re-examined by his Ministry before formulating a detailed report, the Minister said. Mr. Ghulam Dastgir said he was not going to convene any meeting of labour leaders or employers to discuss the recommendations. He hoped the proposed labour policy will benefit labour and employers both without harming the interest of either of them. [Karachi DAWN in English 11 Jul 83 p 8]

BIOLOGIST GETS US GRANT--LAHORE, July 10--The Board of Science and Technology for Rural Development of the United States National Academy of Sciences, has awarded a grant worth US 100,874 dollars to Dr Kausar A Malik of Nuclear Institute of Agricultural Biology Faisalabad. The award has been granted in recognition of the work on biological nitrogen fixation in grasses growing in saline environment. Earlier, Dr Malik and his group had discovered biological nitrogen fixation in the roots of culler grass, a plant which is used to reclaim saline lands. He had isolated the N-2 fixing bacteria from the roots of this plant. The grant will help to further understand this phenomenon and use the information for introducing biological nitrogen fixation in wheat, rice and maize etc. This product can greatly reduce the dependance on chemical fertilizer. Dr Malik is the first biologist to receive such a grant from US National Academy for Sciences. [Karachi DAWN in English 11 Jul 83 p 8]

CSO: 4600/776

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